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Abstract 
This study surveys the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 20th century to the Islamic Republic, 
focused on the impact of Chinese politics on the Iranian left. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
traditional ties were replaced by new colonial networks of transportation and communication throughout 
Asia. News of the Iranian constitutional revolution quickly reached China and was debated by 
constitutionalists and colonialists in the pages of Shanghai-based newspapers. Competition and 
cooperation between Iran and the Republic of China emerged at the League of Nations in the 1920s and 
1930s. Parallel to these ties, a robust, informal network emerged between the Tudeh Party, Iran’s pre-
eminent Communist organization, and the Chinese Communist Party after 1949. The success of the 
Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 helped inspire a more radical, internationalist approach to politics 
in Iran. Iranian youth increasingly saw themselves as part of a global community of oppressed nations. 
Many on the left, both secular and Islamic, studied Chinese texts and drew on Maoist theories to analyze 
Iran and international politics. China directly participated in and encouraged these developments, first by 
public support for the Tudeh Party, and later with clandestine support for an explicitly Maoist splinter 
group, the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party. 
This approach fills a gap in the existing scholarship of Sino-Iranian relations, which concentrates on elite 
interactions post-1979, by pushing back the timeline and foregrounding a set of unofficial connections 
typically relegated to margins of the historiography. It also emphasizes the global origins of the Iranian 
revolution and the international context in which it developed. The tangled relationship between the 
Chinese state, the Iranian state, and the Iranian opposition reveals a complex and sometimes 
controversial historical reality that is often glossed over by modern narratives of perpetual friendship and 
mutual co-operation. It rests on an analysis of primary sources in Mandarin and Persian, including 
Chinese media outlets, published interviews and travelogues from Iranians who went to China, Persian 
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CHINA AND THE IRANIAN LEFT:  
TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL 
 EXCHANGE, 1905 – 1979 
William Figueroa 
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet 
This study surveys the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 20th century 
to the Islamic Republic, focused on the impact of Chinese politics on the Iranian left. At 
the beginning of the 20th century, traditional ties were replaced by new colonial networks 
of transportation and communication throughout Asia. News of the Iranian constitutional 
revolution quickly reached China and was debated by constitutionalists and colonialists 
in the pages of Shanghai-based newspapers. Competition and cooperation between Iran 
and the Republic of China emerged at the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Parallel to these ties, a robust, informal network emerged between the Tudeh Party, Iran’s 
pre-eminent Communist organization, and the Chinese Communist Party after 1949. The 
success of the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 helped inspire a more radical, 
internationalist approach to politics in Iran. Iranian youth increasingly saw themselves as 
part of a global community of oppressed nations. Many on the left, both secular and 
Islamic, studied Chinese texts and drew on Maoist theories to analyze Iran and 
international politics. China directly participated in and encouraged these developments, 
first by public support for the Tudeh Party, and later with clandestine support for an 
explicitly Maoist splinter group, the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party. 
 
This approach fills a gap in the existing scholarship of Sino-Iranian relations, 
which concentrates on elite interactions post-1979, by pushing back the timeline and 
foregrounding a set of unofficial connections typically relegated to margins of the 
historiography. It also emphasizes the global origins of the Iranian revolution and the 
international context in which it developed. The tangled relationship between the Chinese 
state, the Iranian state, and the Iranian opposition reveals a complex and sometimes 
controversial historical reality that is often glossed over by modern narratives of 
perpetual friendship and mutual co-operation. It rests on an analysis of primary sources in 
Mandarin and Persian, including Chinese media outlets, published interviews and 
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In the spring of 1910, Chinese constitutionalist Wang Jingwei (1883-1944) 
wrote effusively of the lessons he had personally derived from the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution: “it was the zeal for freedom, equality, and fraternity that 
aroused the fighting will of the Iranian Constitutionalists, and made them fearless...”1 
Nearly 40 years later, Mehdi Farrokh (1886-1973) witnessed the Communist victory 
from the Iranian embassy to the Republic of China (ROC) in Nanjing, an event he saw 
as a threat to international peace and a harbinger of what could happen in Iran. In stark 
contrast, Reza Radmanesh (1905-1983), one of Iran's most prominent communist 
politicians, stood before the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1956 and hailed the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution as a 
victory for all humanity. A decade later, young Iranian students like Kurosh Lasha’i 
(1938-2002) and Mohsen Rezvani (1935-) traveled to China for political, ideological, 
and military training and subsequently tried (and failed) to launch an armed 
insurrection in the Kurdish countryside. Long before the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and Iran established formal relations in 1971, official and unofficial contacts 
between them were flourishing. In what context did they emerge? What representations 
of China emerged from these moments of interaction, and what can they tell us about 
the formation of modern political and social identities in both countries? In short, what 
did Iranian intellectuals see when they looked towards China, and vice versa?  
 
1 Wang, Yidan. “The Iranian Constitutional Revolution as Reported in the Chinese Press”, Iran's 
Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections. Eds 




A steady stream of literature chronicling the relationship between China and 
Iran has surged in recent decades. The majority of these studies have focused on either 
ancient history or the politics of modern Sino-Iranian relations, usually from a political 
science perspective. Scholars have comparatively neglected the intervening years 
between the very ancient and the very modern. The few analyses that do cover events 
before 1971 are either outdated or cursory, sometimes both. These studies tend to focus 
on diplomatic relations and questions of policy. They typically deal with themes such 
as oil politics, economic relations, military cooperation, and the perceived challenge 
posed by Chinese support for the Islamic Republic to U.S. interests.2  
This dissertation intervenes in the small but growing discourse on Iran-China 
relations by shifting focus to social history. It analyzes official ties, visits, and 
connections, alongside a parallel trajectory of relations far less covered and documented 
in conventional literature, between certain trends among the Iranian militant left and 
China at the height of the Cold War. These events are situated in a longue durée history 
of Sino-Iranian relations covering political, economic, and ideological ties between 
China and Iran from the beginning of the 20th century. Drawing on various historical 
and social science approaches and utilizing Chinese and Iranian primary sources, 
including newspapers, oral interviews, memoirs, and travelogues, it outlines a narrative 
of Sino-Iranian interactions from the early 20th century to the beginning of the Islamic 
 
2 For just some examples see: Kumaraswamy, P.R: China and the Middle East – The Quest for Influence 
(1999); Kemp, Geoffrey. The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle 
East. (2012); Green, Nile. “From the Silk Road to the Railroad (and Back): The Means and Meanings of 
the Iranian Encounter with China”, Iranian Studies, vol. 48, no. 2, 2013, pp. 165-192; Garver, John W. 
China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World. (2006); Azad, Shirzad. Iran and China: A New 




Republic. It fills a gap in the literature by providing a much-needed narrative and 
analysis of the historical development of modern ties between China and Iran. This 
approach foregrounds a set of relations that until now was considered mainly 
background to the larger drama of Sino-Iranian state-to-state interactions.  
This study stands out as a first attempt to move Sino-Iranian studies beyond 
questions of high diplomacy to the dissenting discourses of disenfranchised social 
classes. Traditionally, the professional study of diplomatic relations has taken a state-
centric approach that privileges professional diplomacy, military interactions, and high 
politics. 3 Social, economic, humanitarian, and cultural connections were given low 
priority. This dissertation conceptualizes diplomacy as something beyond “state-to-state 
activity, monopolized by professional, official diplomats.” While not a work of 
diplomatic history, this analysis integrates the lessons of those debates by analyzing both 
official and unofficial connections in tandem. It frames Sino-Iranian relations not only as 
state-to-state interactions post-1971, but also as an expansive set of cultural and social 
interactions between the two societies throughout the 20th century. It sketches a narrative 
of Sino-Iranian interaction that focuses on identity and the socio-political impact of 
highly politicized connections between elite and educated Iranians and Chinese citizens. 
Through closely examining previously unused or underused sources, it 
demonstrates that by the early 20th century, Iranian and Chinese intellectuals were 
indirectly connected by the Pan-Asian constitutional movement. New technologies 
allowed for the rapid exchange of information and led to an interest in each other's 
 
3 Murray, Stuart. “Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy.” International 




recent events and historical experiences. Unofficial connections between the communist 
Tudeh Party of Iran (Tudeh) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began in the early 
1950s. Through this exchange, Maoism, or at least a Maoist-style student radicalism, for 
a brief moment became the dominant ideological position of leftist Iranian student 
activists in Europe and the United States in the late 1960s. The international conflict 
between Soviet and Chinese Marxism left an unmistakable mark on the rhetoric, 
ideology, and tactics of opposition groups of all stripes, both inside Iran and abroad. 
Three major book-length studies have focused explicitly on China and Iran. John 
Garver’s China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World is the most useful 
and comprehensive, but it is almost entirely focused on state-to-state interactions post-
1971. A.H.H Abidi’s 1981 study China and the Persian Gulf does contain one chapter 
that sketches relations from the 1920s to the 1970s, but it is also focused on official 
interactions and does not make use of Chinese sources. Shirzad Azad’s book Iran and 
China: A New Approach to Their Bilateral Relations breaks the mold somewhat by 
looking at press coverage and popular reactions to growing Sino-Iranian ties in Iran, but 
primarily over the last thirty years. None of the previous studies have seriously examined 
the period before the thawing of relations between the PRC and Pahlavi Iran, nor have 
they taken a close look at the unofficial connections that started during the Constitutional 
period and flourished in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 Unofficial connections came to bear on official relations, as Chinese support for 
Iranian revolutionaries played a role in altering the Iranian government’s approach to 




this study to engage with the intellectual history of both Leftist and Islamist politics. 
The international ideological disputes between Mao and Khrushchev over Stalin's 
legacy and the future of Socialism played a vital role in radicalizing young Iranian 
activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many on the left, both secular and Islamic, 
studied Chinese texts and drew on Maoist theories to analyze Iran and devise new 
strategies to overthrow the Iranian monarchy. By the 1970s, both Communist activists 
and Islamist guerrillas began to engage with Maoist, Cuban, and Vietnamese politics. 
While some rejected these trends, others went so far as to endorse “Mao Zedong 
Thought” as their guiding principle. These dissidents were an integral part of a global 
shift towards radical politics among students and a wave of worldwide student protests 
in the late 1960s, sometimes called “global 1968.” 
 The combination of “official” diplomatic with “unofficial” social and cultural 
connections offers a few immediate scholarly advantages. First, this approach 
emphasizes the global origins of the Iranian revolution and the international context in 
which it developed. Traditional studies of modern Iranian history primarily focus on 
domestic factors, but more recent studies have taken a more transnational approach.4 By 
focusing on the international rather than domestic factors that impacted the Iranian 
opposition, the revolution is demonstrated to be an intensely global affair, with centers 
of gravity from Berkeley to Beijing.  
Second, it intervenes in the literature on Sino-Middle East and Chinese foreign 
 
4 For a traditional account, Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran Between Two Revolutions. (1983) and Keddie, Nikki. 
Roots of Revolution (1981). For more transnational studies, see Matin-Asgari, Afshin. Both Eastern and 
Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity (2018) and Alvandi, Roham: Nixon, Kissinger, and 




policy, which lacks substantive analysis of Sino-Iranian relations from a historical 
perspective. The focus on social and cultural exchange allows us to ask new questions 
about the period before official contacts existed. What sorts of interactions persisted in 
the absence of state-to-state diplomacy? How did those interactions shape the image of 
China in the Iranian press and vice versa? How did those perceptions influence official 
and unofficial relations? Finally, it allows Iran and the Middle East to be integrated into 
the growing literature on Maoism as a global phenomenon.5 Despite its influence on the 
international student movement, the literature is mostly silent on Iranian Maoism. 
A brief word about sources: one of the reasons that no study has yet examined 
Sino-Iranian interactions from a social history perspective is the difficulty in accessing 
sources. The best materials on official interactions are in the diplomatic archives of 
either country. However, both Iranian and Chinese government archives are notoriously 
impenetrable to foreign researchers, especially in the current political climate. Travel to 
either country for academics is becoming more and more difficult. This record is 
incomplete and biased towards digitized materials; to that end, it has a more 
comprehensive view of the Chinese press, whose largest periodicals are, for the most 
part, digitized and easily searchable. Despite these issues, the evidence strongly 
suggests a rich history of Sino-Iranian interaction throughout the 20th century and 
Iranian media interest in China after the 1950s. 
Representation, Identity, and the Other in Sino-Iranian Relations 
 
5 See Cook, Alexander. Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History, Cambridge University Press (2014) and  




Identity and international relations are intricately linked. Both historians and students of 
diplomacy have made this observation.6  In a dissertation on an exchange of insults 
between Baltic and Russian diplomats in the 1990s, Wynne Russell explores the links 
between diplomacy and identity regarding self-representation and the maintenance of 
social hierarchies. She finds that contrary to what many diplomatic historians expect, 
identities play an important role in international relations: 
Diplomatic exchanges are permeated with debates on the nature or fundamental 
qualities—one might say the identities—of nations, governments, non-state 
actors, or indeed any pertinent actor in the global social arena…The international 
“order” being negotiated through diplomatic exchanges is as much a social order 
as it is the presence of rules or the absence of war.7 
 There is no reason to limit this insight to official diplomatic relations:  Identities 
are affirmed, contested, and negotiated as much through moments of unofficial contact as 
they are during official delegations, if not more so. Moments of mutual interaction and 
representation can be located within a variety of elite and non-elite interactions on either 
side. In these moments, especially when they represent themselves publicly or promote a 
particular social movement, citizens assume a role similar to a diplomatic representative 
and participate in a kind of representation of the self or a broader community, often with 
reference to a foreign “other.”  
 If representation is to be the focus of analysis, it is useful to give a precise 
definition. It is not used strictly in the diplomatic sense, as a diplomat representing a 
 
6 Tsygankov, Andrei P. “Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian 
Civilizational Debates.” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 762-75; Sharp, Paul.  “For 
Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations” International Studies Review Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 33-57 
7 Russel, Wynne Elizabeth. “Identity Diplomacy: A Study in Diplomatic Representation and the Ordering 




nation. Representation is taken more broadly to mean how one nation was related to the 
other by individuals at specific moments of cultural interaction. Using this definition, 
we achieve two goals: first, it allows for popular articles, unofficial diplomacy, 
travelogues, and memoirs as primary sources. As most official sources for Sino-Iranian 
relations remain inaccessible in Iranian and Chinese archives, this is crucial. Second, it 
highlights questions of identity, self-representation, and otherness, as these issues arise 
in both official and unofficial points of interactions.  
Self-representation and representations of the other have been a perennial topic 
in the social sciences since at least the days of Edward Said. Debates within the fields of 
Iranian studies and Chinese studies reflect these concerns. Contestations over identity, 
representation, and the other have formed a crucial part of the development of each 
discipline's overall direction over the last few decades.  
Within Iranian studies, “the West” looms large as the most prominent cultural 
“other” against which modern Iran has defined itself, both within the field and 
historically by Iranian and Western intellectuals. Early writings on Iranian modernity 
tended to juxtapose “traditional” and “modern” in a way that assumed the superiority, 
desirability, and modernity of all things Western. Mehrzhad Boroujerdi explores how 
thinking about Europe and European others was a crucial part of the process of 
“becoming modern” for Iranian intelligentsia and sustained a powerful “nativist” 
discourse in opposition to it.8 Boroujerdi, following Said and Foucault, examines “the 
machinery of representation, of how an other comes to be constituted” and how “the self 
 
8 Boroujerdi, Mehrzhad. “Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism” 




is invariably linked with the other” in European modernity, as an object against which 
one’s self is invariably defined as superior.9  Iranians engaged in that same process in 
their interactions with the West, which led to what Boroujerdi saw as “Orientalism in 
reverse,” a form of self-Orientalizing and self-othering that produced a problematic but 
popular nativist ideology. 
 Through travelogues, Iranians relayed their specific experiences with the West 
and made comparisons to their own society. Mohammad Reza Ghanoonparvar, Monica 
Ringer, and Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi have all demonstrated that travelogues “served 
as the narrative basis for instituting Europe as the cultural other” and functioned as a 
“Persian cultural mirror.”10 Following Ringer, David Motadel argues that “nineteenth-
century travelogues functioned as a vehicle for distinctive constructions of self-other 
dichotomies, and that they reflected Iranian awareness of life and events abroad.”11 
Motadel uses the travel diaries of Naser al-Din Shah (r.1848-1896), written over several 
European tours, to show how the Safarnāma 12 genre “could thereby serve as a unique 
channel for the conceptualization of an Iranian national self-shaping a sense of a 
collective Iranian elite identity.”13 With few exceptions, this body of literature drew 
exclusively on European examples of an “other,” usually French but occasionally 
British or German.  
Other works have begun to question or complicate this conception of Iranian 
 
9 Ibid, 7 
10 Ghanoonparvar, M. R. In a Persian Mirror: Images of the West and Westerners in Iranian Fiction. 
(2010) 
11 Motadel, David. “The German Other: Nasir al-Din Shah's Perceptions of Difference and Gender during 
his Visits to Germany, 1873–89”. Iranian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 563-579, 567-568 
12 “Travelogue” in Persian 




identity and the supremacy of the European cultural other. It is now more common to 
speak of Iranian modernities in the plural rather than a singular modernity, and to 
deconstruct Eurocentric theories of development, modernity, and identity construction.14 
Titles like “Neither Ākhūnd nor Fukulī” and “Both Eastern and Western” reflect the 
underlying drive to complicate the binary “East-West” narrative and see beyond the 
reflection of Europe in the Persian mirror. In these and other works, the field has turned 
away from Europe as the predominant cultural other and affords greater recognition of 
Iran’s engagement with a broader cultural world. For example, Afshin Marashi argues 
that Iran does not fit most European models of national and modern development. 
Instead of formulating identities along the lines of European philosophers like 
Habermas, the formation of a public sphere in Iran “enabled a much larger array of 
cultural possibilities and narrative forms to circulate and contest for hegemony.”15 
Rather than a dichotomy of traditional and modern, Marashi sees “secularized Iranian 
modernist discourse shar[ing] the same public sphere with the Shi'a religio-political 
tradition.”16 
Social science research into Chinese identity has also identified a relationship 
between Chinese modernity and awareness of a Western “other.” However, more recent 
Chinese identity studies have been less concerned with a foreign (European) other and 
more with a domestic (ethnic) other. Chinese identity and ethnicity are notoriously 
 
14 Matin, Kamran. Rezaeiyadi, Hamid. “Neither Ākhūnd nor Fukulī: Munāzirah and the Discourse of 
Iranian Modernity”. Journal of Iranian Studies, Volume 49, 2016 - Issue 5, pp. 855-885; Matin-Asgari, 
Afshin. Both Eastern and Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity. (2018) 
15 Marashi, Afshin. “Paradigms of Iranian Nationalism: History, Theory, and Historiography” in Aghaie, 
Scot Kamran and Afshin Marashi (Eds). Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity, University of 
Texas Press, (2014) p 15 




difficult concepts to define but are inextricably linked. China’s fifty-five official ethnic 
minorities (少数民族/shaoshuminzu) are considered ethnic others within China, in the 
same way that Chinese are typically considered ethnic others by societies outside of 
China. The dominant identity, Han Chinese, is also referred to as a minzu (民族) but has 
a distinctive social status and imagined “big brother-little brother” relationship vis-à-vis 
the others. 17 Thomas Mullany has argued that Han-ness functions analogously to 
White-ness, in that it assimilates other groups and acquires color and characteristics by 
reference to other, usually darker-skinned groups.18   
But for many years, scholars investigating “Chinese identity” and scholars 
investigating “ethnicity in China” were having two different discussions. The discussion 
of Chinese identity was characterized by attempts to delineate the essential features of 
what it means to be Chinese. The dominant “primordialist” (sometimes called 
“accretionary”) approach was mostly interested in ethnic minorities primarily as “soon-
to-be-Hans” that were in the process of assimilation. This propensity to assimilate was 
seen as a distinctive feature of Chinese identity, despite its apparent parallels to the 
“civilizing mission” of European colonialism.19 Meanwhile, ethnic minorities were 
being investigated, primarily by anthropologists, as separate parts of the Chinese 
collective identity. The two fields did not have much to do with one another. Over the 
 
17 This Chinese term is usually translated as “ethnicity”. In the context of the Chinese state's usage, a minzu 
is an officially recognized group of people, usually conceptualized as having specific racial, lineage, 
linguistic, or cultural ties. Affiliation with a minzu can determine access to certain government social 
programs designed to help ethnic minorities. The vast majority of Chinese identify as Han, the dominant 
minzu. 
18 Mullaney, Thomas S. (Ed). Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China's 
Majority. University of California Press, Berkeley (2012) 




last two decades, however, there has been a significant shift in how scholars view the 
relationship between ethnicity and Chinese identity. Instead of a model that considered 
Chinese and non-Chinese identity as two distinct and separate spheres, the two are seen 
as mutually influential and interactive.  
In the early 1990s, a dialogue began between anthropologists who had been 
studying shaoshuminzu and China scholars who had been studying Han identity. One of 
the leading voices advocating a new approach from this group was Dru C. Gladney, 
who specializes in Uyghur Muslim society. Gladney conceptualized minority identity 
and Han identity as being co-dependent rather than competitive. In his view, 
“representations of the 'minority' in China reflects the objectivizing of a 'majority' 
nationality discourse...minority is to majority as female is to male, as 'Third' world is to 
'First,'...The politics of representation in China reveals much about the state's project in 
constructing, in often binary minority/majority terms, an 'imagined' national identity.” 20 
In other words, the dominant Chinese identity was constructed in relation to the way 
non-Han peoples are imagined to behave. Like Mullaney, Gladney borrows from the 
discourse of Critical Race Theory to describe Han as essentially an “opaque” identity 
that only attains “color” in relation to other groups, which are identified as having a 
variety of positive or negative traits based on the self-conception, or attempts to alter the 
self-conception, of the dominant social group. The Chinese state is deeply involved in 
constructing both dominant and minority ethnic identities.21 
 
20 Gladney, Dru. “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring majority/minority identities”. Journal of 
Asian Studies 53(1) (February 1994): pp. 92-123, 70-71 
21 Mullaney, Thomas S. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China. 




While these studies have contributed considerably to our understanding of 
ethnicity and the relationship between Han and minority identity, they typically only 
consider ethnic minorities as a reference point for Chinese identity. There may be 
advantages to considering others beyond the usual minority referents. For example, 
Elena Barabantseva has successfully applied this lens to the overseas Chinese 
community, which functions as a kind of unofficial ethnic minority living abroad. 
Stefan Landsberger has explored depictions of white Europeans in Chinese 
propaganda.22 His approach echoes the study of Safarname and Iranian modernity in 
that it examines the construction of identity through reference to a Western other. 
Comparatively less attention has been paid to the representation of other Asians. 
Both Iranian studies and Chinese studies converge on the need for a more 
thorough exploration of different others.  In the case of Iran, the goal is to move past 
Eurocentric terms of analysis and to examine cultural and social interactions on distinct 
terms. In the case of China, the field has attempted to move beyond a regional or 
national framework and explore how Chinese identity is configured globally. Therefore, 
this dissertation will attempt to read Iranian and Chinese depictions of one another as 
instances of identity construction that involve inter-Asia, rather than East-West 
interactions. 
Towards a New Narrative of Sino-Iranian Relations 
This dissertation is divided into four chapters, organized chronologically. Chapter 
1 will examine the reconstruction of Sino-Iranian relations in the late 19th and early 20th 
 
22 Barabantseva, Elena. Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-Centering Chin (2011); 





centuries, first along the lines of opposition to European colonialism, and then along its 
fault-lines and breakage points. It explores the technological innovations, from trains, to 
steamships, to telegraphs that contributed to the discontinuation and reconstitution of 
Sino-Iranian relations in the 20th century. Chinese interest in the Iranian revolution is 
examined in the context of a global Pan-Asian anti-colonial movement. Chinese elite 
ideas about China were expressed in a new anti-colonial discourse of Sino-Iranian 
solidarity, which imagined a global community of Asian constitutional states. Chinese 
and British elites debated the results and merits of Chinese and Iranian constitutionalism 
in the pages of Shanghai newspapers. As these information networks fell under Chinese 
control, expressions of support for the Iranian constitutional revolution increased 
accordingly.    
Chapter 2 explores the development of semi-official relations between Iran and 
the Republic of China, 1920-1941. These relations are presented as “semi-official” 
because they mainly consisted of ad hoc diplomatic representation and were ultimately 
replaced by official relations with the People’s Republic of China. 23  It will sketch out a 
narrative of relations between Nationalist China and Pahlavi Iran and analyze the factors 
behind Sino-Iranian co-operation and competition at the League of Nations in the 1930s. 
This narrative emphasizes the role of Iranian and Chinese merchant interests in Shanghai, 
especially tea and silk traders. Unofficial commercial interests played a larger role than 
previously thought in driving the establishment of the Sino-Persian Treaty of 1920. As 
Sino-Iranian relations remained primarily confined to mutual admiration and low-level 
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diplomatic ties, this chapter works to recover how Chinese and Iranians represented 
relations with another and how these representations reflected their views about 
themselves. Positive portrayals of Reza Shah as a populist modernizer reflect ideological 
and political affinities between the two nations, which also contributed to the resumption 
of diplomatic ties after 400 years. 
 Chapter 3 surveys the impact of the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 on 
official and unofficial Sino-Iranian relations. A robust network of ideological and social 
exchange existed in the 1950s between Communist China and Iranian Communist 
organizations like the Tudeh Party. From 1949 to 1959, the success of the CCP 
influenced both the Iranian state and opposition groups, creating two competing 
narratives of Chinese history in the Iranian public sphere. For some, China served as a 
dire warning of what could happen if the Iranian left proliferated unfettered, a tragic 
cautionary tale about the dangers of Communism. To others, China promised a bright, 
revolutionary future and provided a model to emulate, an inspiring example of what 
could be achieved through socialist mobilization. The first attitude, embraced by the 
Iranian state and its elite supporters, appeared in the pages of cultural magazines like 
Ettela'at Haftegi and in the writings of diplomats like Mehdi Farrokh, whose memoirs 
have never before been analyzed by scholars. Iranian communists and student activists 
demonstrated the second through official expressions of solidarity and occasional 
participation in Chinese international socialist events.  
 Chapter 4 considers the background, history, and impact of the Iranian 




to construct a general narrative of the Iranian Maoist movement through interviews 
with former members of the Revolutionary Organization. From their base in Britain 
and then later Germany, Iranian students used Maoism to overshadow the traditional 
leadership of the Iranian Left and chart a new, revolutionary path forward that 
embraced armed struggle and the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet split. 
Furthermore, it analyzes the impact of this movement and why China was willing to 
sponsor it. In short, the Chinese gained a valuable source of information about Iran and 
a useful propaganda tool. While Maoism echoed throughout the tactics of the Marxist 
and Muslim opposition and in the cynically borrowed rhetoric of the Iranian state, it 
was ultimately China's equally cynical and sudden support of the Shah that would 
seriously undercut the appeal of Maoism in an Iranian context. In this respect, China's 
attempts to court both the Shah and the Iranian Communist movement reveals an 
adaptive and highly flexible foreign policy that privileges China's strategic interests 
and national prestige above all else. The final section argues that this was a conscious 
effort on the part of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. His efforts to reach out to China 
directly followed an attempt on his life by a student loosely affiliated with the RO, and 






Chapter 1: The Reconstitution of Sino-Iranian Relations, 1905-1925 
 China and Iran have historically been indirectly linked through language, trade, 
and imperial diplomacy. 24  Persian was an important courtly and religious language 
throughout Asia, and it played a minor role in Chinese politics throughout the medieval 
and pre-modern periods. 25 Sogdian merchants, musicians, and performers were 
commonly found at Tang (618-907 CE) courts and are depicted in art.26 During the 
Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 CE), China and Persia were nominally linked by Mongol 
rule, and Persian was one of the official administrative languages. A few Persians held 
important status in China as members of the semuren, an administrative class made up 
of non-Mongol, non-Chinese subjects.27 Ming (1368-1644 CE) scribes continued 
translating proclamations into Persian and maintained tributary relations with Persian-
speaking polities.28 Chinese potters crafted blue and white wares specifically designed 
for the Middle Eastern market, and in Safavid Iran (1501-1736 CE) porcelain was 
highly valued by elites and those with elite pretensions.29 Although official contact was 
rare, there was little distinction on either side between envoys, tributary missions, and 
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independent merchants, all of whom could be seen as representatives of their people.30 
While these ties were comparatively low-level and should not be exaggerated, they 
demonstrate the extent to which early Sino-Iranian relations were the result of pre-
modern networks of political power and economic exchange.  
By the Qing period (1644-1912), connections between Persia and China had 
become even more limited. The use of Persian as an administrative language and the 
popularity of Persian texts among the Chinese Muslim community decreased compared 
to earlier periods.31 This change was partly due to the elevated political importance of 
Turkic languages after the conquest of Xinjiang and other Western territories 
populated by Turkic speaking Muslims in 1755, and in part due to increased links 
between China and the Arab Middle East through networks of European colonialism.32 
By the early 1900s, traditional ties between China and Iran had lost their earlier 
significance. At the same time, new forms of political and intellectual contact emerged 
from a common search for modernity. Once connected by merchant caravans and 
imperial decrees, it was now European steamships, railroads, and newspapers that 
created new opportunities for Sino-Iranian connections. Chinese intellectuals, and later 
Iranian statesmen and dissidents, could now learn about one another and incorporate 
this knowledge into their own political and social identities. Internationalism was at the 
heart of a new discourse that compared China to Iran in political terms, leading to 
significant developments among Iranian leftists in the decades to come. In this way, 
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Sino-Iranian relations were not so much revived in the 20th century as reconstituted 
through modern technological, political, and ideological networks. 
This chapter examines the emergence of a new, modern discourse of Sino-
Iranian relations, beginning with the reception of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 
in China. It outlines the decline of traditional ties between China and Iran and the rise 
of new transportation and industrial technologies that enabled new networks to replace 
them. The analysis begins with the emergence of their two constitutional revolutions in 
the context of a global discourse of constitutional reform. Through a close reading of 
Chinese newspapers and diplomatic gazettes, it traces the start of a discourse of 
modern Sino-Iranian relations that was inextricably bound up in the history of 
imperialism and colonialism. As newspapers in Shanghai moved from British to 
Chinese control, the editorial slant shifted from opposing constitutional rule to 
supporting it. While Iranians were comparably less aware of Chinese history, they 
were still connected to an emerging pan-Asian anti-colonial discourse that included 
Chinese, Indian, Turkish, and Japanese voices. Their frustrations with British 
colonialism and despotic rule created a common language across Asia that laid the 
groundwork for later generations to see Sino-Iranian relations as natural and desirable.   
China, Iran, and the Infrastructure of Globalization 
While China has a long history of interaction both friendly and fraught with the 
Persianate world, the modern significance of these ties should not be overemphasized. 
Although the Silk Road has, in recent years, become what Nile Green calls “an 




there is little evidence that this history played a substantial role in the modern era.33 As 
Green's research has demonstrated, traditional ties between the two empires had lapsed 
by the 1900s. Persian was rarely spoken among Chinese Muslims, and Persian 
manuscripts were rapidly being translated into local languages.34 The use of Persian 
manuscripts was further marginalized by the spread of the Han Kitab, a collection of 
Chinese Muslim writings that attempts to harmonize Islamic and Confucian thought, 
and later by 19th century Islamic revivalists who championed Arabic texts.35 David 
Brophy gives a fairly dim assessment of the status of Persian in the latter days of the 
Chinese Empire: “For Qing officials, Persian was the language of a set of relatively 
insignificant tributary polities to the west of Xinjiang...The court had little to no 
knowledge of Iran as a distinct political actor, nor did it have direct diplomatic contact 
with Mughal India, and it therefore saw no need to enhance its ability to communicate 
with the outside world in Persian.”36 Studies such as Green’s and Brophy’s show the 
historical discontinuities of Iran-China relations.   
Green also notes that the physical infrastructure that connected East Asia and the 
Middle East had dramatically changed.37 Both China and Iran underwent profound 
technological and economic changes at the turn of the 20th century. New technologies, 
especially railroads and steamships, had replaced the slow overland routes made 
possible by the Mongols. Advances in printing allowed Arabic books to reach China 
and allowed Chinese Muslims to study in Egypt, India, the Ottoman Empire, and other 
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Muslim countries – but critically not in Iran. Unlike other Muslim states, Iran’s ruling 
Qājār Dynasty (1789-1925) pursued no outreach projects to Chinese Muslims, although 
Iranian traders flourished throughout coastal southern China and Southeast Asia through 
their own initiative.38 Railroads and steamships also brought Chinese Muslims to the 
Arab Middle East and Arab Muslims to China.39 These exchanges were not facilitated 
by economic exchange or motivated by nostalgia for a lost connection, but rather by the 
emergence of European colonialism and the challenges it posed to Asian societies. In 
other words, by the early 20th century, connections between Iran and China were 
mediated not by overland trade networks or shared historical memory, but rather the 
“industrial infrastructure of European-dominated globalization.”40  
Among the technological and industrial changes that impacted Sino-Iranian 
relations, three stand out as the most influential: the development of railroad and 
steamship networks, the emergence of a print and newspaper culture, and the invention 
of the telegraph. Railroads and steamships enabled the exchange of people and 
commercial goods while also directing their flow through European-controlled 
networks. Newspapers and telegram networks allowed literate elites to follow daily 
discussions of international news for the first time. These advances created new 
opportunities for travel and the exchange of information. They also produced networks 
that were controlled by European colonial powers. In exchange for control over Iranian 
natural resources and critical infrastructure, Russia and Great Britain were all too 
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happy to provide the capital and expertise necessary for technological development. 
Iranian and Chinese courts were equally eager to grant extraordinary concessions for 
cash payments and modern infrastructure. These policies sparked serious opposition 
from those affected by the economic disruption caused by European intrusion. 
Nowhere is this dynamic better exemplified than in the story of the trans-Iranian 
railway. 
Railways came late to Iran. There was no construction on a major railway 
network until 1927, and it was not completed until 1938.41 This delayed development 
resulted from Iran’s geographic location between the British and Russian Empires, 
which each sought to connect Iran to their own networks and bypass the other.42 The 
first Qājār attempt to build a national railroad came in 1872, in the form of the Reuter 
Concession. The government sought to grant the right to construct a railway system to 
German-born entrepreneur Baron Julius de Reuter (1816-1899) of Great Britain. In 
exchange, he merely asked for the right to nearly all future industrial development, 
exploitation of natural resources, and financial institutions.43 Reuter was required only 
to pay 20% annual income for the railroad system and 15% for the other monopolies 
granted, as well as a cursory “loan” of 200,000. The concession was so outrageous that 
Lord Curzon, himself a proponent of British imperialism, called it “the most complete 
and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign 
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hands that has ever been dreamt of.”44 Nasir al-Din Shah (1831-1896) was forced to 
cancel the plan due to widespread opposition to avert a palace revolt 
In response to this move, members of the Qājār elite attempted to work with 
religious officials and merchants to agitate for the construction of a railroad without 
foreign involvement.45 As Koyagi and others have argued, “the trans-Iranian railway 
was thus conceived as a countermeasure against imperial railway projects. It was 
expected to create a Tehran-centered national economy in Iran that fostered domestic 
circulation of commodities and international trade.”46 These efforts were frustrated 
when the Shah signed an agreement with Russia in 1890 that banned further railway 
construction out of a desire to block the entry of European goods into northern Iran.47 
The ban lasted until 1910 when further construction was frustrated by the outbreak of 
World War I.48The trans-Iranian railroad was but one of many issues that led to Iranian 
elites’ frustrations with British and Russian politics, which were directly tied to their 
economic concerns. Abbas Amanat describes the Reuter Concession as “Iran’s first 
experience with large-scale Western capital [that] bore all the marks of unreserved 
exploitation.” This experience would leave a lasting negative impression, one that 
would be shared by China for similar reasons.   
The Reuter Concession was part of a larger pattern of capitulations to foreign 
governments that would leave the Qājār state politically and financially dependent on 
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colonial powers. Over the course of the 19th century, Iran suffered a string of 
diplomatic and military defeats that resulted in the imposition of humiliating treaties, 
including the treaties of Golestān (1813), Turkmanchay (1828), and Paris (1857).49 The 
resultant loss of territory and sovereignty to the Russian and British Empires led to a 
severe reduction in Persia's status and prestige internationally.50 Amanat argues that as 
Europeans made diplomatic and territorial gains in Iran, they also pursued 
“interventions in Iran’s domestic affairs and…race[d] to acquire commercial and other 
advantages, capitulatory rights, and, later, economic concessions. Europe’s 
condescending attitude, gradually setting in as Iran’s weaknesses on the battlefield 
became more apparent, served as a cultural backdrop.”51 This allowed European 
nations to extract legal and economic concessions from the court that facilitated Iran's 
economic penetration by European goods.52 The Qājār court was equally eager for 
short-term gain and susceptible to the pressure from the Great Powers and their Iranian 
supporters, and therefore frequently granted or even sought out these concessions. 53  
The loss of territory and sovereignty also spurred members of the Qājār elite to 
pursue a “defensive modernization” policy. These efforts led to institutions like Dār ul-
Funun, the first university in Iran, and other educational, industrial, and military reform 
attempts.54 Reformers like Amir Kabir (1807-1852) and Melkum Khan (1834-1908) 
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spent their careers promoting administrative, military, and economic reforms.55 
However, scandals, court inertia, and a lack of finances prevented the reform 
movement from making significant progress. Naser al-Din Shah executed Amir Kabir 
due to the opposition generated within the court to his reform measures. Melkum Khan 
was exiled in 1889 over a scandal involving a lottery concession and spent his later 
years publishing Qanun, a banned magazine that attacked the Iranian government.56 
Despite some successes, these attempts at reform were ultimately insufficient and 
contributed to the court’s perpetually poor finances, which spurred the sale of more 
concessions.57  
By the 1890s, a litany of concessions had been granted to foreign governments 
and individuals to develop natural resources, public utilities, and financial institutions. 
Rights to Caspian fisheries, mines in Azerbaijan, river navigation, and the right to 
apply Iranian law to foreign citizens (extraterritoriality) were all signed away.58 
Nationalists criticized the move for selling out Iran’s economic sovereignty, and 
religious officials argued that it was contrary to Islamic property laws.59 In addition to 
offending religious and nationalist sensibilities, this also opened up Iranian merchants 
to competition from foreign goods. Widespread opposition continued to build and 
periodically exploded into open unrest. The most famous example of this is the 1891 
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Tobacco Concession, which triggered a popular protest movement and substantial 
urban riots against the concession and European influence in general.60 One merchant 
in Tabriz placed an anonymous placard in response to a British notice captured the 
popular sentiment: 
Ulemas [sic] of the town! Law is the law of religion and not the laws of the 
Europeans!  
Woe to those Ulemas who will not co-operate with the nation! Woe to those who 
will not spend their lives and property! Anyone of the Ulemas who will not 
agree with the people will lose his life. Woe to anyone who may sell one muskal 
of Tobacco to the Europeans! Woe to the Europeans who may wish to enforce 
these customs of the Infidels. We will kill the Europeans first, and then plunder 
their property…Woe to those who will keep quiet!  
Curses on the father of anyone who may destroy this Notice!61 
The movement against the Tobacco Concession is widely considered by scholars to be a 
“dress rehearsal” for the Constitutional Revolution, as it brought together religious, 
economic, nationalist, and democratic critiques of the government and focused them on 
a particular issue.62 This formula would prove equally potent in China, which underwent 
its own history of capitulation and humiliation. 
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Fig 1. Edward Linley Sambourne, Punch Magazine, 1907.  
 The history of railroad construction in China echoes that of Iran in several ways. 
The Qing government’s desire for a railway network was spurred by their humiliating 
defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).63 Over the next decade, a rail system 
was developed by British, French, German, and other interests that connected Chinese 
ports to interior provinces.64 Like in Iran, the construction of Chinese railroads was 
“framed by the political and economic motivations of foreign powers,” notably those 
who had received concessions in the form of treaty ports – enclaves where foreign law 
took precedent over Chinese law and foreigners were granted special rights.65 In 1911, 
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the Qing government moved to nationalize the railroad system under foreign pressure 
through loans provided by the same European governments.66 Opposition coalesced 
under the Railway Protection Movement (Bǎo lù yùndòng 保路运动), which objected to 
state appropriation and concessionary practices. 67  Opponents drew on an anti-colonial 
discourse which accused the government of selling out Chinese sovereign and economic 
rights to Western powers. One pamphlet in Sichuan included the following text, which 
illustrates the local mood:  
In Provision One, the Qing Dynasty is borrowing six million pounds sterling 
from the Four Powers bank consortium, and this money is borrowed for the 
railway. This is like a farmer writing a borrower’s note, taking on debt to 
mortgage the fields…Provision Nine is truly tragic, reading it brings grief to 
one’s heart, it mortgages 5.2 million in provincial transit duties, with principal 
and interest to be repaid upon maturity…Open your eyes and screw up your 
courage, seize our railway and seize the customhouses!68 
Such sentiments echoed similar voices in Iran. Local officials of various backgrounds 
led movements to either end, block, or reclaim control from European powers. 
Railroad development was accompanied by steamboat technology. Steamship 
routes between Iran and India were initiated in 1862 as part of a British attempt to 
organize and control the post system in Iran.69 These networks remained of marginal 
importance, as Iran made no serious attempts to develop maritime power. In China, 
however, extensive networks of rivers were vital to the strategic and economic control 
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of the country. As a result, steamships were a significant preoccupation of Chinese 
reformers. The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was founded in 1872 by 
Qing official Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) to challenge the supremacy of American and 
European shipping companies. Over the next few decades, it succeeded in out-
competing their main competitors and bought out the bankrupt American Shanghai 
Steam Navigation Company.70  Although most of the industry remained in Japanese or 
British hands, the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company became one of 
China's four largest shipping companies.71 Li Hongzhang’s success was one of the 
early victories of the Self-Strengthening Movement, which called for national renewal 
and industrial development. 
The Self-Strengthening Movement sought to reform the Qing Dynasty by 
integrating Western approaches to science, warfare, and government with Chinese 
imperial traditions. Like Iran, China experienced a decline of international prestige and 
military power relative to the West in the 19th century.72 Like Iran, China was subject 
to humiliating demands following a string of military defeat, often referred to as the 
Unequal Treaties. The first of these was the Treaty of Nanking (1843), imposed upon 
China by the British after the First Opium War (1839-1842).73 In addition to monetary 
concessions, tax exemptions, and extraterritorial rights for British citizens, it also 
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demanded four treaty ports and the island of Hong Kong. The treaties of Whampoa 
(1844) and Aigun (1858) soon followed, which established similar legal rights for the 
French and the Russian Empires. Soon, Europeans controlled most modern Chinese 
industries and even oversaw tax collection, ostensibly to ensure repayment of 
indemnities from the Opium Wars. China was “carved up like a melon” into various 
spheres of influence, an image that remains a potent memory in Chinese nationalism to 
this day. 74 Like in Iran, these crises forced the Qing government to acknowledge the 
seriousness of the situation and make attempts to reform, while simultaneously 
entangling them in relations with European powers that would make successful reform 
nearly impossible.        
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Fig 2. A political cartoon by Tse Tsan Tai 謝纘泰 (1872-1937), The Situation in the Far 
East (時局全圖), Hong Kong, July 1899. Different animals and characters represent 
foreign influence: the Russian Bear, the English Bulldog, the French Frog, the 
American Eagle, and in Japan, a malevolent Rising Sun. 
 
The development of steamboat technology was a critical component of the Self-
Strengthening Movement, as steamboat technology was itself critical to the national 
humiliations (guóchǐ 國恥) of the 19th century. The British were able to win both 
Opium Wars with little difficulty because of their naval superiority.75 In the First 
Opium War, British steamships attacked Canton from a direction believed impossible 
 




by the Qing, as they could navigate in exceptionally shallow waters.76 As a result, early 
proponents of the movement like Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), and Zuo 
Zongtong (1812-1885) prioritized military modernization and created arsenals in 
Nanjing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Fuzhou.77 Despite having no official government 
sponsorship, Li Hongzhang took it upon himself to modernize the military units under 
his control. Later, he used tax revenue under his control to sponsor the famed Beiyang 
Fleet (北洋舰队), one of four modern navies created by the Qing during the 1880s and 
1890s.78 Despite some successes, in 1895, the much-vaunted fleet was annihilated by 
the Japanese at the Battle of Weihaiwei. Like the Qājār’s “defensive modernization,” 
Chinese Self-Strengthening could not prevent the state's collapse.  
Both Chinese and Iranian ambitions for reform were cut short by the pressure 
of European and Japanese colonialism. Still, their reforms were not without 
consequence. Both contributed to a discourse of national revival and political reform 
that laid the groundwork for the constitutional movement. More directly, railroads and 
steamships would forever change China and Iran's physical and economic realities, just 
as the circumstance of their emergence would bring about entirely new political 
dynamics. These new technologies made international travel more accessible than ever, 
even if they discouraged direct connections between Iran and China. 
 Still, some people did travel between China and Iran. Iranian and Chinese elites 
had access to the same European-based global colonial networks. For example, 
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newspapers record dozens of Persian ships docking in Shanghai every week by the 
1930s.79 Green points out that “steamship connections were a key factor in enabling 
Chinese Muslim contact with Egypt, Arabia and India, as well as in enabling increasing 
numbers of Hui (Chinese Muslims) to perform the hajj.”80 In 1904 Mehdi Qolī Hedāyat 
(1864-1955) journeyed to China as part of an international journey and pilgrimage that 
combined both steamboat and rail travel.81 He frequently uses Russian, French, and 
German to communicate with fellow passengers and local officials, stays in hotels 
staffed by Europeans, and travels along “British-operated boats and Russian-operated 
trains.”82 Qolī Hedāyat was an exceptional case, however. There does not seem to have 
been any significant amount of Sino-Iranian traffic at this time, nor do any of these 
journeys produce significant travelogues beyond Hedāyat’s. More important to the 
history of Sino-Iranian relations was the sharing of information and the discourse of 
solidarity enabled by newspapers and telegraph networks.  
Communicating Ideas:  Newspapers and the Pan-Asian Constitutional Movement 
The telegraph created previously impossible connections between Iran, China, 
and the rest of Asia. Electric telegraphy, which became commercially viable in the 
1840s and was widespread by the 1850s, enabled near-instantaneous communications 
across long distances for the first time in human history.83 Telegraph networks 
throughout Asia were shaped by the interplay of foreign ownership, international 
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interests, and Chinese politics.84 British, Russian, and Dutch interests all competed 
over control of China’s telegraphy market.85 In Iran, the Qājār government undertook 
the initial construction of a small network of telegraphs. It was not until the Indo-
European telegraph line, completed in 1865 by German firm Siemens & Halske and 
supported by British and Russian capital, that a truly international network was in 
place.86 Upon its successful construction, entrepreneur Werner von Siemens remarked: 
“Shout it from the rooftops […] that we made it to Teheran in one minute and to 
Calcutta in 28.” Such speed allowed early 20th-century newspapers to carry news of 
revolutions from across Asia, and the world, with little delay. It enabled elites in China 
and Iran to follow international affairs week to week and month to month. Most of the 
Chinese newspapers cited in this study reported international news via telegraph cables 
from Tehran, London, Moscow, or other imperial centers. 
In both Iran and China, print culture was intimately tied to the spread of ideas 
about democracy, nationalism, and constitutional rule.87 Journalism emerged in Iran in 
the latter half of the Qājār period and was primarily a state-run enterprise.88 These 
publications were mostly concerned with court matters and had a limited audience, as 
literacy was not widespread.89 Persian-language newspapers published abroad, like 
Qānūn (London), Ḥabl al-matīn (Calcutta), and Aḵtar (Istanbul), were less controlled 
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and helped spread support for constitutional rule among educated elites.90 They also 
helped inform Iranians of events in the outside world. Ḥabl al-matīn, in particular, 
would often carry news of events in China, although this does not seem to have had a 
significant effect on its Iranian audience at this time. After the constitutional revolution 
in 1906, print culture experienced an explosion of popularity in Iran, as newspapers 
made a conscious effort to appeal to the masses and illiterate people gathered in coffee 
houses to hear the news read aloud.91 By 1908, more than 18 newspapers vied for the 
reading public's attention, and many espoused some form of pro-constitution, 
revolutionary nationalist politics.  
One of the most prominent voices from this time was Iranian intellectual and 
linguist Ali-Akbar Dehkhodā (1879-1956), who lampooned the government through 
satirical articles in the liberal revolutionary newspaper Ṣūr-e Esrāfīl (Trumpet of 
Esrafil) from 1907 to 1909. In one such column, Dehkhodā lists a few sentiments in his 
signature tongue-in-cheek style that he claims he is not expressing: 
I’m not saying the Iranian people were once the first nation in the world and 
today, thanks to the ministrations of these same leaders, it is the disgrace of 
contemporary civilization. 
I’m not saying that the frontiers of Iran once extended from beyond the Great 
Wall of China to the banks of the river Danube and today, by reason of the 
efforts of these leaders, if in the length and breadth of Iran two mice have a 
quarrel, one of them will bump its head against the wall. 
 I’m not saying that with all these chiefs and bosses all looking after us, only the 
other day eighteen cities of ours in the Caucasus were bagged by the Russians, 
and that a few days hence the rest of them will be carved up like sacrificial meat.  
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I’m not saying that for many years Europe has not had to suffer plague or 
pestilence, while every other year we must bury with our own hands half a 
million of the working population—that is, of our own young men and women.  
I’m not saying that in these past few centuries every state has pulled itself up by 
its bootstraps, extended its sway over its own territory, established colonies, 
while we, for all our chiefs and superiors with their protection of our country, 
have not even been able to protect our own nation.  
No, I’m not saying any of this. Because I know that it all goes back to fate and 
chance. All this was our destiny, all decreed as the fate of us Iranians.92  
Many constitutionalist papers like this attracted the ire of the government, including 
Ṣūr-e Esrāfīl, which was banned in 1909. Its authors were forced into exile in Europe.93 
Ḥabl al-matīn , which had also begun to publish a liberal Tehran daily, was also 
suspended four times between 1907 and 1909.94 This heavy press censorship only 
encouraged the popularity of newspapers printed abroad.95  
 Newspapers in China had their origins in the designs of British industrialists and 
Protestant missionaries.96 Published in Chinese and English, they allowed the growing 
Chinese reading public to join a “global public” that exposed them to new ideas, 
arguments, and events – and not only from the West.97 Although initially dominated by 
British and American publishers, numerous Chinese publications emerged over time, 
from literary magazines to illustrated journals. Especially in Shanghai, print culture 
became a vibrant and integral part of city life and significantly impacted the 
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development of a modern notion of Chinese identity.98 Newspapers were also 
intentionally acquired by Chinese entrepreneurs for the express purpose of supporting 
national development and reform.99 Like in Iran, newspapers became an important 
medium for spreading reformist and revolutionary ideas that supported a constitutional 
government. 100 These developments set the stage for a new discourse of Sino-Iranian 
relations based around revolutionary politics. In the early 20th century, Chinese 
intellectuals took a renewed interest in Iran's political situation with the advent of 
constitutional movements in both countries. 
In China, constitutionalism emerged as a response to the Qing government's 
failures to adapt to European competition. The government's political position became 
even more precarious at the turn of the century with the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), 
a massive uprising that required foreign troops to put down. The colonial powers took 
advantage of the situation to force the Qing government to accept the Boxer Protocol, 
which demanded 450 million taels of silver ($333 million) and prohibited the import 
of arms or arms production materials for two years. As a result, the government 
belatedly agreed to implement a series of reforms called the New Policies (新政). The 
first real concessions to the constitutional movement came under Empress Dowager 
Cixi (1835-1908), who began exploring the idea of a provisional national assembly in 
1905. That same year, several other landmark reforms were announced, such as 
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abolishing the traditional Chinese civil servant examination system, one of the main 
symbols of traditional authority left in the Empire. Despite these commitments, the 
assembly did not meet until 1909, a year after her death. In a classic case of “too little, 
too late,” it did not have time to achieve much before the Xinhai Revolution overthrew 
the Qing state in 1911. 
The revolution itself was both planned and spontaneous. A previously obscure 
group known as the Revolutionary Alliance (同盟会) attempted to instigate numerous 
uprisings, but all were either quickly defeated or leaked. The alliance consisted of a 
loose affiliation of nationalist forces and revolutionary parties. Founded in Tokyo in 
1905, it was a merger of multiple revolutionary currents led by prominent republicans 
like Song Jiaoren (1882-1913), Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), Huang Xing (1874-1916), 
and Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), among others. When the Wuchang Uprising broke out 
on October 10th, 1911, the Revolutionary Alliance had nothing to do with the 
planning; instead, it grew out of widespread unrest surrounding the Railway Protection 
Movement. The Revolutionary Alliance seized the moment and, riding on a wave of 
discontent and enthusiasm for a New China, toppled the Qing government with 
immense popular support. After the fall of the Qing, the Alliance transformed into a 
fully-fledged nationalist political party, the Zhōngguó Guómíndǎng (中國國民黨, lit. 
Chinese Nationalist Party), and Sun Yat-sen was elected provisional president of the 
newly declared Republic of China. Sun's role in this history earned him the title of 




although he and his group of elite professional revolutionaries were but one of several 
factors that brought about the fall of the Qing. 
 This constitutional assembly did not last either, as military strongmen quickly 
dominated it. Yuan Shikai (1881-1916) briefly resurrected the threat of a return to 
imperial authority and autocracy when he declared himself the “Grand Constitutional 
Emperor” in 1916, which only caused opposition to coalesce against him. After only 83 
days, he abdicated the throne and died three months later of sickness. This debacle 
permanently damaged central authority, and the following decade saw the rise of 
regional powers, which undercut both the influence and the prestige of the fledgling 
Republic. The Nationalists continued to maintain some authority around Nanjing and 
claimed to be the rightful Chinese government, but so-called “warlords” amassed power 
for themselves as provincial leaders. While some enacted reform policies and military 
modernization that the Central government had been unable to accomplish, others ruled 
with an iron fist. 101 The decline of central authority continued until the Nationalists 
launched the Northern Expeditions (1927-1928) under General Chiang Kai-shek (1887-
1975). Despite its failures, historians consider the constitutional revolution as the 
beginning of modern China. It heralded the end of the thousands of years of imperial 
administration and ushered in a new era of political change and economic development. 
There were several notable similarities between the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution and the Xinhai Revolution, which occurred in roughly the same time 
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frame. A weak Qājār monarchy, thoroughly penetrated and exploited by European 
imperial powers, gave rise to reformist sentiment. Phrases like ʿadālat (justice) and 
hoqūq-e mellat (rights of the people) emerged and adapted traditional ideas into a 
modern political vocabulary.102 In addition to elite reformers, popular preachers and 
the bazaari class (merchants and market workers) also called for reform based on 
material and moral complaints against the encroachment of European economic and 
cultural influence.103 While older historiography centered on this unusual alliance of 
liberals, merchants, and religious leaders, newer works have added an appreciation for 
the multitude of groups, including women and religious and ethnic minorities, who 
contributed to the movement.104 Constitutionalism was supported by an explosion in 
the output and influence of print culture, much as it was in China. 
The move towards constitutionalism in Iran was also spurred by the outbreak 
of widespread protests against the government. The precipitating event occurred on 
December 12th, 1905, when the government-appointed Imam in Tehran attempted to 
expel a fellow preacher who supported the grievances of local sugar merchants.105 
Amid a sermon that exhorted the government to follow “the law” (qānūn), guards with 
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clubs dispersed the crowd and arrested the Imam. The incident sparked protests 
centered on a shrine south of Tehran that soon spread to Qom and other cities.106 The 
idea of mashrūteh (a neologism for “constitution” derived from the word for 
“conditional,” or to place conditions on the power of the sovereign) became a kind of 
catch-all solution to the many grievances of Iran’s various social classes.107 On August 
10, 1906, the embattled Mozaffar ad-Din Shah had no choice but to agree to convene a 
parliament (Majles) to appease the uprising. Remarkably, the first Majles convened 
less than two months later on October 7th, 1906. 
The Iranian constitution was painstakingly drawn up and debated, but the 
fledgling movement soon “ran counter to a royalist front that, backed by imperial 
Russia, aimed to reassert the power of an autocratic Qājār shah in power and preserve 
the privileges of the ruling elite.”108 Disputes between the clergy and supporters of the 
new constitution over the limits of its authority also spurred a conservative religious 
backlash. Many of these new opponents had initially supported the constitutionalists, 
like Sheikh Fazlollāh Nuri (1843-1909).109 After a failed assassination attempt in 
February 1908, Mohammad ʿAli Shah (r.1907-1909), crowned shortly after the 
constitution was put into effect, took his Russian advisors and royalist supporters' 
advice and moved against the Majles with the aid of the Russian Cossacks. Royalists 
and constitutionalists quickly chose sides, and different causes coalesced around either 
issue. Unrest in Tabriz spilled over into a civil revolt led by tribal leaders like Sattar 
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Khān (1866-1914) and Bāqer Khān (1870-1916), and the Russian government, fearful 
of a revival of revolutionary politics in the Caucasus, occupied the city in 1909.  
A faction of the Bakhtiyari tribe of central and southwestern Iran came to their 
rescue; led by ʿAli-Qoli Khan Sardar Asʾad (1856-1917), a hastily-raised army 
captured Tehran on July 13th, 1909. The victors deposed Mohammad ʿAli Shah in 
favor of his 11-year-old son, Ahmad Shah Qājār. These events were closely followed 
in the international press, especially in Britain, where there was some public sympathy 
for the constitutionalists. The second Majles was challenged by factionalism, hostile 
foreign powers, and all the financial and political problems of the Qājār state. Russia 
engineered a conflict over the confirmation of American financial advisor Morgan 
Shuster, and in “a rare expression of international bullying” occupied nearly all of 
northern Iran in 1912. A third attempt to convene parliament was made in 1915, but it 
quickly dissolved due to a lack of support. The outbreak of World War I and persistent 
civil disorder in the following years made the constitutional government question 
mostly moot. When state authority was restored under Reza Khan (r. 1925-41) in the 
1920s, he substantially curtailed the power of the Majles. Despite its failures, the 
constitutional movement succeeded in altering Iran's social and political fabric and 
paving the way for later reforms and modernization efforts.110  
These two revolutions were part of a global trend of revolutionary politics that 
swept the globe at the turn of the 20th century. By the early 1900s, there were anti-
colonial constitutional movements in Japan, Turkey, Mexico, Egypt, India, Vietnam, 
 




Indonesia, and beyond. Mishra Pankaj has argued that modern Asia's political elites 
were united by a shared experience of domination by the West.111 These men “traveled 
and wrote prolifically, restlessly assessing their own and other societies, pondering the 
corruption of power, the decay of community, the loss of political legitimacy and the 
temptations of the West. Their passionate enquiries appear in retrospect as a single 
thread, weaving seemingly disparate events and regions into a single web of 
meaning.”112 Although they lived in different societies, sometimes oceans apart, the 
new networks of European globalization described earlier in this chapter enabled them 
to inhabit a single imagined world of colonized people.  
From the Indian Mutiny to the revolutions in Persia and Turkey and the Russo-
Japanese War, the elites of early modern Asia were deeply emotionally invested in the 
fate of constitutional movements worldwide. Pankaj’s study provides ample evidence 
of this imagined interconnectedness. For him, a decisive moment is the Japanese 
victory over Russia in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. The significance of this victory 
lay in the identities of the combatants: “For the first time since the Middle Ages, a non-
European country had vanquished a European power in a major war; and the news 
careened around a world that Western imperialists – and the invention of the telegraph 
– had closely knit together.”113 In Persian, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Indian 
newspapers, the Japanese victory and its implications were hotly debated.114 There is no 
shortage of familiar faces professing admiration for one another in painstakingly 
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Lord Curzon…feared that ‘the reverberations of that victory have gone like a 
thunderclap through the whispering galleries of the East’ … Mohandas Gandhi 
(1869 – 1948), who predicted ‘so far and wide have the roots of Japanese 
victory spread that we cannot now visualize all the fruit it will put forth’…In 
Damascus, Mustafa Kemal, a young Ottoman soldier later known as Atatürk 
(1881 – 1938), was ecstatic… Reading the newspapers in his provincial town, 
the sixteen-year-old Jawaharlal Nehru (1889 – 1964), later India’s first prime 
minister, had excitedly followed the early stages of Japan’s war with Russia, 
fantasizing about his own role in ‘Indian freedom and Asiatic freedom from the 
thralldom of Europe’…Newborn babies in Indian villages were named after 
Japanese admirals…In the United States, the African-American leader W. E. B. 
Du Bois (1868-1963) spoke of a worldwide eruption of ‘colored pride’…115 
The impact of the Japanese victory was especially strong in China. Mao Zedong (1893-
1976), then a schoolboy, later said, “At that time, I knew and felt the beauty of Japan, 
and felt something of her pride…”116 Sun-Yatsen was traveling back to China via the 
Suez Canal in Egypt when the news broke, and Arab dock workers who mistook him 
for Japanese offered their congratulations.117 Later, he wrote of the Japanese victory: 
Men thought and believed that European civilization was a progressive one – in 
science, industry, manufacture, and armament – and that Asia had nothing to 
compare with it. Consequently, they assumed that Asia could never resist 
Europe, that European oppression could never be shaken off. Such was the idea 
prevailing thirty years ago.118 
All around the world, Asian commentators were reading their struggles through the lens 
of the experience of other Asians. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897), a radical anti-
colonial Muslim thinker whose journey of dissent took him from India, Iran, Egypt, and 
the Ottoman Empire, wrote of the Muslim condition in 1896: 
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What an affliction! What kind of situation is this? What kind of adversity is 
this? England has occupied Egypt, the Sudan and the great Indian Peninsula 
which are large parts of the Islamic states; the French have taken possession of 
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria; the Netherlands have become a despotic ruler of 
Java and the Oceanic islands; Russia has captured West Turkistan, the large 
cities of Transoxiana, Caucasia and Daghestan; China has taken East Turkistan. 
Not more than a few Islamic countries, which are also in great danger, have 
remained independent.119 
Throughout Asia, intellectuals were exchanging ideas and information. Often indirectly, 
they learned of each other through newspapers and filtered the global through the lens 
of their own experiences. They were connected through a discourse of anti-colonial 
revolution and followed an international narrative of events hotly debated in periodicals 
from Syria to Shanghai. Given this context, it is hardly surprising that commentators in 
China took notice when the Iranian constitutional revolution broke out.  
The Iranian Constitutional Revolution in the English-language Chinese press 
British missionaries, diplomats, and other elites in Shanghai were among the 
first to draw comparisons between modern Iran and China, but they came to decidedly 
negative conclusions. They wrote about these issues in English-language newspapers 
that catered to expatriates and cosmopolitan Chinese elites. The first article about 
Persia was published in 1873 in the North China Herald, the most influential English-
language newspaper in China of its time.120 Entitled “Persia and Its Future,” it was a 
reprint from The Friend of India (1835-1876), another British newspaper published in 
Calcutta, and gave an overview of the contemporary situation from the view of British 
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imperialism. The context of the article was Naser al-Din Shah’s 1873 trip to London, 
part of a widely publicized European tour.121 Over several months, the Shah visited 
Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris, Geneva, Vienna, Bologna, Corfu, Istanbul, 
and other European cities. The article reacts to the Shah’s arrival in London. It begins 
with a scathing assessment of the pomp and circumstance surrounding the event and of 
the Shah himself: 
The Shah of Persia has been received in Europe with the magnificence that 
might have been expected, however disproportionate to his own merits and 
those of his dynasty… Russia and England are the two Powers that have drawn 
to the West the first ruler of Persia who has ever cared, or dared, to leave his 
troubled kingdom for so long a period as four months. But for his faith in the 
telegraph even Nuseer-ood Deen would not have done so.122 
Naser al-Din Shah’s trip was a tangible expression of the new dynamics enabled by the 
European infrastructure of globalization, whether tangibly (the Shah primarily traveled 
by steamship and by rail) or practically/emotionally, as the telegraph enabled Naser al-
Din Shah to stay informed about the state of his Kingdom despite his long absence.  
These new dynamics engendered strong reactions from Europeans like the 
author here, who spends the bulk of the article criticizing the state of Persian 
administration: “...Nuseer-od-Deen is the worst type of Asiastic despots...The path of 
Persia has been year by year downward...” This criticism was not disinterested, but 
rather part of an official discourse that justified the exploitation of Asian countries by 
framing European influence as a cure for the woes of Asia:  
Happy Shah, to be thus competed for by the two great Powers who dominate 
 





Asia, and to be pressed to take as much English money as he chooses from a 
market mad for new investments at good interest! [...] If good government is 
combined with Western capital and enterprise, there is no limit to the future of 
Persia...our great “buffer” policy makes the independent Powers on and near our 
frontier strong at once for internal development and to resist external 
aggression.123  
Iran’s value is directly tied to its wealth of natural resources and to British ambitions to 
create a railroad network: “This Resht and Bushire railway once made, the future of 
Persia...promises to be somewhat more worthy of its past than it has been for some 
centuries.” This colonial discourse, which views Asian countries through the lens of 
their usefulness to the imperial project, underpins nearly every article featured in the 
English-language Chinese press.  
In August of 1889, an article titled “Progress in Persia” reviewed a piece 
published in the Asiatic Quarterly Review earlier that summer by Sinologist Demetrius 
Boulger. Boulger supported the ongoing reform measures in Iran, which in the author's 
view was a waste of time, as the country was about to be swallowed up by England or 
Russia as a matter of “manifest destiny.”124 With regard to China, the author took 
issue with Boulger’s descriptions of ongoing negotiations over the 1889 bank 
concession. In addition to praising the Shah for his “shrewd discretion” in retaining 
control over future mining discoveries, Boulger implied that “projects in that part of 
Persia…could in an emergency be brought within the range of our protecting 
influence.” The author believes that such an admission damages British interests: 
...Is not an article of this kind calculated to make the Chinese think they are 
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quite right in refusing foreigners concessions for railways, etc., when they see 
what the granting of such concessions is expected to involve in Persia? It is very 
well to say that China is not Persia, or Turkey, or Egypt, but Peking may 
perhaps think that it is wise to be on the safe side, and keep foreign 
concessionaires out as much as possible.125 
Articles like this reveal the conscious manipulations of information that authors of the 
English-language Chinese press engaged in to advance their interests.  
In addition to writing about Iran in China, the North China Herald editors also 
compared Iran to China. The author of “Progress in Persia” remarked that “Like all the 
rest of Asia - we must except China till the audience question is settled - Persia has at 
least accepted the inevitable in the shape of European influence…” Another article 
bluntly states that communications in Iran “are even worse than in China.”126 This sort 
of unfavorable comparison became increasingly common over the decades. On 
December 17th, 1897, the paper published an article titled “Three Empires” that 
negatively compared Persia to China in a variety of ways: 
We who live in China do not as a rule feel that we have any special interest in 
the dominions of Muzaffir-id-Din, the Shah of Persia. To us that country seems 
what the late Thomas Taylor Meadows used to call ‘ten-thousand-miles-
offy.’...Yet there is a good deal about Persia that suggests China…We are fond 
of remarking that the political state of China is far from satisfactory. But in 
Persia things are definitely worse…Corruption, lying, and thieving all prevail to 
an extent unheard-of even in China, where all things are done in accordance 
with Li, or Reason...Let us in China rejoice that our troubles...are confined to 
getting [stamps] with too little gum-arabic on their backs.127 
These frequent pot-shots likely amused disgruntled foreign office workers and 
merchants who liked to complain of conditions in China. They also reflect European 
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stereotypes about the Orient, which seemed to assign the Middle East and Muslim 
countries with lower prestige and assumed “civilizational level” than China, whose 
historical power and culture seemed to command a comparatively higher assessment.   
In comparing China to Iran, articles before the constitutional revolution 
reflected British anxieties about Russian expansion and the “Great Game.” “Three 
Empires” goes on to argue that Iran was suffering severe political and economic woes 
due to corruption, incompetence, “ecclesiastical tyranny [of] the Mahomedan religion,” 
and the weakness of the Shah.128 “As a result, Russia waits on the border for an 
opportunity to “restore order” with the Tsar’s Cossacks…At the other end of the Asiatic 
continent is China. She is not yet reduced to the straits of Persia, which seems liable at 
any time to extinction. All that even now prevents it is Great Britain.” Articles like this, 
which targeted the empire's diplomatic elite, were designed to convince other 
Europeans to support anti-Russian politics and increased intervention in Chinese 
affairs. On February 7th, 1900, another piece warned of “A Lesson From Persia” on the 
danger of Russian expansion in China: 
Those who fondly believe that the practical annexation of Northern China by 
Russia should not be opposed by Englishmen...are urged to read an article 
headed “Russian Expansion and British Trade in Persia,” which appeared in the 
London Times...Our attention is especially drawn to Persia now because Russia 
is not unnaturally taking full advantage of our preoccupation in South Africa to 
expand in Persia and China.129 
It describes how Russia leveraged its influence over Iranian economic policy to destroy 
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British economic penetration of northern Iran nearly. These concerns were also directly 
related to the spread of rail technology: “What, as we see, has been done in Persia will 
undoubtedly be attempted, when the Trans-Siberian railway is completed, in China.” 
Again, we see China compared to Iran to persuade European elites to support specific 
anti-Russian policies.  
   The constitutional revolution in Iran generated many articles between 1906 and 
1913. The first mention was on September 21st, 1906, less than two weeks after the 
passage of a law governing the elections on September 9th.130 It ties the emergence of 
the constitutional revolution to the global international upheavals of the early 20th 
century: “The recent victory of Japan over Russia not only led to significant change...in 
the Far East generally, but also affected the whole aspect of diplomatic relations in 
Europe…and has culminated in the grant of a measure of constitutional government [in 
Persia].” While nominally supportive of constitutional rule as a general concept, the 
author remarks that “it remains to be seen whether the Persian “Constitution” is actually 
to be the forerunner of reforms…but at least the manner in which the popular demands 
have been met has an appearance of genuineness which is lacking in China's attitude 
towards reform.” While discussing limitations on voting rights, he also comments that 
“it may be doubted whether a wider representation was called for at this stage. Popular 
representation of a kind has been obtained and without unnecessary delay.” The author 
seems skeptical that real constitutional rule being implemented in either China or Iran 
any time soon.  
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The most common types of comparisons between China and Iran were related 
to the Iranian constitutional revolution. These were typically negative, with the chaotic 
situation in Iran used to justify skepticism of parliamentary rule in China. For 
example, an editorial published in 193 entitled “Persia and China” opined that 
“extraordinary similarities” existed between the problems facing both countries, 
namely “the maintenance of sovereignty and independence” after the advent of 
Republicanism.131 “In Persia the substitution of the rule of an inept and incapable 
Parliament...has resulted in a state of affairs strikingly similar to that existing in China 
to-day...in neither case does the practical authority of the central Government extend 
to any great distance from the capital.” The author concludes that the experience of 
China and Persia, compared to British rule in India, demonstrates the impossibility of 
an efficient government in Asia that does not rely on “personal authority” and 
“adequate force.” For him, it brought about “doubts as to the practical value of 
Republicanism...” in countries that did not have a “long experience with it.”   
Many articles provided updates on revolutionary events in Iran, including the 
abolition of the first parliament, the uprisings in Tabriz, the march on Tehran, the 
restoration of the constitution, and the subsequent occupation of Iran by Russia.132 
With titles like “Civil War in Persia,” “The Problem of Persia,” and “The Disorders in 
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Persia,” these articles express pessimism about the possibility of constitutional rule in 
Iran; a convenient position to take, as it justified the policies of British imperialism 
despite frequent protest by the Chinese. The publication of The Persian Revolution 
(1910) by British orientalist Edward Browne (1862-1926) helped create support for 
the constitutionalists as representatives of the Iranian nation and modernity in Asia, an 
enthusiasm that was reflected in some of the later articles.133 Nevertheless, this support 
did not translate to the British government, which made no moves to support the 
Majles, and did little to convince British elites of the value of constitutionalism in 
Asia.   
The diplomatic press expressed a European colonial view and reproduced 
colonialist arguments about China, Iran, and constitutionalism. Authors like Lord 
Curzon and other Orientalist intellectuals laid the groundwork for official justification 
of colonial policy through an interpretive lens that denied the political agency and 
intellectual ability of Asians. They argued that a genuinely democratic system was not 
fit for Persia or China and that attempts to establish one would only lead to disorder 
and foreign domination. This editorial slant was a consequence of the networks of 
information that connected Iran to China.134 Paradoxically, these dour articles served 
as an important source of information about the Iranian situation for early Chinese 
constitutionalists, many of whom were educated elites who could read European 
newspapers. Unlike the British authors of the North China Herald, however, Chinese 
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authors would have an entirely different view of the Iranian constitutional revolution, 
influenced by their own recent historical experiences.  
The Iranian Constitutional Revolution in the Chinese Press 
Chinese constitutionalists read events in Persia through the prism of their own 
political movement. Yidan Wang has reviewed the attitude of Chinese intellectuals 
towards the Iranian Constitutional Revolution in three influential magazines from the 
period: Dongfang Zazhi (Eastern Miscellany), Zhengyi Tongbao (the Journal of 
Politics and Art), and Minbao (People's Report), the latter of which was the official 
journal of Sun Yat-sen.135 He finds that Chinese authors were extremely sympathetic 
towards the constitutional movement and projected their own hopes for China onto the 
Iranian situation. One author perceived attempts to educate the young Ahmad Shah 
with a “progressive and extensive [education], instead of a limited and traditional 
stick-in-the-mud one” as indicative of the “progressive education policy of the new 
constitutional government.”136 His analysis reflected the widespread concern in China 
with reforming the education system, which was based on learning Confucian classics 
to pass the traditional civil servant examination. The Qing court had only recently 
attempted to incorporate more practical courses in science, military affairs, and 
modern politics. Europe remained an essential source of articles and arguments, but 
these were also deployed in ways that furthered the anti-imperial cause; for example, 
in 1912, Qian Zhixiu translated an article by Edward Browne that blamed Russian and 
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British aggression for the failure of the constitutional movement.137  
These early narratives of Sino-Iranian solidarity reflect a growing tradition of 
internationalism and Pan-Asianism in Chinese political discourse. More and more, 
Chinese intellectuals were comparing the situation in China to other Asian countries. 
Sun Yat-sen himself took Iran into account in his understanding of Pan-Asian 
solidarity. In a speech at the Kobe Women's College on November 23rd, 1924 before 
the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Sun laid out his vision for what he calls “the 
doctrine of Pan-Asianism.”138 Drawing on Japanese discourses, he sketches out a 
historical narrative centered on the subjugation of Asian peoples to European colonial 
states. The crucial question for Sun was how to stand up to Europe; his answer was 
military power. For this reason, Sun views Iran as one of multiple countries to be 
admired and emulated: “at present, Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia are also striving 
hard to adopt European culture and improve their armaments.” He integrates Iran, the 
Arab world, and the rest of Asia into a single political order based on resistance to 
European domination. What is most striking is that these foreign “others” (Arabs and 
Persians) are configured as part of the same in-group as the Chinese, one defined by 
experience with colonization. 
Despite this interest, Chinese knowledge about Iran was still minimal. The same 
authors who claimed to be inspired by the Iranian example praised the Shah’s reliance 
on foreign advisors, a perennial complaint of Iranian constitutionalists. There was little 
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understanding of the constitutional revolution beyond the barest outline of its events.  It 
was more the promise, the idea of a successful constitutional movement in Iran that 
was important and inspiring, rather than the specific politics of its advocates. The 
words of Wang Jingwei, a faithful and enthusiastic follower of Sun Yat-sen, 
demonstrate the essential point of Sino-Iranian solidarity for Chinese constitutionalists: 
“Enthusiasm for revolution is found today everywhere in the world...Now is the time 
for us to show determination and to rouse ourselves...this is what the Persian 
Revolution has taught us.”139  
In addition to magazines, Chinese newspapers also published articles with news 
and opinions about Iran. Usually owned and operated by foreigners, at the turn of the 
20th century the Chinese press fell into the hands of politicians and literati that 
espoused constitutionalism. As the press came under the control of Chinese 
entrepreneurs, the tone of the coverage began to shift. One of the first modern Chinese 
newspapers, Shen Bao, was created and managed by British industrialist Ernest Major 
(1841-1908) in 1872.140  It published some very brief news reports on events in Iran as 
soon as it was established, usually from a perspective sympathetic to British concerns; 
the constitution was only mentioned in passing in articles that emphasized the internal 
disorder it had created.141 Overall, it had a conservative, pro-government perspective.  
In 1907, Shen Bao was sold to Chinese entrepreneur Zhang Jian (1853-1926), a 
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Chinese “official-entrepreneur” sympathetic to the constitutional movement.142 Shortly 
thereafter, the paper began to publish articles in favor of constitutionalism in both 
China and Iran.143 Shen Bao reached a circulation of 30,000 copies a day at its peak and 
ensured that at least some literate Chinese could follow international news very 
closely.144  
  The first article Shen Bao published about Iran was an upbeat assessment of the 
Reuter concession, one year after it was founded and still under British control. “It is 
advisable to use the power of neighboring countries. How can we stand on our own 
without exercising power?”145 The author also echoed British arguments against 
Russian involvement in Iran and accused the Tsar of “strangling Persia.”146 Despite the 
paper’s silence on British imperialism, coverage of Iran at Shen Bao was notably more 
positive than the North China Herald. For example, Nasser al-Din Shah’s European 
tour was discussed in a completely different tone than in the North China Herald. One 
article enthusiastically describes the steamship ceremony surrounding the Shah’s 
arrival at the dock: 
Several ships all raised the flag of the Persian King and crossed the sea...The 
first group of ships sailed slowly into two rows and greeted a total of twenty 
ships. They were all solid and protected by thick iron...The sound of the cannon 
is as loud as thunder, and the flames flash like electricity...All the equipment is 
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shaken...The smoke gradually dissipates, and the sailors are all ants climbing up 
the masts...The spectators all crowd around the train to compete with each other 
to see the emperor take to his car...I have never seen so many ships in my life. 
While British observers fill their descriptions with sardonic humor and veiled insults, 
this Chinese traveler seems to have genuine enthusiasm for the idea of the Shah 
“learning from the West” and bringing that learning back to Iran. One Chines author 
connected the Shah’s trip to what he desired for his own country:  
Of the countries of the world, none are more powerful than Britain. Of the 
capitals of the world, none are richer than London...the people's minds and 
talents are all used to make superior machinery and equipment...Japan admires 
its prosperity and strength, and now follows [Western] laws...The Persian Shah 
now has seen a country of laws. If everything can be done properly after 
returning to Iran, it will be prosperous...Today, the land of the capital of China is 
so withered...Opening to the world as soon as possible can remedy this pitiful 
situation.  
 When the Iranian constitutional movement broke out in 1906, Shen Bao was still 
in a state of transition. Some articles referred to non-specific “Persian chaos” during the 
unrest of 1905, and the constitution itself merited only a quick mention in the 
international news section on August 14th, 1906.147 On October 11th, the paper informed 
readers that “The King of Persia...approved the constitution and reform efforts in the 
hope that the state will one day be improved. The people of Persia and the capital 
celebrated together.”148 A few weeks later, an editorial declared that “there will be one 
more constitutional state in the world…Even if some of my colleagues regret it there is 
nothing to be done.”149 Towards the end of the year, there was a flurry of reports on the 
ill health of Mozaffer ad-Din Shah, and even an erroneous early report of his death, later 
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retracted. Continued reports were made of the unrest, but outright support for the Iranian 
constitution was still limited.150  
 By 1907, the paper was entirely under Chinese ownership and began publishing 
articles by prominent Chinese constitutionalists.151 Over the next few years, Shen Bao 
published dozens of articles covering the chaotic events of the second half of the 
constitutional revolution, often in short bulletins without much detail. On May 5th, 1907, 
one such bulletin directly linked “chaos in Tabriz” to “the people ask[ing] the King to 
approve the constitution.”152 More forceful statements came as royalists and 
constitutionalists clashed throughout 1907. In an article titled “Persian Autocracy,” one 
author wrote that “the King of Persia once more attempted his arbitrary policy, but was 
blocked.”153 On August 7th, 1908, riots were reported in the capital where “hundreds of 
people, including Persian merchants, demanded the parliament be opened quickly.”154 
The constitutionalist forces were sometimes referred to as the Constitutionalist Party” 
(Lìxiàndǎng 立憲黨) but more often as the “Nationalist Party” (Guómíndǎng 國民黨) or 
the “Revolutionary Party” (Gémìngdǎng 革命黨). The royalists were called the 
“Conservative Party” (Shǒujiùdǎng 守舊黨), a reference to the “conservative faction” 
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(shǒujiùpài  守旧派) of the Qing court, those hated traditional officials who had 
opposed reform during the previous century.155 In turn-of-the-century Shanghai, where 
support for nationalism and constitutional reform was high, it was clear which side Shen 
Bao supported. 
 Shen Bao also became more vocal in its criticism of colonialism after 1907, and 
began to filter news about Iran through the prism of Chinese experiences with British 
imperialism. Russian involvement had been decried since the paper was founded, per its 
British owners' interests, and this trend continued during the constitutional revolution.156 
Once ownership had passed into the hands of Chinese nationals, criticizing British 
policy became a major preoccupation of the paper, especially when writing about Iran. 
For example, Shen Bao reacted negatively to the presence of British troops in Iran and 
increasingly described both Russian and British policy as “interference.”157 An article 
titled “Negotiations between the strong and the weak” described how Britain exercised 
its influence to prevent Iran from raising taxes on British goods.158 This perspective was 
not limited to contemporary events. In 1917, a retrospective article on the Reuter 
Concession referred to it as “the theft of Persia” and compared it to “Lü Buwei’s 
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conspiracy,” a historical reference to a famous scheming merchant.159 These expressions 
of support were linked to China’s own frustrations with British colonial impositions.   
While coverage of the constitutional revolution was supportive, it was not 
always optimistic. Unlike Wang Jingwei and the writers who contributed to Minbao and 
Dongfang Zazhi, the editorial staff of Shen Bao was more reserved and less exuberant 
over the Iranian revolution. Excitement for the prospect of another Asian revolution was 
tempered by widespread reports of political violence, political turmoil, and the 
involvement of the Russian army. Occasional reports of laws passed by the Majles were 
drastically outnumbered by reports on Iran's unstable political situation. Phrases like 
“Persian Chaos” (Bōsī luànshì 波斯亂事), “Persian Riots” (Bōsī sāoluàn 波斯騷亂) 
“Persian Crisis” (Bōsī wéijí 波斯危急), and “Persian Internal Strife” (Bōsī nèihòng 
波斯內訌) were common, especially during the unrest in Tabriz in the summer of 
1908.160 This was amplified by the continued use of European sources of information on 
Iran, usually through telegraph cables or translated articles. Incidents of violence or theft 
against embassy staff or British officials by “Persian bandits” underscored the reports of 
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disorder, starvation, and suffering.161 While Chinese authors did not directly criticize the 
constitutionalists, Chinese readers were likely left with the impression that the 
constitutional movement had led to instability and outside interference.  
An unusually long editorial in 1908 explores to the reason for Shen Bao’s 
reticence to sing the praises of Iranian constitutionalism. In an essay on countries that 
have recently seen political turmoil, the author concludes that “political competition” 
(zhèngzhì jìngzhēng 政治競爭) is “the reason why our country’s politics has been 
underdeveloped for thousands of years.”162 He briefly surveys recent events, including 
the constitutional revolution in Persia, the unrest that preceded the Mexican Revolution 
of 1910, the 1908 Lisbon regicide, and the political upheavals in Russia, India, and Italy. 
These events were presented as a cautionary tale for China’s budding reformists: 
In the Persian capital Tehran, the Revolutionary Party and the Conservative 
Party clashed. After a few days of fighting, homes were destroyed, factories 
were looted, and many nobles had been captured. The chaos led to the Persian 
King being re-instated. This is also proof of political competition…Just look at 
the history of this month and the political turmoil in various countries. Those 
who want to advance politically are rarely able to escape their station...163wfig 
 Iran was presented as a revolutionary movement that had led to a negative outcome, 
however justified the cause of political advancement might be. Commentators 
emphasized that chaos could derail a political movement and invite foreign intervention, 
and the implication was that Chinese factions must work closely together and avoid the 
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kind of turmoil that followed other revolutions.  
 Despite this pessimism, the Iranian revolution was presented as part of a larger 
story of reform and constitutionalism in Asia. In August 1908, the Chinese government 
published the “Constitutional Outline,” which sketched out the first practical steps 
towards a constituion since the beginning of the “New Policies.” One month later, an 
excerpt was published from a study that considered constitutional politics in China, 
Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and Morocco. The author lauded China's progress towards a 
constitutional assembly and hailed 1908 as “the most prosperous year of constitutional 
politics.”164 The dramatic clash between the Shah and the Majles on June 23rd, 1908 was 
the focus of his analysis, which emphasized the continuation of the constitutional 
struggle despite severe setbacks:  
Although Persia has a formal parliament, the Persian King is accustomed to 
tyranny and relies on the Russian Cossack soldiers to oppress the people. This 
year the Persian King clashed with the parliament. In the main artillery 
bombardment killed fifty members of the People's Party and led to martial 
law...the King has issued an edict pledging to obey the constitution and 
reconvene the parliament in three months...165 
The piece linked constitutional reform to military progress and industrialization. The 
author estimates that “in the future, the development of the national power of the five 
nations will be much better than before the constitution was established” and goes on to 
present statistics that demonstrate the growth of military and economic power in the five 
 





nations.166 He conveys a conviction that constitutional reform will eventually lead to 
improvement, regardless of its difficulties. Articles like this help demonstrate the 
diversity of opinions about the Iranian constitutional revolution that was put forth in the 
Chinese press, even among its supporters. 
Within a few years of the 1911 Xinhai revolution, constitutionalism was facing 
serious challenges in both countries. Chinese interest in Iran dwindled after the Iranian 
parliament was again suspended on December 24th, 1911. By the middle of the decade, 
most reports were focused on events related to World War I (1914-1918), or other 
concerns like opium smuggling. Official contacts between the Iranian and Chinese 
governments would not emerge until the 1920s.  
Conclusions 
While Sino-Persian relations are often depicted as the resumption of ancient 
ties that date back to the Silk Road, this chapter ends in agreement with Nile Green 
that modern Sino-Persian connections are largely divorced from their original Silk 
Road context, which had lapsed almost entirely by the 19th century. In the early to 
mid-1900s, Sino-Iranian connections were not so much re-established as reconstituted 
against the backdrop of a vastly changed political and social situation. The decay of 
traditional economic and political ties between China and Iran was hastened by 20th-
century European globalization. From steamships to railroads, to newspapers and 
telegraphs, European capital sought to create an interconnected flow of goods and 
 




information, although this was neither altruistic nor without a heavy price. The 
concessions extracted by Britain, Russia, and other colonial powers helped spur a 
generation of Asian elites who rejected those unequal arrangements and strove to 
overcome Europe by assimilating the best of what it had to offer into their own 
cultures. For many, constitutionalism and participatory democracy offered the key to 
national renewal. New patterns of Sino-Iranian interaction emerged along the lines of 
inter-Asian solidarity and support for political revolution. 
Chinese journalists and British civil servants in Shanghai took a special interest 
in Iran. In the pages of formerly-British periodicals and newly established cultural 
magazines, the latest information was transferred through telegraphs and disseminated 
to the growing Chinese reading public. This exchange demonstrates how, in the context 
of a newly connected global Asia, Chinese intellectuals were keenly engaged with the 
outside world. They saw their own identity, history, and future reflected in the 
experiences of Iran. This was a new dynamic of Sino-Iranian relations that arose 
independent of the Silk Road or any other traditional patterns of exchange, one based on 
the idea of Sino-Iranian connections and an internationalist, anti-colonialist reading of 
both Chinese and Iranian history. 
Imagined connections between Iran and China emerged among Chinese elites 
and European colonial administrators in China. These discourses did not draw on Silk 
Road narratives, but rather the political reality of European domination from which 
they emerged. The discourse of ancient civilizations was not key at this point, though 




Iran, their interpretations reflected their domestic concerns and demands for the future. 
They incorporated the Iranian experience into a grand narrative of global or Pan-Asian 
interconnectivity. This new narrative emerged from the same networks it would aim to 
dismantle, from British or Russian news sources and in newspapers owned or formerly 
owned by foreigners.167  By contrast, Iranian constitutionalists were likely aware of 
events in China, but had less reason to promote a pan-Asian approach to politics, and 
were therefore comparatively less interested.  
One noticeable omission is a discussion on the reception of Chinese 
constitutionalism and Chinese history in Iran. Iranian elites certainly had the 
opportunity to be aware of events in China. Abdul Hairi has demonstrated that the 
Iranian constitutional movement should be considered “an extension of a widespread 
constitutional development then taking place in many parts of the world.” He argues 
that this awareness of the Ottoman, Egyptian, Japanese, Indian, and Chinese 
experiences made constitution a logical choice for Iranian politicians.168 Iranians 
certainly followed events like the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, and 
were part of the same global Asian networks of information that included the likes of 
Sun Yat-sen, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, and Liang Qichao. Some even traveled to China, 
including Mehdi Qolī Hedāyat, and Amīn al-Sulṭān, who visited with six companions in 
1903.169 Moḥammad-ʿAli Sayyāḥ (d. 1925), a liberal constitutionalist, also visited 
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China, although he did not leave a record of his travels.170 Iranian Constitutional-era 
papers carried small articles about events in China, including the Calcutta-based Ḥabl 
al-matīn, which had a regular section that summarized news from China and Europe.  
Therefore, the absence of Iranian voices in this chapter does not reflect a lack of 
such sources in the record, but rather the inaccessibility of that record to the author of 
this study at present. There appears to have been substantially more awareness of the 
Iranian constitutional revolution in China than the Chinese revolution in Iran, in part 
because the most dramatic successes of the Chinese movement occurred in 1911, years 
after after the Iranian constitutionalists had already faltered. By contrast, the major 
dramas of the Iranian revolution unfolded while the Chinese revolution was still nascent 
and in search of inspiration. The Japanese constitutional revolution was much more 
closely followed by Iranians, in part because it occurred before their movement, and in 
part because of the dramatic successes of the Japanese in the years that followed. 
Travelogues like Hedāyat’s do not appear to have been readily available in later years, 
even to diplomats working in China. However, without a more thorough review of the 
record, it cannot be conclusively said that Iranians had no interest in China’s early 
republican history. Rather than provide an incomplete analysis based on a preliminary 
reading, the addition of an Iranian perspective to the current story will remain for a 
future study. 
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Chapter 2: Iran-Republic of China Relations: 1920-1949 
When discussing modern China's international relations, it becomes necessary 
after a point to specify “which China.” Over the last century, two separate 
governments have made competing claims to be the sole legitimate representative 
governing body of China, regardless of who controls the territory. Before the Chinese 
Civil War (1927-1949), the Guomindang government was recognized internationally 
as the sole government of China. Following the victory of the Chinese Community 
Party (CCP) in 1949 and the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the 
remaining Nationalist forces were forced to flee to the island of Taiwan. To this day, 
both nations claim to be the official representatives of “China,” although international 
opinion has mostly deferred to the reality of the PRC’s territorial control. One result of 
this diplomatic headache is that while Iran did not have diplomatic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China, it did have a long-standing relationship with the Republic 
of China, which blurred the lines between official and unofficial relations.  
Diplomacy between Iran and Nationalist China began with the signing of the 
Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920, an event carefully analyzed by Li-chiao Chen.171 He 
argues that the treaty was part of China and Iran attempts at “strengthening themselves 
and their search for independence and integrity after the First World War” and their 
opposition to extraterritoriality in international affairs.172 While Chen’s article provides 
valuable context, it is limited by an incomplete view of the whole of Sino-Iranian 
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relations. For example, Chen erroneously claims that “only a draft and not a formal 
treaty was signed” and that “the two Asian countries had no official contact, such as a 
consulate or a legation…until 1942.”173 This is an understandable oversight, as no 
study of this period exists in the literature. The Iran-ROC connection has been largely 
overlooked in favor of later connections with the PRC. This chapter instead presents 
Iran-Republic of China relations as part of the overall story of Sino-Iranian interaction. 
It aims to fill a gap in the literature by sketching out a narrative of the Republic of 
China’s relations with the Iran between 1920 and 1949. 
The Sino-Iranian Treaty was officially ratified in 1922, and an official 
consulate was established in Shanghai in 1934.174 These events took place against the 
backdrop of Sino-Iranian cooperation and competition at the League of Nations. Both 
China and Iran sought to improve their international prestige by participating in the 
institutions of European diplomacy. Chinese merchants and Iranian traders in Shanghai 
took advantage of this impulse to push their own economic interests. They petitioned 
for a Sino-Iranian trade agreement that would enable the revival of direct silk and tea 
trade between the two nations, which led Iran to dispatch a mission to establish an East 
Asian trade organization in Shanghai. An official trade agreement was never signed, 
but this period left a lasting positive impression of Nationalist China on the Iranian 
state. Furthermore, it highlights the fascinating story of Iranian merchant interests in 
Nationalist Shanghai, which played a more significant role in driving forward Sino-
Iranian relations than previously believed. 
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Before 1949, international opinion was mostly in agreement that the Nationalist 
Republic of China, led by General Chiang Kai-Shek, was China's legitimate 
government, although large swaths remained under local rule. After dominating his 
rivals, Chiang’s Nationalist Party, the Guomindang, emerged as the country's main 
political organization. Chiang soon faced opposition from a wide array of social 
groups, including the nascent Chinese Communist Party, which had been formed under 
Soviet tutelage on July 23rd, 1921. Conflict between the two culminated in a wave of 
bloody repressions at the hands of the Nationalists, followed by a protracted civil war 
that began in 1927 and continued intermittently until 1949. Over time, the Communists 
eventually reversed the tide against the better armed, better funded, and internationally 
recognized Nationalist government. In May of 1949, after Nanjing surrendered to the 
CCP, Chiang declared martial law, and the Republican army and administration fled 
the mainland to Taiwan.  
On October 1st, 1949, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party 
officially declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China. In the eyes of the 
international community, the Republic of China was still seen at China's legitimate 
government, but the country was unquestionably under the control of the CCP. The 
PRC spent the next several decades advocating that nations switch recognition from 
the ROC to themselves, a policy that achieved considerable success with the Republic 
of China's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971. By that time, most of the world 




governments lay claim to the entirety of the nation, including Taiwan, and consider the 
other to be illegitimate. Therefore “China” can refer to the PRC, the ROC, or the socio-
cultural entity rather than the state itself. For the present chapter, the use of “China” 
denotes the Nationalist government, and the Communist government will be 
distinguished as the PRC, CCP, or the People’s Republic of China.   
Official contacts between the Iran and the Republic of China came into being 
as both states underwent profound political and social upheavals in the late 1910s 
and early 1920s that left them under the control of military modernizers. Iran found 
itself under foreign occupation, split between Great Britain and Tsarist Russia. At the 
same time, Bolshevism became an increasingly powerful force in Iran, especially in 
provinces close to the Soviet border and largely non-Persian populations. After the 
outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the nascent Soviet Union supported several 
democratic and leftist social movements within Iran, including the Jangali movement 
and the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic, also called the Soviet Republic of Gilan.175 
In the ensuing political struggle, Reza Khan, an ambitious and rapidly rising military 
officer, was able to consolidate power by brutally crushing democratic experiments 
in the provinces. His rise was facilitated by a political elite that had largely 
abandoned the project of liberal democracy for an “illiberal nationalism” that drew 
on the rhetoric of cultural renewal that was sweeping across Asia.176  He crowned 
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himself “Reza Shah Pahlavi” in 1926 and declared the beginning of a new dynasty.177  
Historians have disagreed in their assessment of Reza Shah and the impact of 
his period of rule. While some have seen him as a modernizer and reformer, others 
have argued that he was primarily driven by a desire to “expand his control by 
expanding his state’s power into all sectors of the country - into its polity, economy, 
society, and ideology.”178 Much of his expansion of state power was centered around 
state bureaucracy and the military. Between 1925 and 1941, the military tripled in 
size, and the state bureaucracy had grown from nearly non-existent to employing 
over 90,000 people.179 Reza Shah himself put on a military persona and often 
appeared publicly in his general’s uniform. He centralized economic and political 
power in a personal patronage network and transformed the Majles into a virtually 
meaningless institution. His government laid railroads, built factories, and set up 
electrical grids. The education system was transformed along Western lines, 
expanded, and standardized. A secular judicial system replaced the traditional 
religious courts. Edicts were issued that attempted to ban various forms of Islamic 
and “traditional” attire.180 Under his rule, the state sought to directly influence the 
daily lives of Iranian citizens in unprecedented ways. To promote national unity, he 
embraced an ethnic nationalist reading of Iranian history that relied heavily on 
visions of ancient Aryan glory. In short, the Iranian state extended its reach into new 
realms previously untouched by the Qājārs. 
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The role of Reza Shah in Iran is often compared to that of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk (1881-1938) in neighboring Turkey, but an equally useful comparison can be 
made to China’s Chiang Kai-Shek, who became the official leader of the Republic of 
China in 1928. Like Reza Shah, Chiang took power when the central government 
had largely collapsed and was challenged by local military powers. Like Reza Shah, 
“Generalissimo” Chiang Kai-Shek cultivated a military image and leaned heavily on 
the military to support his rule, especially once the Japanese invasion began in 1931. 
Despite the challenges brought by the war, Chiang’s government still made 
substantial efforts to modernize the country's political, transportation, military, and 
economic systems. Chiang also attempted to promote nationalist sentiment and 
ideological unity through appeals to the ancient past, using a social and cultural 
reform movement based on neo-Confucian and Christian morality. Like Reza Shah, 
Chiang remains a controversial figure among both the public and historians. The 
Republic of China under the Guomindang was undoubtedly an authoritarian one-
party state, and Chiang brooked no challenges to his rule. The point to bear in mind 
is that there was a marked similarity in the political and ideological approaches of 
both the Republic of Chinese and Iran, which encouraged co-operation and friendly 
relations between the two.  
Foreign policy is often related to domestic pressures and state ideology, and a 
common approach to politics can sometimes translate into a compatible approach to 
international relations. There was a desire among both Iranian and Chinese elites to 




community. External aggression and foreign concessions had badly damaged Iranian 
prestige by the early 1920s. To this end, Iranian officials sought out alliances with a 
“third power” in the West to counterbalance their two main rivals, Britain and 
Russia. They also concluded agreements with Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan that 
enhanced their international standing. These alliances often had little practical or 
long-term significance, but they allowed Iran to be seen acting independently and on 
its own terms.181  
The pressure to establish official relations and conduct independent 
diplomacy with as many states as possible was also present in China. Diplomatic 
defeats after the Opium Wars and World War I formed an integral part of the 
“national humiliation” narrative. In the words of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, China’s 
government sought “the status of absolute independence and equality in the family of 
nations.” Chiang’s overriding foreign policy concern was Japanese aggression, but 
minor relations were established with other countries to advance the image of a new 
China conducting its affairs on equal footing with the world.182  Sino-Iranian 
relations in this era should be understood in the context of this goal, which was both 
personal and political to many Iranian and Chinese intellectuals.  
Iran’s early relationship with Turkey serves as a clear example of this 
dynamic in the history of modern Iranian diplomacy. In his essay “Performing the 
Nation: The Shah's official state visit to Kemalist Turkey, June to July 1934,” Afshin 
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Marashi describes the pomp and circumstance surrounding Reza Khan’s widely 
publicized trip to Ankara in the summer of 1934. Crowds poured into streets 
decorated with nationalist symbols, enthusiastically waving flags and taking part in 
the performance of the nation. Marashi succinctly describes the international context 
in which this event occurred:  
The elaborate and public nature of the welcoming ceremony at the Ankara 
train station reflected the new political climate of the emerging inter-war 
Middle Eastern state system. In the aftermath of the First World War, the 
Wilsonian doctrines of national sovereignty and international diplomacy had 
produced an increasingly formalised international system of nation-states. 
The demise of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov empires— and the 
establishment of the League of Nations— led to the century’s first springtime 
of nations and the emergence of a wave of new states seeking recognition 
within the new international order. 183 
More than the norms of international diplomacy, this reflected how Asian 
elites viewed the world and their rightful place in it. There was an underlying belief 
in a “political metaphysic” that presumed an international community of equal 
partners, from which the non-West had been excluded.184 In forging new relations 
with one another, Asian elites sought to resist this pattern and assert their 
independence. Conducting interstate relations under the rules of Western diplomacy 
was a way to rectify the humiliations of the colonial era and assert themselves on an 
international stage as modern societies. 
 At the same time, these moments of engagement were not only for the eyes of the 
West. Domestic audiences were also an important target of the performance of 
nationhood. Diplomatic visits, especially at such a high level, were important because 
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they “worked to publicise the adoption of the new Wilsonian model of national politics 
by the two emerging states” and to “circulate a new set of national symbols with which to 
define themselves, their relationship to each other, and their place in the world.” 185 
Encounters with the Chinese “other” provided the opportunity to present a representation 
of China that served to bolster the Iranian nationalist narratives. Moments of official 
representation, sometimes published in newspapers for public consumption, allowed for 
the performance of diplomatic ceremonies that reflected the military and modernizing 
ideology of both states. While China was not nearly as important to Iran as Turkey and 
therefore less widely publicized, official Sino-Iranian relations can also be understood 
through this lens. Due to the lack of significant economic, cultural, or strategic ties, early 
official interactions were partly performative, driven by the desire for prestige, and 
mediated by Chinese and Iranian notions of political and cultural identity. In the Republic 
of China, as it was with Turkey, this was enhanced by the fact that the two states shared a 
common nationalist-modernization ideology. 
Sino-Iranian Co-operation and Competition, 1920-1941  
As Li-Chiao Chen has argued, the end of World War I created new 
opportunities for both China and Iran to reverse some of the misfortunes it had 
suffered at the hands of European powers. Taiwanese scholar Chi-Hua Tang refers to 
the Chinese government's efforts to abrogate or otherwise cancel the Unequal 
Treaties and their humiliating terms as “Treaty Revision Diplomacy.”186 Chief 
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among these terms was the right of extraterritoriality, a perennial concern of Iranian 
and Chinese nationalists.187 China had unsuccessfully attempted to cancel 
extraterritorial rights for most European countries when it entered World War I and 
was in the process of trying to regain control of the Shandong Peninsula, which had 
been ceded to Japan without Chinese consent at the Treaty of Paris. Iran had also 
canceled its extraterritorial rights with Russia, now the Soviet Union, after the 
Russian Revolution toppled the imperial state.188 The Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 
1919 tried to renegotiate Iran’s relationship with Britain along more independent 
lines, but it was never ratified due to public opposition to British and Russian 
interference.189 By early 1920, both China and Iran were new members of the League 
of Nations and were actively searching for a way to bolster their prestige in the 
context of these ongoing struggles. 
In March, 1920, Chinese and Iranian representatives met for the first time in 
Rome.190 The initiative was taken by Isaac Khan, the Iranian minister in Italy, who 
had been instructed to pursue a friendship treaty with China by the Iranian 
government.191 Chinese minister Wang Kuang-Chi welcomed the development, 
saying “China and Iran were ancient civilized countries, but all encountered serious 
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challenges from foreign powers now,” and the Chinese Foreign Ministry wrote that 
“Iran has been a friend of business since the Tang dynasty, and now has the same 
ambition as ours.”192 The most important feature of the treaty was that it stipulated 
that all citizens “will be subject to the local laws, and all judicial matters arising from 
disputes, crimes, etc. will be settled before the local tribunals of Persia or China, 
respectively.”193 For China, it was only the second “equal treaty” (to borrow Chen’s 
phrase) to be signed without an extraterritoriality agreement, after the Sino-Bolivian 
Friendship Treaty that preceded it in 1919.194 The treaty was ratified on February 6th, 
1922.195 Chinese newspapers emphasized the significance of concluding the treaty 
without extraterritoriality.196  
For the next twelve years, there would not be any substantial development in 
Sino-Iranian relations; ambassadors were not exchanged and no further diplomatic 
communication was attempted. This is possibly due to the changing priorities of the 
Iranian state under Reza Shah, who came to power over this period and had many 
competing foreign policy and developmental priorities. Relations with China, a low 
priority to begin with, likely fell by the wayside. Despite this lull, the press continued 
to follow Iranian affairs. Amanat notes that during this period “the political climate 
noticeably shifted in favor of Reza Khan,” in part because of his use of political 
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intimidation and hired thugs to oppress his opponents.197 Shen Bao noted Reza 
Shah’s rise to power, which was inaccurately portrayed as a reaction to popular 
demand. A Shen Bao report alludes to “opposition from religious leaders and the 
people” to establishing a republic.198 Another describes an incident at the Majles in 
on March 21st, 1924 as the result of popular pressure: 
The Persian King has long been in Europe, which has led to a movement to 
reform the Persian Republic. The conservatives have become more 
entrenched in parliament. Some support a republic, but there are still many 
people who support the Shah. Opponents of the Republicans crowded into 
congress and the police could not control them. Members of Congress who 
advocated for a republic were beaten…199 
Praise for Reza Shah was the norm, usually presented as analogous to China’s 
national heroes or other nationalist strongmen. A later article gives a retrospective of 
the Shah’s life that cast him as the founder of a republic and a nationalist modernizer,   
a kind of a combination between Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek: 
He ordered the former King of Persia to go abroad, and planned to change 
Persia into a Republic, with himself as the president. Later, due to the fact 
that...the Persian people were not very satisfied with the Republican system, 
Reza Khan was formally appointed as the hereditary Shah. He reorganized 
the army, defeated the bandits and rebellious Turkish chieftains, and enacted 
a new constitution...Women do not wear veils, schools have been set up, 
streets are opened, new homes are built, public health is protected...the 
biggest achievement is the construction of a railway...Among the countries of 
the Near East, Reza Shah's position is only matched by Kemal of Turkey...the 
motherland has achieve a strong position thanks to the Iranian founder Reza 
Shah, and it shines brightly in the deserts of the East.200 
This hagiographic portrayal of Reza Shah is indicative of the ideological affinities 
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between Nationalist China and Pahlavi Iran that facilitated good relations between 
both states.  
By the late 1920s, China and Iran found themselves in competition over a 
position of influence in the League of Nations. League leadership comprised fourteen 
council seats, five of which were permanent - held by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, 
and Germany - and the rest distributed among various European and South American 
states. Only one seat was reserved for Asia, and competition frequently fell between 
China, Iran, and later Turkey.201 For example, China occupied the seat in 1928, but it 
was forced to vacate because Persia was gathering support to mount a challenge. 
Persia issued an apology to the Chinese state and expressed hopes that it would “not 
harm friendly relations between China and Persia.”202 In 1930, China was prevented 
from occupying another seat available on the principle that “Asia should have one 
non-permanent seat at a time,” and Iran’s term was not yet up.203 The next year, Iran 
was the one forced to step down in favor of China.204 When this term expired in 
1934, Iran first put itself forth as a candidate to challenge the Chinese and then later 
withdrew in favor of Turkey, which had a better chance of winning. The North China 
Herald observed that “Persia's withdrawal in favour of Turkey increases the 
opposition to China's chance of retaining the seat.”205 Iran sent its first ambassador to 
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China at the height of this diplomatic rivalry.206 
China and Iran’s interactions at the League of Nations often surrounded a critical 
international issue for both nations: the opium trade. Despite being illegal, opium was the 
main commodity traded between China and Iran in the early 1900s. This trade was the 
legacy of British imperial networks and continued well into the 1940s. Ram Regavim has 
completed a detailed study of the Iranian opium industry and its relationship to China 
during this period. 207 According to Regavim, after the rise of Reza Khan, the Iranian 
opium industry was mostly tolerated and eventually became a government monopoly.208 
In 1923, the North China Herald reported that 12,642 pounds of opium had been 
officially imported into China from Iran, according to statistics provided by Arthur 
Millspaugh, the American adviser in charge of Iranian finances.209 In 1925, the Advisory 
Council of the League of Nations Opium Commission declared that “Persia has already 
this year exported 460 tons of illicit opium, most of which is supposed to have been 
smuggled into China.”210 Opium itself had been derisively called “Persian Dirt” (波斯土) 
in the Chinese press since the 1870s. Curbing this trade was exceedingly difficult, as the 
Iranian government had little incentive to end one of the most important revenue sources 
for its military and industrializing policies.211 A League of Nations commission in the 
1920s found no evidence that the Iranian government was making any serious attempt to 
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curb opium cultivation or smoking. 
Ending the opium trade ranked as a main objective for China's Republican 
government and for Chinese intellectuals, who viewed it as part of a long history of 
humiliation. In the nineteenth century, Britain had forced the militarily weak Qing state 
to accept a legal opium trade in two Opium Wars, which exacerbated a severe social 
problem and created a deep and lasting sense of injustice. By the 1900s, efforts to ban 
the trade had become increasingly transnational, and Chinese activists recognized that 
“China alone cannot hope to cope with the problem of narcotic drugs; permanent 
success in our war with opium requires effective cooperation between all the opium-
producing and drug -manufacturing countries.”212 The First International Opium 
Convention was held in Shanghai as early as 1912, and the League of Nations 
established the League’s Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium in 1921. However, 
Iran was not particularly keen to cooperate; Iranian participation in these institutions 
was mainly to stave off regulation, and later to ensure that the lucrative opium industry 
was replaced with funding for development projects. EROC delegates took part in these 
organizations as well, and disputes between the two sides over opium production 
played out in an international arena.  
Iran’s unwillingness to modify its position on the opium issue was evident even 
when ostensibly participating in organizations dedicated to curbing its spread. On May 
26th, 1936, the ROC delegate to the League Advisory Committee in Geneva raised the 
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opium issue to his Iranian counterpart. He demanded an explanation of why quantities 
of opium had been shipped to China without import certificates, which were used to 
verify the opium was used for medical purposes. The Iranian delegate replied that “his 
Government was not a signatory to The Hague and Geneva Conventions” and that 
“certain regions of China” might have escaped Chinese regulatory control and failed to 
inspect the certificates. When pressed for which regions he specifically had in mind, the 
representative was forced to admit that “Chinese ships called at times at Iranian ports, 
presenting alleged import certificates which the Government of Iran was not checking 
up.”213 While this somewhat tense exchange shows that opium could cause friction 
between the two countries, such conflict occurred against a backdrop of steadily 
increasing relations. It seems likely that both the opium trade and the competition 
between China and Iran at the League of Nations were a factor in the ROC's decision to 
pursue closer ties to further influence the Iranian government. Most importantly, both 
states were seen on the international stage conducting their own affairs, in diplomatic 
arenas previously reserved for Western nations. 
Shanghai Diplomacy 
The first Iranian diplomatic representative in modern China was Mirza 
Hossein Khan Keyostevan, who arrived in Shanghai on May 7th, 1934.214 
Keyostevan had joined the Iranian Foreign Service in 1916, and was consul in 
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Karachi, India before his appointment in Shanghai.215 Prior to his arrival, unofficial 
relations had been maintained by the owner of a large Iranian shipping company 
operating in Shanghai called Nemazee & Co. The appointment attracted international 
attention because of the supposed resumption of ties after 1300 years. Time 
Magazine wrote “The proudest of Persians last week was Hossein Khan 
Keyostevan…he had just received orders to go next month to Shanghai and open a 
Persian consulate, thus becoming the first man in 1,300 years to establish official 
diplomatic relations between Persia and China.”216 This was actually inaccurate, as 
China had last had diplomatic contact with Safavid Iran (1501-1736) less than 400 
years ago.217 The Chinese press reported this fact correctly. The new embassy was 
located at No. 5, Lane 591, Jing'an Temple, near the Italian consulate.218 
 
Fig 3 
 Key Ostovan quickly immersed himself in Shanghai diplomatic circles. He 
had frequent meetings with the mayor and with members of the Foreign Ministry in 
Nanjing.219  A common sight at art exhibitions, cocktail parties, and other prominent 
social events, he was often surrounded by other diplomats and foreign 
representatives that undoubtedly made for an impressive statement of the growing 
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international prestige of modern China.220 He also attended public memorials and 
other rituals of statesmanship, including a visit to the mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen and 
a memorial for King George V.221 He was frequently depicted in the press, in both 
photographs and cartoons. The presence of Key Ostovan and other diplomats in 
Shanghai allowed the Chinese state to act out nationalist rituals with international 
actors. It served a function beyond the importance of the relationship itself – which 
in this case was not particularly important – for the propaganda and identity building 
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in Shanghai. Sketched on the occasion of his arrival in China. 222 
Overall, there was little pressing need for Sino-Iranian cooperation, as both 
countries were quite remote and had only cursory economic and cultural ties. According 
to official publications, Reza Khan pursued ties with China out of a desire to raise Iran's 
profile internationally and to protect the interests of Iranian merchants.223 Shanghai had 
long been home to a small community of Iranian traders. However, the trade level was 
relatively low and primarily consisted of cotton, wool, dates, cigarettes, dried fruits, 
alcoholic beverages, chemical reagents like ferric acid, and wheat flour.224 Iran primarily 
imported tea, silk, and other luxury items from China.225 Furthermore, although exact 
figures are difficult to confirm, statistics from the Chinese press suggest that there were 
only a few Iranian households in Shanghai in the 1930s; in 1934, only two households 
consisting of five men and five women each were officially recorded.226 News articles 
alluded to the fact that “the number of overseas Chinese doing direct business in Persia is 
very small, just like the overseas Chinese in Persia,” and that “the number of overseas 
Chinese in Persia is not very large, about 100 people.”227 In an article in The Singapore 
Free Press and Mercantile Advisor, Key Ostovan claimed that “there are more than 2,000 
Persians in China, most of them being centered in Chinese Turkestan. In Shanghai, 
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however, there are only about 100.”228 European globalization had effectively 
disconnected China and Iran from each other and circumvented their traditional economic 
ties. 
Still, the Iranian government was keen to increase business ties with China. 
Ostovan spoke of increasing trade ties and the need to conduct business “directly” 
between China and Iran from his first day in Shanghai.229 Commerce between the two 
nations had become indirect with the rise of railroads and steamships, which had routed 
Chinese and Iranian imports and exports through third parties like India and Russia.230 
This was particularly the case with tea, one of the most important globally traded 
commodities in the early 20th-century world.231 An article memorializing the death of a 
pioneering Iranian tea trader in Shanghai, Mr. H. M. H. Nemazee, explains how Iranians 
like himself played a key role in the tea trade in Shanghai: 
Mr. Nemazee was formerly head of the firm of H. M. H Nemazee & Sons, which 
he founded in 1893. Prior to that date, green tea was shipped overland by camel 
caravans through India and Afghanistan to the markets of Central Asia. Coming 
to Shanghai for the autumn races, Mr. Nemazee soon came to the conclusion that 
if the tea were packed in cases and shipped by way of the Black Sea, it would 
arrive in better condition...His commercial activities covered a wide field, and 
extended to the control of a large fleet of fourteen steamers plying between the 
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China coast and Arabia.232 
A 1910 report indicates that the bulk of tea shipments that year were going through 
Russia, specifically to Batumi in present-day Georgia, which suggests that they were 
bound for Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and western Russian markets.233 Nemazee is 
listed as the second-largest exporter to Batoum, with 45,012 half-chests of tea shipped 
that year.234 A 1913 report similarly indicated that “tea now ranks as an import of first 
importance in Persia.”235 Iranians like Nemazee played a key role in re-routing exports 
bound for Central Asia and the Middle East through European intermediaries. 
 
Fig 6. An advertisement for Nemazee & Co in The China Press, a British periodical.236 
 Both the Chinese and Iranian governments had reasons to promote the tea trade 
and made efforts to do so, and these efforts were not always complimentary. The Iranian 
state had acquired a monopoly on the sale, importation, export, and storage of tea and 
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sugar in 1925.237 In 1930, Iran employed six Chinese experts to advise the government on 
tea plantation development, which led to the creation of a tea drying facility in Lahjan in 
1936.238 Ironically, this damaged Chinese tea producers at a time when Chinese exports 
to Russia were already falling. An article in The China Press describes the competition 
between China and Iran over Russian markets: 
Persia has employed six Chinese experts to advise the Minister of Agriculture in 
the matter of planting... Persia is exceptionally well situated to supply Muscovite 
needs and there appears to be no reason, climatic or other, why tea culture should 
not be equally as successful in Persia as in Assam. Existing extensions of the 
Russian railway system will bring the consumer into close contact with Persian 
plantations and one further blow will be dealt to China's diminishing export of a 
staple, in the production of which this country led the world until a half a century 
ago.239 
China was equally facing competition from Britain, whose re-export of Indian tea to 
Russia cut into a sizable portion of the Chinese tea trade.240 Consequently, Chinese 
tea producers had strong motivation to conclude a trade agreement that would enable 
Chinese goods, especially tea, to supply Iran directly rather than through Russian, 
Indian, or British intermediaries. Opening markets in Iran directly to Chinese goods 
would offset some of the recent losses caused by Iranian competition. 
Unofficial Sino-Iranian networks were directly involved in pushing for 
improved trade relations. After the arrival of an official Iranian representative, 
merchant organizations in Shanghai took the initiative to advocate for a Sino-Iranian 
trade agreement. Between 1934 and 1936, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce 
 
237 “Tea Monopoly is Granted in Persia.” The China Press (1925-1938), Jun 02, 1925 
238 Abidi 30  
239 “Persia Planting Tea.” The China Press (1925-1938), Sep 11, 1930.   
240 Wade, H. T. “THE TEA SEASON OF 1913: HOW CHINA IS BEING OUSTED SOME WAYS OF 




received no less than three letters from a consortium of Chinese and Persian 
merchants based in Fujian. The first was sent on June 15th, 1934, three months after 
Key Ostovan’s arrival: 
The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce reported yesterday that the Ministry of 
Industry of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanjing received a letter from 
the Yangzhuang Tea Association (Yangzhuang chaye gonghui 
洋莊茶業公會) on the 15th of this month. According to this letter from the 
Persian merchants, Persia imports 12 to 15 million pounds of black tea every 
year, about 200,000 to 250,000 boxes, all from India, Ceylon, Java, and 
Taiwan. In the past, Persia imported mostly Chinese tea, but since the 
establishment of a monopoly, Chinese tea has disappeared from the Persian 
market...the reason is that China has not concluded a trade agreement with 
the country.241   
The letter claimed that representatives from the tea trade had been one of the reasons 
the Chinese government had reached out to Iran in the first place, but that the 
government had inexplicably stopped. It also proposed that the government offer 
Persia a contract to purchase tea at a minimal tax and a most-favored-nation clause to 
ensure that other countries did not outbid China. The association felt that China had 
to make the first move, as the market for Iranian products in China was relatively 
small, so Iran had less motivation to conclude a deal. “After signing this agreement, 
there will be more of Persia in China.”242 
 When a few months had passed without an agreement, a representative of the 
Yangzhuang Tea Association sent another letter on August 29th, 1934. This one 
urged the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to use its influence and pressure the 
government to conclude a deal: 
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It has been a long time since the start of negotiations between the two sides 
on the Sino-Persian trade agreement regarding the export of tea...If no 
agreement is made, the national tea industry will be restrited...it will be 
difficult to develop...For this reason, I have sent a letter to the City Chamber 
of Commerce, urging you to petition the Ministry of Foreign Affairs...If there 
is a delay in the agreement, then Chinese tea markets may make the same 
mistake as the Treaty of Tianjin [when China ceded trading rights to France 
and effectively ended its influence in Vietnam]. 243   
The repeated requests show the importance of this issue to the local Chinese and 
Iranian merchant community. The specter of diplomatic disasters like the Unequal 
Treaties was invoked in Sino-Iranian relations to promote a defensive trade 
agreement that would help Chinese merchants regain some ground lost to colonial 
competitors. 
 Tea traders were not the only industry interested in a Sino-Iranian trade deal. 
On November 8th, 1934, a third letter reached the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 
this time from the Silk Industry Association: 
Regarding the Sino-Iranian trade agreement, which the government has not 
yet brought up...In Persia, in addition to Chinese tea, Chinese silk is also a 
bulk export product. Since the country concluded an unequal tariff treaty, 
both silk and tea have disappeared in Persia...After several negotiations, a 
satisfactory result has not yet been obtained...our pain is the same as the tea 
industry...It seems there is no hope of success at the present. 244 
An update on negotiations was published a month later by a newspaper in Nanjing, 
which claimed the two sides were close to an agreement. The treaty was framed as a 
way to rescue the embattled silk and tea industries in Shanghai: “the Shanghai silk 
and tea industry was hit by overseas trade...Please quickly conclude the Sino-Persian 
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trade treaty to provide relief.”245 However, four months later, that relief had still not 
arrived, and it seems the Iranian government did not respond to the Chinese draft 
proposal.246 
While an official agreement was never concluded, the advocacy surrounding 
it did lead towards greater Sino-Iranian cooperation. The Iranian government 
eventually dispatched personnel to Shanghai to set up a Far East Trade Bureau to 
improve Iran’s foreign trade ties throughout Asia. The Consulate was also upgraded 
to a Consulate General office in 1936, which coincided with a flurry of visits from 
“Iranian guests” and meetings with the Iranian ambassador widely publicized in Shen 
Bao and other dailies.247 It is unknown what delayed the Sino-Iranian trade deal in 
the years that followed. It was possibly opposed by Iran’s growing national industry 
of tea merchants, who would have no reason to welcome Chinese competition. 
However, the question was rendered moot just a few years after; World War I broke 
out in 1939, and Iran was occupied by Britain and Russia in 1941. In the years that 
followed, the question of a trade deal would fall by the wayside and Sino-Iranian ties 
would once again become indirect. Iranian interests in China were managed in part 
by foreign intermediaries: first the Netherlands in 1941, and later Turkey, reflecting 
the low level of priority given to this relationship. An official embassy would not be 
established until after the war, in 1944, first in Chongqing and then later moved to 
Nanjing. These events were covered in the Chinese, Iranian, and international press, 
 
245 “Sino-Persian Treaty are Mutual Consultation” (中波訂約在相互磋商中). Shen Bao. January 6, 1935. 
246 “Sino-Persian Negotaiations” (中波議訂商約) Shen Bao, April 22nd, 1935 
,247 “Iranian Office in Shanghai Upgraded (伊朗駐滬領署昇格)”, Shen Bao 1872-1949 [Shanghai], March 




but only with passing interest.248 
Conclusions 
From the 1920s until the early 1950s, Iranian state ties to Nationalist China 
were relatively weak. They were driven by two factors: a desire for international 
prestige and the demands of Chinese and Iranian merchants in Shanghai. Iran and the 
Republic of China competed in international markets and political organizations, and 
each had divergent priorities on issues like opium and the tea trade. However, the two 
states had complementary ideological orientations and historical outlooks, especially 
when it came to Western imperialism. At the behest of Chinese merchants and in search 
of diplomatic victories following the Treaty of Paris, China reached out to Iran and 
attempted to conclude a trade agreement. Iran responded by signing the Sino-Persian 
Treaty of 1920 and establishing unofficial representation in Shanghai in 1934. It was 
generally disinterested in opening Iran to Chinese goods, especially tea and silk, as a 
nascent national Iranian industry stood ready to compete with Chinese producers. 
Connections in trade, state visits, and other official interactions served the additional 
purpose of legitimizing both of these rapidly modernizing Asian states' independence 
and authority and were facilitated by a similar ideological and political orientation.  
While Sino-Iranian relations in this period were not substantial, they offer a 
fascinating window into Iranian merchant communities' activities in Shanghai and the 
international community of diplomats that closely supported them. Although small, the 
Persians of Shanghai and Hong Kong seems to have held a substantial amount of 
 




political and economic influence relative to their size in early 20th century China. 
Additional research is necessary into the history of this poorly studied diaspora 
community. The figure of Key Ostovan, an important constitutionalist figure and ally of 
Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882-1967), is similarly unknown in Iranian Studies. Minor 
political relationships can take on a new significance from local actors' perspective and 
their attempts to resist the challenges of a global economic system dominated by 
Europe. It seems to have been local economic concerns that initially drove Nationalist 
China to make contact with Iran. In Fujian, tea and silk producers advocated for their 
own economic interests and sought to open up the Iranian market to Chinese goods. 
Traditional diplomatic analysis privileges questions of international diplomacy and 
influence, and while the pursuit of prestige and an end to extraterritoriality play an 
important role, such analyses overlook the influence of non-state actors. 
The day to day activities of seemingly insignificant diplomats and international 
high society figures can play a role in constructing state identity and elite propaganda. 
Key Ostovan and other diplomats performed for other elites the desired image of the 
Chinese nation's international character by their presence at memorials and public 
events. At the same time, a positive appraisal of Reza Shah emerged in the Chinese 
press, which whitewashed his autocratic methods and emphasized his role as a national 
founder and modernist strongman, a role analogous to China’s own Chiang Kai-shek. 
On his way back to Iran after serving two years in China, Key Ostovan expressed an 




a great patriot, who is working only for peace and prosperity.”249 In Iran, these 
portrayals were matched by a growing discourse that lionized Chiang and Nationalist 
























Chapter 3 - Competing Visions of China - Sino-Iranian Relations, 1949-1959 
This chapter will compare the impact of the Chinese Communist Revolution of 
1949 on official and unofficial Sino-Iranian relations. It will chart the emergence of two 
competing visions of China, one espoused by the state, the other by its communist 
opposition. Unofficial ties developed between the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Iranian Tudeh Party, primarily through networks of student activists from Iran that 
visited China for international conferences. Official ties between Iran and the Republic 
of China persisted through the 1950s and were increasingly visible to Iranian elites. 
This period also saw a substantial travelogue from an Iranian diplomat and an increase 
in stories about China and Chinese history in newspapers and cultural magazines. In 
comparing these different media, it is clear that at least two ideas about China, 
seemingly at odds, were being proposed in Iran: one which saw China as a positive 
model for the future and one which saw China as a negative example to avoid. 
Simultaneously, in China, a positive view of the Iranian people was being promoted 
alongside a highly negative view of the Iranian government. How can we make sense of 
these competing representations, and what can they tell us about either society's 
history? 
China as a Threat: The Specter of a Chinese Communist Revolution in Iran 
Sino-Iranian relations and events in China received significantly more attention 
in the Iranian press starting in the 1950s. This change was precipitated by the victory of 




expansion of Communism. 250 The United States had been supporting Chiang Kai-shek, 
but this support could not reverse the tide of events on the mainland. The question of 
how China was “lost” by the West became a serious preoccupation for Western 
politicians and the American voting public. So great was the concern that it led 
historian Robert Newman to remark that “[t]o many Americans, the atheists defeated 
the Christians in 1949.”251 This event set off a wave of anti-communist sentiment and 
was one of the events that set the tone of the Cold War as an ideological conflict.  
Iranian politicians shared American sentiments about the Chinese Revolution 
because of their political connections with American politicians and shared sources of 
information. The government of Reza Shah was anti-communist both on ideological 
and practical grounds. Following Mohammad Reza Shah’s accession to the throne in 
1941, the monarchy's weakness allowed political parties and open politics to re-emerge. 
Among the many political movements of this period, the Tudeh Party was the only one 
that developed a base among the masses and was highly successful in organizing oil 
refinery workers.252 The Tudeh also had a phenomenally successful social program that 
included outreach at various levels, from labor unions to media publications to social 
outreach. The party flexed its muscle in 1951, when it organized massive strikes and 
protests that paralyzed the oil industry and sent the Iranian parliament into a panic 
about the growing power of Marxism in Iran.253 Soviet support for opponents of the 
Shah and the self-evident strength of the Tudeh Party served to increase the 
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government's hostility towards all things Marxist.  
At the same time, the United States had begun to view affairs in the Middle East 
through a Cold War lens and sought allies to block any attempts at Soviet expansion in 
the region. In 1953, the U.S. and the U.K sponsored a coup d'état against Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, who had initiated a plan to nationalize the oil industry 
with massive popular support.  The coup solidified the role of the United States as 
reliable partners for the Pahlavi government in the years that followed. In 1955, Iran 
joined the U.S.-sponsored Baghdad Pact alongside Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and the U.K 
in an effort designed to contain the USSR. By then, the Shah had established a close 
relationship with the United States by portraying himself as a deterrent to the spread of 
Soviet influence.  
All of this contributed to a state-sponsored image of China that was heavily 
influenced by Western scholarship and American politics, although not all of it was 
explicitly political. Some of the most extensive articles about China can be found in the 
pages of the popular periodical Eṭṭelāʿāt-e māhāna (Ettela’at Monthly), a monthly 
magazine associated with the oldest running Persian daily, Eṭṭelāʿāt. Ettela’at Monthly 
ran from March 1948 to March 1959, and targeted educated Iranians with an interest in 
international affairs and world cultures. Published in a bilingual edition until 1951, it 
typically carried longer articles on history, culture, and international affairs. It was 
filled with articles on Greek philosophy, French literature, and the habits and customs 




carried citations for French, English, and German studies.254  
 The most common articles about China explored particular facets of Chinese 
history or related popular Chinese myths, stories, and historical (or quasi-historical) 
episodes. One such article was published in the 1955 Farvardin edition of Ettela’at 
Monthly.255 Entitled “The Power of Love Created the Greatest Line of Defense”,256 it 
recounts the legends surrounding the first Chinese Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, including 
legendary tales of how he constructed the Great Wall and the harsh methods he used to 
consolidate his power in China. The article gives the usual statistics about the wall’s 
length and the erroneous claim that it is the only artificial structure that could be seen 
from the moon by the naked eye, likely drawn from sources in foreign periodicals.  
It also presents the story in a way that reflects the anxieties of the Iranian state 
and the priorities of contemporary development discourse. Iranian officials were fearful 
that the country would once again collapse into civil war, possibly through the 
instigation of outside forces, and sought centralization and industrial development as a 
solution. It is therefore unsurprising that the author defends reports that Qin Shi Huang 
worked over 5 million men to death, as it was to “prevent the invasion of northern 
barbarians” and “bring all Chinese soil under the banner of a single government and 
restore the greatness and power of the dynastic monarchs.” This discourse was likely 
attractive to the state, as it bolstered the Iranian government’s arguments about the 
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necessity of the monarchy in the face of challenges to central authority.   
Articles like this explored different aspects of Chinese culture but still echoed 
Western concerns. They often highlighted the perceived backwardness and inferiority of 
China vis-à-vis Iranian civilization.  The same article goes on to decry the practice of foot 
binding, which was often described as “torture”: 
Dear reader, you have probably heard that the biggest disadvantage for a Chinese woman 
is to have large feet. The feet of Chinese women are so small that they may be smaller 
than those of a five or six-year-old child. In Chinese families until recently, when a girl 
came of age, she immediately had her legs put in special restraints that prevented her 
from developing…This bizarre, torturous fashion has tormented Chinese women for 
twenty-two centuries…”257  
This discourse echoed both Chinese and Western concerns with the practice of foot 
binding, but notably has the effect of “othering” Chinese people by highlighting a cultural 
practice that seems barbarous to Iranian and Western audiences. Other articles were 
translations drawn from the Western press; for example, one piece discussing the famous 
opera Turandot by Giacomo Puccini, set in China, was taken from an unnamed European 
magazine.258 This piece uses a Persian font that mimics the brush strokes of Chinese 
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Fig 7. “Asian” style type on an article about Giacomo Puccini's “Turandot” 
 






Fig 9. Title and Illustration of an Article on the Great Wall 
Some authors took a decidedly political tone. In a three-page article published in 
1955, an unnamed author describes recent events of Chinese history. Titled “From 
Loving the Maxim Gun to the Hatred of Karl Marx’s Thoughts,” it is fiercely anti-
Communist and pro-Nationalist. “Like the melted black material that flows down from 
the mountain of fire, the volcano engulfs the surrounding plains…the Chinese 
Communists attacked Mukden…”259 It echoes the debates about “Who Lost China” that 
were prominent in Western scholarship and the American political scene. The author 
blames the defeat on a lack of American support: “Chiang sent his wife to America to ask 
the American government for help…If he could have resisted until US help arrives, many 
lives would have be saved…If America did not help, the great gap between [the 
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Fig 10. An image of Chiang Kai-shek in Ettela'at  
 
Mehdi Farrokh’s Travels in China 
One of the most interesting sources is the testament of Mehdi Farrokh (1886-
1973), an Iranian statesman and diplomat best known for his political memoirs and 
writings on the history of Afghanistan.260 Farrokh was a long-serving statesman whose 
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tenure had begun during the Constitutional Era when he fought under Sattar Khan against 
the Qājārs and their Russian allies.261 Throughout his career, he held a variety of posts, 
from senator governor-general to ambassador. In the 1920s, he served as ambassador to 
Afghanistan during political instability, an experience that informed his writing. In July 
of 1948, Farrokh was assigned as the Iranian ambassador to the Nationalist government 
in Nanjing.262 Shortly after his arrival, the Nationalists were driven out of their capital by 
the resurgent Communist forces, which Farrokh witnessed personally. Upon his return, he 
wrote an account of his travels titled One Year in the Heavenly Country of China, in 
which he described his mission to Nanjing, his political views on the situation, and the 
history and culture of China as he saw it. This volume, which has previously been 
overlooked by scholars of Iranian and Chinese diplomatic history, provides insight into 
elite Iranian attitudes towards China during the 1950s. 
Farrokh wrote his memoir for two reasons. It began when, upon his return to Iran 
in 1949, Farrokh was urged by the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, Ali Asghar Hekmat 
(1892-1980), to present his experiences in China to members of the foreign ministry. 
Hekmat also insisted that Farrokh publish his findings for the public, because there was 
no reliable source of information available in print in Iran on “a country as large as 
China” or Iran's relationship with it.263 The book is therefore an attempt to develop and 
improve Iranian knowledge of China, its politics and its people.264 Farrokh was also 
going through political problems related to a textbook on Afghanistan that he published 
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in 1952. This publication embarrassed and exposed Afghan officials involved in a 1929 
coup d'etat, and the Afghan mission to Iran successfully lobbied to have all copies of his 
book removed from circulation. This public defeat may have motivated him to make a 
new contribution to avoid damage to his reputation. Regardless, given the highly 
publicized nature of this conflict at the time One Year was published and Farrokh's high 
profile in the Foreign Service, it is likely that many Iranian diplomats and government 
officials would have come across it. Therefore, it can be said that this travelogue helped 
to produce and propagate ideas about China among the political elite.  
Farrokh’s journey to China began in September of 1948. After an evening with 
the Chinese Ambassador in Tehran and a lesson on the proper use of chopsticks, Farrokh 
traveled to Abadan and sailed out of the Shatt al-Arab on a British vessel headed east. 
The boat stopped in Kuwait, Bahrain and briefly at Karachi to allow Farrokh to have a 
tooth extracted. Their final destination was Mumbai, where they met with foreign 
officials and the Taj Mahal as they awaited a barge that would take them to Hong Kong.  
Farrokh describes both ships as luxurious and decadent. They included a pool, movie 
theater, stores and barber shops, medical facilities, and a dining area. By utilizing the 
networks of European colonialism, Farrokh and other wealthy Iranians and Indians could 
travel to China in an extraordinarily comfortable fashion. The barge took a roundabout 
trip through Colombo, Calcutta, Indonesia, Malaysia, Penang, and Singapore before it 
finally stopped at Hong Kong. From there, Farrokh and his companion, a secretary named 
Maryam, traveled to Shanghai by plane. Upon entering China, he felt inspired by the 
beauty of the scenery to compose a poem: 




O light of the East upon Earth 
Hundreds of blessings (of peace) be upon you and your leader  
From the king and the kingdom of Annam265  
Heavenly country with splendor and pomp  
Millionaires among people with wealth and gold 
The land of industry and history of the world 
Who dares to raise a hand upon you in violence?266 
 
Farrokh's time in Shanghai and Hong Kong provides a window into the little-
known community of Iranians that prospered in Shanghai during the first half of the 20th 
century. He met several other Iranians en route to China. In Singapore, an Iranian general 
and his family boarded the barge, and in Hong Kong they were joined by a Mr. Mehdi 
Namāzi, the current owner of Nemazee & Co. A wealthy philanthropist who had 
constructed schools and hospitals back home in his native Shiraz, Namāzi owned a home 
in Hong Kong that was attended by butlers, in addition to a home in Shanghai that 
shocked the consular officers with its splendor. Namāzi had also sponsored community 
infrastructure for the Iranian community in Shanghai, including a prayer house ( خانه
 Farrokh held Namazi to be a man “full of patriotism and goodness, like all .(نمازی
Shirazis” and his success made him feel proud of his people's prosperity even in this 
faraway place.267 Farrokh spent much of his time in Shanghai, and later at the embassy in 
Nanking, with members of the tight-knit local Persian community. He describes with 
affectionate detail the various parties held by what he called the “Iranian colony” at the 
embassy, including a wedding for one of the staff members.  
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Fig 11. The “Iranian colony” in Shanghai 
 
 
Fig 12. Parsa's wedding at the embassy in Nanjing 
Farrokh's work is part travelogue, part textbook, and much of it is devoted to 
descriptions of the history, politics, and culture of modern China. The information he 




cultural biases.268 He covers topics like language, currency, history, government, food, 
religion, topography, and population. Recent events are told from a Nationalist 
perspective, and the historical sections primarily rehearse the story of China's 
exploitation by British, Russian, and Japanese imperialism. He was particularly 
fascinated with China's attitude towards religion, which he noted was considerably more 
flexible than Iranian attitudes, and conversion was easy and not uncommon.269 He 
considered “lack of religion” among one of the weak points holding the Chinese nation 
back, which he believed led to moral lapses that drove drug use, poverty, and government 
corruption.270  Despite this apparent irreligiousness, Farrokh has nothing but praise for 
Chinese civilization and culture and China's achievements in technology and industry. 
“The Chinese people are known for their extraordinary intelligence in industry...Many 
inventions in human history originate from China.”271 He attributes this to “Confucius 
philosophy [which has] had a strange effect on the spirit and blood of the Chinese 
people.” These sections reflect Farrokh's ambition for his work to function as a primary 
source of knowledge about China for the general public, and his discussion of Islam in 
China also helped spread knowledge of the Chinese Muslim community in Iran. 
Farrokh associates the modern sights he sees in China with the influence of the 
West, for good and for ill. He described both Shanghai and Hong Kong as beautiful, 
modern cities and praised their industrial development and infrastructure.272 Shanghai is 
“very European and very modern,” a change he attributes to its bustling trade with the 
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outside world.273 He credits the British with the development of Hong Kong, although he 
cautions that they have set up a free trade zone that is highly beneficial to themselves in 
the process.274 Despite his admiration for their technological achievements, he is highly 
critical of the role of foreigners in his summaries of recent Chinese history. He argues 
that “British imperialism led the Chinese to throw themselves into the arms of the 
Russians, only to discover they are also imperialists.”275 These attitudes reflected the 
priorities of the Iranian state in the 1950s and Farrokh's position as a nationalist who 
spent much of his career opposing British and Russian imperial designs in Iran. 
 
Fig 13. Illustrations from a section on Chinese characters and their meanings 
Farrokh's interpretation of what he saw in China was colored by his own 
experience and understanding of Iranian history. Regarding China's experience with 
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imperialism, he wrote that “the Chinese government and nation were suffering the same 
pain as Iran” and compared Chiang's campaign against his military rivals to Reza Khan's 
campaign against the tribal leaders resisted his authority at the beginning of his reign.276 
He repeatedly drew parallels between Chiang Kai-shek and Reza Shah: “If Reza Pahlavi 
was the founder of the Iranian nation, it must be acknowledged that General Chiang Kai-
shek was the founder of China.”277 Farrokh depicted Chiang as a patriotic strong-man, a 
lone figure standing alone against a relentless series of threats, from Japanese invaders to 
Russian imperialism and Communist infiltration. He depicted Chiang’s downfall was the 
result of foreign interference and treasonous detractors:  
The greatest service that Chiang Kai-shek rendered his homeland was to thwart 
the Japanese plan. China had no weapons, ammunition, or personnel, but with the 
tireless efforts of Chiang Kai-shek, they resisted for eight years against a strong 
government like Japan and the treacherous provocations of the communists, and 
freed the country from the clutches of the Japanese. To achieve this goal required 
a degree of sacrifice, hardship, and tolerance in the face of all misery. He proved 
himself and stood alone. Unfortunately, at such times the British and others were 
selling weapons to the Japanese.278  
According to Farrokh, the Nationalist government's ultimate downfall after World War II 
was the fault of the Americans. It was up to the United States to strengthen the 
Nationalists against the Soviets and their allies in the CCP, something they failed to do. 
“The mistake of the Americans led to the fall of the Nationalist government...but how 
expensive this mistake is unclear, because at the time I was writing this book, the 
Americans had given thousands of lives in the Korean War.” By evoking the “Who Lost 
China” narrative, Farrokh was also indirectly making a case for American involvement in 
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Iran, as some Iranian statesmen saw America as a third party that Britain and the Soviet 
Union could be played against, as well as a potential ally against populist and leftist 
opposition movements. While America may have made a mistake, the solution was to 
rectify it and support Nationalist China to the hilt. The 1953 American-and-British-
backed coup d'etat would cement the alliance between U.S. and Iranian interests against 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, the same year the book was published.  
Farrokh viewed the Chinese experience as a severe warning for Iran about what 
the future might hold. He draws this comparison directly in a summary of recent Chinese 
history:  
From the beginning of the Sun Yat-sen uprising, China, like Iran, has been 
plagued by the plans of great statesmen...internal revolutions sponsored by 
foreigners, and greed. The greedy generals of China have taken the lead and 
prevented the progress of the country...The ominous plans of Moscow that follow 
Peter the Great's promises are set...The Muslim nations of the world should be 
united against these children of misery and bloodshed. May the Almighty save us 
from this dreadful abyss.279 
Deeply affected by the violence that he saw when the communists entered Nanjing in 
April, he recalled cannon fire, gun battles in the streets, and numerous acts of looting and 
violence.280  This experience seemed to convince him that the threat of communist chaos 
was a real one that could also spread to Iran. In correspondence with another diplomat 
who has asked his opinion on China's situation and its relevance, Farrokh links China's 
fate and the fortunes of international communism with Iran and its domestic situation. 
Throughout the letter, Farrokh argues that the fall of the Nationalists represents a threat to 
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democracy everywhere, including Iran, and issues a stark warning about Iran's domestic 
situation: 
My friend, now by reading my letter you will understand why I took the time to 
answer your questions...Note also that your country, Iran, is in danger from the 
Soviet Union and the Fifth Column of the Russians, who are called Tudeh and 
support peace and anti-colonialism, etc. in your country...The religion of Islam 
does not agree with the Communists in any way, just as the Muslim parts of China 
have not surrendered to this dangerous ideology so far. 
The official image of China emerged as a negative model of a country that, 
through internal weakness and foreign perfidy, had suffered the unenviable fate of falling 
to a Communist revolution. He interprets events in China through his own political and 
personal experience and his understanding of Iranian history. His book helped to 
popularize a particular elite-driven narrative of the Chinese revolution that echoed the 
arguments of Western politicians and academics, along with articles in the popular press. 
However, this was not the only vision of China that was articulated in Iran. The success 
of the Chinese revolution may have struck the fear of a communist revolution into the 
hearts of Iranian officials, but the Iranian opposition had a different reaction entirely. 
The Tudeh Party and the Communist Party of China, 1949-1959 
While ties with the exiled Republican government in Taiwan would persist, by 
the next decade, they were overshadowed by the development of new international 
connections and unofficial ties between Iranian activists and the newly declared 
People's Republic of China. In the preceding decades, Sino-Iranian connections were 
mediated by European-dominated networks. Chinese intellectuals familiar with Iran's 
situation imagined the country as a potential revolutionary model and drew on the 




second half of the 20th century began, significant historical developments caused the 
emergence of new areas of interaction and communication. The victory of the Chinese 
Communist Revolution on October 1st, 1949, had an enormous impact on intellectuals 
worldwide. 
As Chinese intellectuals had begun to do earlier in the century, some Iranian 
activists began to view China as part of a shared process of anti-colonial revolution. 
Simultaneously, the official Chinese press was pushing a parallel narrative that placed 
China at the center of a global revolutionary process. Despite the lack of official 
connections, unofficial Sino-Iranian ties existed in the 1950s and 1960s between the 
Tudeh Party and the CCP. International conferences allowed Iranian leftists to visit 
China and see the impressive changes the country was undergoing. The messages of 
solidarity and unity they sent reflected growing concern among Chinese and Iranian 
activists with oppression globally. Ties with Iranian communist organizations were 
established and provided a new conduit for both people and information to reach China 
from Iran. In the Chinese press, articles about Iran stressed Pan-Asian, anti-imperial, 
and internationalist notions of solidarity. These ties also played a role in China's 
internal propaganda, and especially in state attempts to fashion a modern Chinese 
identity, by providing material to promote the idea of a globally active and 
internationally prestigious New China.  
These new developments formed a part of the expansion of inter-Asian/Third 
World connections during the Cold War. As the Cold War's political center of gravity 




superpower competition over the “neutral zone” of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.281 
During this period, China was active in constructing political and social networks that 
paralleled Western-dominated global organizations like the UN. Events like the Bandung 
Conference of 1955 and groups like the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 
(AAPSO) disrupted the international order and helped thrust issues like racism and 
human rights onto the global agenda.282 Others, like the Women's International 
Democratic Federation (WIDF), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), 
and the International Union of Students (IUS), were based in the West, but nonetheless 
served as a platform in which non-Western parties had a growing voice.283 Although this 
Afro-Asian solidarity moment is often viewed pessimistically, it was part of the 
emergence of a modern discourse of global international relations and the concept of the 
Third World, and therefore represents an important episode in the history of transnational 
politics and the Cold War.284 Furthermore, it provided the first opportunity for direct 
interaction between the modern Chinese state and numerous non-Western countries, 
including Iran. Before establishing official connections, Sino-Iranian relations were part 
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of a process of international Third World solidarity, exchange, and debate. These 
unofficial connections highlight the emergence of new discourses of identity that drew on 
internationalism, anti-colonialism, and solidarity among Asian countries. 
Sino-Iranian Connections in Propaganda 
Unofficial Sino-Iranian connections informed Chinese propaganda during the 
1950s. Chinese press reports emphasized the underdevelopment of the Iranian economy 
and the poverty of its people, especially women and children, which was primarily 
blamed on U.S. imperialism. Reporters stressed Chinese support for the Iranian people 
and condemned Iran’s “reactionary” ruling elite. These articles appeared primarily for 
domestic consumption and were closely related to China’s internal policy initiatives, 
which promoted industrial development and equality between genders. From 1949 to 
1959, the Chinese press published over a hundred articles dealing with Iran's recent 
history, its current political situation, and what the proper Chinese attitude towards it 
should be. A review of just some of the article titles is instructive: “U.S. Imperialism 
Instigated the Iranian People to Kill Each Other,” “The Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the 
Iranian People,” “Iranian People's Group Protests Bloody Suppression of Iranian 
Government,” “Support the Iranian People in their Struggle against British-American 
Imperialism,” and “The Dangerous Steps of the Iranian Government.”285 Iranian 
participation in the U.S.-backed Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO), an alliance which 
the Chinese saw as an attempt to encircle and contain the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic, was also strongly condemned. John Garver has claimed that Chinese 
 




propaganda towards Iran was generally more anti-U.S. than it was anti-Iran, but while 
criticism of the United States did dominate, the Iranian government was by no means 
spared. A close review of the material shows that the government itself was frequently 
criticized as “bloody” and “reactionary.”286  
Other authors made their point not through fiery op-eds, but through political 
cartoons, which usually depicted America engaged in underhanded attempts to undercut 
Britain's position by taking over its exploitative relationship with Iranian oil companies. 
Many of these were simply republished cartoons with Chinese subtitles, usually sourced 
from Soviet newspapers. There is at least one example of a cartoon drawn by a well-
known Chinese artist, Sun Shunchao, better known by his nom de plume, Fang Cheng 
(1918-2018). Like many of his generation, Fang Cheng was educated in both Chinese and 
Western style and was involved in political activism early as a student at Wuhan 
University. In later years, he recalled learning many songs in Chinese, English, and 
Russian as a child, reflecting the international nature of his education.287 Although he was 
initially known for works that satirized society, after the foundation of the PRC, he 
shifted his attention to lampooning international affairs and Western imperialism. In the 
piece depicted below, Fang Cheng is criticizing American offers to “mediate” a dispute 
between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the U.K.  
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Fig 14. A political cartoon by Chinese artist Fang Cheng. Uncle Sam replaces a poster 
entitled “American Monopoly” over one that says “British Monopoly” on  a barrel of 
“Iranian Oil.” A brush labeled “Mediate the British-Iranian Dispute”, is being dipped in 
a bucket of paste: “American Loans to Iran.” Behind, a grumpy Mr. Britain watches with 
disdain. 
 




Republic and the Hui (Chinese Muslim) community. The CCP's relationship with Islam is 
complicated and fraught. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, there 
was significant concern about the possibility of a separatist movement in Xinjiang and a 
general lack of support for the officially atheist government on the part of Chinese 
Muslims. Muhammad Ma Jian (1906-1978), a prominent member of this community and 
famed for his widely-used Chinese translation of the Quran, was the source for several 
op-eds on Iran's situation, emphasizing the persecution of Muslims by imperialism.288 
One 1952 article, entitled “American Invaders are the Enemies of Islam All Over the 
World,” cites American activities in Iran and Egypt to level a critique of the United States 
that draws on Islamic history.289 It exhorts Muslims “all over the world” to unite with 
peace loving governments and people to oppose US imperialism. As the target audience 
was Chinese readers, the implication was clear: by opposing the US, China is a defender 
of Islam and deserves Chinese Muslims' support. 
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Fig 15. Originally printed in the Soviet “Journal of Literature” on July 14th and 
republished in China in 1951, this cartoon depicts the Iranian people driving off two 
“vultures” that represent foreign oil companies. 
In short, Iran was an important topic in Chinese propaganda and served a variety 
of purposes. The CCP, which had placed industrialization and gender equality at the 
center of their early revolutionary agenda, was implicitly inviting comparison to China 
when it emphasized the lack of economic development and low status of Iranian women. 
By identifying a common enemy and declaring support for Iranian oil nationalization, the 
Chinese revolution was further globalized and moved towards a discourse that placed it at 
the pinnacle of a new kind of international solidarity. While it is exceedingly difficult to 
measure what kind of an impact this had on the reading public, at least one reader, a 
student named Lin Cong, felt compelled to send a letter entitled “Be concerned about the 
struggle of the people of Iran and Egypt,” which was published in the Renmin Ribao in 
1951: 
After reading the editorial in Renmin Ribao on October 31 entitled 'The Just 
Struggle of the Egyptian and Iranian People', I was deeply moved...[Before] I 




felt that it was something that concerned people in other countries. I am in this 
wonderful school, and it isn't much to do with me, so why bother? However, after 
reading the editorial of your newspaper, I learned that the movement for the 
independence of the Iranian and Egyptian people is part of the struggle of the 
people of the world against imperialism. Therefore, they are not alone...This made 
me feel that I can't just immerse myself in books and not ask about world events. I 
am a young student of New China. I should have a high degree of 
internationalism and be concerned about the struggles of oppressed people. We 
Chinese people are closely related to their struggle, and we must support them. 
Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Corporate Finance Department, 
Lin Cong 
 
Genuine or not, letters such as this demonstrate the message the CCP was trying 
to send, as well as the vision of Chinese identity that was growing out of new discourses 
of international, Sino-Iranian, and Sino-Arab solidarity. Chinese students were 
encouraged through official media to adopt an internationalist approach to politics and 
encouraged to feel solidarity with the countries of the Middle East. While it cannot be 
said from this one example how effective this was, it demonstrates one of the many ways 
Iran and the Middle East were represented in state propaganda. This phenomenon was not 
limited to the Chinese side; Iranian activists and students were also coming to see the 
world in internationalist terms, with China playing a significant role in their imaginings. 
Unofficial Tudeh-CCP Connections 
On October 10th, 1949, the Tudeh Central Committee sent a telegram to Beijing, 
conveying its congratulations on their victory. “The Central Committee of the Tudeh 




self-liberation.”290 On November 11th, 1949, the official CCP newspaper, Renmin Ribao 
(Renmin Ribao) published messages received from the Tudeh Party, translated somewhat 
inaccurately as the “Workers Party.”291 The Democratic Women's Association (yilang 
minzhu funu xiehui 伊朗民主妇女协会), presumably referring to Tudeh's women's 
organization, expressed that “with great joy, we have heard the news from the People's 
Republic of China. We Iranian women believe your victory is also our victory. Dear 
sisters, from your victory we have derived much support for our continued fight against 
domestic reactionaries and British and American imperialism.” The message from the 
Tudeh youth wing echoed similar sentiments: “Undoubtedly, the great and historic 
victory of the Chinese people will play a major role in the struggle for lasting peace all 
over the world, and in the cause of liberation of all oppressed nations.” Chairman Mao 
Zedong (1893-1976) personally sent a reply on November 19th, thanking the Tudeh Party 
for its congratulatory message and paying tribute to “the struggle of the Tudeh Party and 
the Iranian people against imperialism and internal reactionaries.”292 
One month later, Iraj Eskandari (1908-1985), a prominent Tudeh leader and one 
of its founding members, sent a personal reply that was published in Renmin Ribao, 
which more accurately translated the Tudeh Party as yilang qunzhong dang, or “Iranian 
Masses Party.” In it, he wrote: 
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At the time when the new government of the People's Republic of China was 
established, the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party expressed its brotherly 
respect to you. The victory won by the Chinese people under your leadership 
against domestic reaction and foreign imperialism is of historic significance, 
especially for the oppressed people in Asia. The Iranian people truly see their own 
liberation from foreign imperialism and the exploitation of feudal merchants in 
the victory of the Chinese revolution. The feudal merchants, in order to protect 
their privilege, effectively oppressed our workers and peasants and, like the KMT 
traitors, allowed Iran to be plundered by foreign trusts. They violated the will of 
the Iranian people and turned our country into a base for British and American 
aggression against the great socialist country and Iran's true friend, the Soviet 
Union. 
[…] 
Long live the great Chinese people and their great Communist Party! Long live 
comrade Mao Zedong and the People's Republic of China and its great leader! 
Iranian Tudeh Party Central Committee, Eraj Iskandari293 
This kind of lavish praise was to be expected among fraternal Communist parties, 
but there is little reason to doubt that the example of the CCP was genuinely inspiring to 
Iranian activists. Articles with a similar degree of exuberance were published in the legal 
Tudeh newspaper Besou-ye Ayandeh (Towards the Future), which was frequently 
mentioned as a source by the Chinese press over the next few years and which 
periodically published articles calling for the Iranian government to recognize the 
PRC.294 More importantly, it reflects the direct and enthusiastic lines of communication 
established between the two parties. While there was little Tudeh could do to assist the 
CCP practically, they provided what diplomatic and moral support that they could. On 
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the Iranian side, the Tudeh Party publicly adopted a stance in favor of recognition of the 
PRC. In May 1951, in an open letter to then-Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq 
published in Besou-ye Ayandeh, the Tudeh urged Mosaddeq to “recognize the People's 
Government of China which is the base of liberty and peace in Asia.”295 Another letter 
published in July 1953 chastised Mosaddeq for signing an agreement that barred Iran 
from exporting strategic goods to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the PRC.296 
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, and the Iranian government supported the 
United States, the Tudeh Party circulated petitions and put on anti-war demonstrations in 
the capital. 
This support went beyond expressions of solidarity and spilled ink. The Tudeh 
Party also led left-leaning Iranians in protests that explicitly took pro-Chinese stances. 
For example, Guangming Daily reported that a large rally against the Korean War was 
held in Tehran on December 7th, 1950. The rally was organized by the Women’s wing of 
the Tudeh Party and included signs like “Long live the Korean people's freedom!” and 
“Long live the women's democratic movement!”297 One Chinese report based on the 
Tudeh Party's information claimed that Iranian activists had collected 195,700 signatures 
ahead of an international conference on the Korean War, including 170 judges, 138 
doctors, 121 lawyers, 13 lawmakers, and 10 “famous provincial priests.”298 While these 
numbers may be inflated, it likely reflects genuine support for the Chinese position in the 
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Korean War among educated, left-leaning Iranians. 
On the Chinese side, relations with Tudeh provided a source for domestic 
propaganda and information about Iran. The Tudeh seems to have provided the CCP with 
either copies or select translations of its newspapers, especially Besou-ye Ayande, giving 
China a way to assess events in Iran without relying on European or Soviet news sources. 
Of course, many stories were still based on translations of Soviet TASS news bulletins, 
but the Chinese press also began to adopt positions supportive of the Tudeh Party. This 
extended beyond general assessments about the political situation to areas of specific 
concern to the Iranian communists. For example, while China supported Iran's oil 
nationalization efforts in 1953, they echoed the Tudeh's cautious stance towards 
Mosaddeq, who was the popular face of the nationalization effort but did not have the 
support of Tudeh. Instead, they emphasized the importance of strikes led by Tudeh-
affiliated unions, and Mosaddeq's role was hardly commented on; some articles even 
chastised the Prime Minister for his pro-US stance.299   
Articles written by Tudeh activists in foreign periodicals were also translated and 
published. On March 28th, 1952, violent clashes between the police and Tudeh activists 
on their way to “participate in a demonstration against the US imperialists' bacterial 
warfare in North Korea and China” were covered extensively in the Chinese press, in 
spite of it being a rather minor incident.300 Later, in 1956, when the Iranian government 
was cracking down on Tudeh leaders, the execution of senior member Khosrow Roozbeh 
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(1915-1958) was widely publicized, something that the Tudeh leadership strove to bring 
to international attention.301 In general, the Chinese press from 1949 to 1959 was filled 
with stories of government violence and execution of activists, mostly related to the 
Tudeh Party, and drawing on statistics and names provided by the party. 
The highest point of CCP-Tudeh relations came in 1956, when Tudeh Central 
Committee Chairman Reza Radmanesh (1905-1983) and future Chairman Noureddin 
Kianouri (1905-1999) visited China as part of an official delegation to the 8th CCP 
Congress.302 The delegates arrived in Beijing on September 16th, and participated in a 
tour of the Chenguang Agricultural Production Cooperative in Luyuan Township and a 
sightseeing tour of Beijing, including the famous Niujie Mosque. On September 21st, 
1958, Radmanesh gave a speech at the CCP Congress, extending his congratulations to 
China for the advancements it had seen over the last eight years. “All people who have 
suffered from foreign aggression and their own reactionaries can learn from the Chinese 
people's victorious example...Our national liberation movement in Iran draws strength 
from studying extensively the theory of the Chinese revolution.”303 He compared the 
bloody suppression of the CCP at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 to the recent 
attacks that the Iranian government had carried out on the Tudeh Party, and criticized the 
Iranian government's preference for Chiang Kai-shek, who he claimed was “generally 
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hated” in Iran. “Now our party is healing its own wounds, reassessing the past according 
to its Marxist-Leninist worldview, learning lessons from past mistakes, and clearing a 
way for itself. In this regard, the experience of China's great revolutionary movement is 
invaluable to us.” Radmanesh's visit, which was followed by another official delegation 
in 1959 headed by Ehsan Tabari (1917-1989), indicated the extent to which Tudeh 
leadership and the Iranian left as a whole was affected by the victory of the CCP.304 The 
slow introduction of Maoist materials would come to have a significant impact over the 
next decade in the form of an upsurge of Maoist politics among the student community 
during the mid-1960s and early 1970s.305  
 
Fig 16. Reza Radmanesh at the 1958 CCP Party Congress. 
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International Conferences and Sino-Iranian Solidarity 
In the 1950s, another new arena of Sino-Iranian exchange opened up in the form 
of international conferences. China hosted several large-scale international conferences in 
the 1950s and 1960s that were attended by Iranian delegates. Although it can be difficult 
to tell the exact number, at least a few dozen Iranian students were invited to China to be 
given the grand tour and sent home with a glowing report of Chinese industrial progress 
and ideological strength. These delegates, often student activists linked with Tudeh or 
other leftist networks, were widely quoted in the Chinese press, where they expressed 
solidarity and admiration for the People's Republic. Reports of their activities were used 
to portray China as supportive of revolution in the colonized world and as a model for 
how that could be achieved. China was soon depicting itself as the leader of a global 
community of Asian, African, and Latin American people who shared a history of 
oppression and humiliation by European colonial powers. Of course, the reality was that 
Chinese interests set the agenda at these conferences; Middle Eastern, African, and Latin 
American representatives played a ceremonial and supporting role. At the same time, it 
provided real and otherwise rare opportunities for activists to visit China and gain first-
hand knowledge about its circumstances, even if filtered through official programming. 
China had several reasons to support and participate in these international 
networks. Almost immediately after it was established, the PRC found itself frozen out of 
the United Nations in favor of delegates from Taiwan. They faced a hostile United States 




dominated by Western powers and generally unresponsive to the colonized world's 
demands. The need for friends and allies was matched by the CCP's desire to promote a 
patriotic, modern vision of Chinese identity that would mobilize the population. All of 
these needs were served by promoting international conferences and Afro-Asian 
solidarity, in which Sino- Persian relations played a significant, though typical role.  
One of the first major conferences held in Beijing was the Asian Women's 
Conference. It was held in December 1949 and sponsored by the Women’s International 
Democratic Federation (WIDF), the All-China Women’s Democratic Federation, and the 
Women’s Self Defense Committee (Mahila Atma Rakshi Samiti, or MARS) from West 
Bengal, India. This conference was a precursor to the Bandung Conference of 1955.306 
According to scholar Elisabeth Armstrong, the Asian Women’s Conference “mark[ed] a 
new beginning in confronting relations of feminist imperialism and creating new terms 
for solidarity.”307 Conference participants “honed a solidarity of commonality for 
women's shared human rights...[and] made visible new subjects for organizing, peasant 
women...as well as the rural sites of their struggles.”308 Because Chinese archival records 
for the Beijing conference are inaccessible, it has been studied through the lens of its 
Indian participants. However, an analysis of the Chinese press shows that Iran was one of 
the three main areas of focus of the conference, alongside India and Vietnam. 
The conference opened on December 10th and concluded on December 19th. 
 






Despite the name, it included delegates from all over the world.309 However, the 
conference's purpose was to highlight the plight of Iranian, Indian, and Vietnamese 
women, and so delegates from these countries led the proceedings and received the most 
attention and coverage in the Chinese press. Several news bulletins were run about the 
Iranian and Indian delegates, and copies of their reports and speeches appeared in most 
major newspapers. A special Xinhua radio broadcast was made by the Iranian 
representative, Mahin Baluch310 on December 2nd on the situation of Iranian women. Both 
her remarks at the conference and her report on Iranian women were published in full.311 
At the conference itself, Mahin Baluch gave a speech on the plight of Iranian 
women and a general address on the 12th. She spoke extensively about Iran's political 
situation, the situation of Iranian women, and the history of her organization. As a leftist 
affiliated with the Tudeh Party, her comments touched on the same themes of solidarity, 
anti-imperialism, and enthusiasm for the Chinese experience: 
Chinese sisters, your struggle and your success...have brought infinite help to our 
common struggle...For centuries, women and mothers in Iran have lived in 
distress, and were enslaved by a feudal and exploitative system. This system has 
been further strengthened by the imperialist support of Iran's oil and natural 
resources. The struggle of Iranian women is to liberate them from feudal 
exploitation on the one hand, and to oppose British and American colonialists and 
strive for national independence on the other.312 
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In addition to publishing her speeches, Baluch also was separately interviewed by 
the Shanghai Daily. In an article which described her as “a beautiful young yellow-haired 
girl who attends this conference full of enthusiasm and hope,” she describes a very bleak 
situation for Iranian women: “The hard-earned income of the worker is not sufficient to 
sustain his family. Therefore, his wife and children have to...sell their labors in order to 
make ends meet...Their status is very low. They are not treated like people.”313 According 
to the interviewer, “Mahin said: when she saw Chinese women, she remembered the 
Iranian women who were deeply oppressed...[but] the liberation of the Chinese people 
and Chinese women has added a new force to the world peace camp. The reactionary 
forces in the world are approaching the end of their lives. The future...will also be 
bright.”  
Baluch's comments are fairly typical of Iranian students who visited China in this 
period. Several other conferences brought Iranian activists to Beijing. Iranian student 
delegates participated in the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) conference 
at Qiqihar City in September 1950,314 the International Union of Students (IUS) 
Conference at Beijing in May 1951,315 the Asia and Pacific Rim Peace Conference in 
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October 1952,316 and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) 
Conference in June 1956.317 Some of these conferences were accompanied by separate 
special events designed to showcase China's internationalist spirit and often played on 
communist and religious sentiment. To give just one example, the Asia and Pacific Rim 
Peace Conference featured both speeches from Tudeh affiliated activists and a prayer 
ceremony for peace in Korea jointly held by Chinese Muslims and foreign Muslim 
delegates. This event was attended by several Iranian journalists, among other guests.318 
In 1954, the CCP established the Asian Student Nursing Home to facilitate the training of 
student doctors from all over the world. Young representatives from Iran and several 
other countries were invited to attend the opening ceremony.319 These events projected 
the image of a strong, independent China with innumerable foreign allies. 
The significance of these conferences to the CCP domestic agenda can be seen in 
an op-ed published in the Renmin Ribao on January 31, 1950 entitled “Beijing – Famed 
Capital of the Democratic Camp.”320 The author draws a direct connection between 
Chinese liberation, world revolution, and the recent flurry of conference activity. “Since 
the liberation, Beijing has not only become the capital of the Chinese revolution, but has 
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also become an important bastion of the world revolution, especially the Asian 
revolutionary movement.” The Asian and Australian Trade Union Conference was hailed 
as “unprecedented in the history of Asia...the liberation of Beijing enabled this 
conference to proceed smoothly. The victory of the Chinese revolution enabled the 
Asian-Australian Workers Movement to have a center of solidarity.” The Asian Women's 
Conference “strengthened the solidarity of Asian countries and women around the world, 
and has provided them with a profound education on internationalism.” Articles like this 
one served to advance the notion that China was at the center of a community of 
revolutionary and potentially revolutionary countries that stood in opposition to US-
backed governments and international organizations. 
These conferences served as an important setting in which Iranians could learn 
about China, at a time when there was a great deal of interest among Iranian intellectuals 
in the Chinese revolutionary experience. The situation was very different from the early 
1900s when no analogous networks existed for Chinese students. These efforts appear to 
have translated into genuine enthusiasm for the CCP and its policies and ideology. In 
1952, in an interview with Xinhua, a group of Iranian trade union delegates claimed that 
they had learned so much about land reform, education, youth training, child care, worker 
welfare, and other topics that they could not even begin to talk about their general 
impressions, or they would take up more time than they had. “We will do our utmost to 
make the Iranian people understand what the people of China have achieved...[and] to 




conferences.”321 While these efforts may have bypassed the majority of Iranian people, 
who were mostly illiterate at the time, they were influential among leftists and student 
networks, which would lead to an explosion of interest in Maoist politics in the 1960s. 
Conclusions 
The 1950s saw significant changes in the character and size of the networks of 
Sino-Iranian relations. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, unofficial 
connections rapidly grew, despite Iran's official support for Taiwan. The Chinese press 
published extensive propaganda about the Iranian situation, while relations with the 
Tudeh Party were established and expanded, providing new sources of propaganda, 
international solidarity, and information about Iran. As a result of the expansion of 
international solidarity conferences, a small number of Iranian students – perhaps no 
more than two or three dozen, perhaps more – traveled to China and were impressed by 
what they saw. Like Chinese students in an earlier era, Iranian students were inspired by 
the Chinese revolution's example and sought to emulate it. Both Chinese students and 
Iranian students existed in an environment that stressed a common international struggle 
in which the fates of Iran and China were permanently linked. Rarely was the Silk Road 
or ancient history mentioned. 
This chapter demonstrates the importance of approaching Sino-Iranian relations 
from a broader perspective. Contacts that may have seemed unimportant or ephemeral 
can instead be seen as part of a transnational process of identity formation and solidarity 
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building centered on inter-Asian connections, rather than East-West. Most studies on the 
creation of a modern national identity in Iran or China have focused on how these 
identities were fashioned in reference to the West. Studying Sino-Iranian relations from 
the perspective of identity, propaganda, and international history reveals how Third 
World connections also played an important role, especially in the post-World War II era. 
Sino-Iranian relations in the 1950s reflected and contributed to the self-fashioning of 
Iranian elites and Iranian leftists by providing a non-Western mirror for contemplation. 
They were part of a growing trend towards internationalism and radical politics that had 
been intensifying since the beginning of the century. 
Unofficial Sino-Iranian connections were limited mainly to leftist circles and 
official state propaganda and did not significantly impact Iran or China beyond that. 
While aspects of this story are told through official propaganda whose influence is 
difficult to measure, it nevertheless demonstrates the degree to which Iran and China 
were connected at a time when official ties were non-existent. Even if we do not take 
each pronouncement of solidarity at face value, they can be taken as representative of an 
attempt to build a new, modern discourse of anti-imperialism, international solidarity, and 
self-identity. Furthermore, they form the foundation for critical developments in the next 
decade among leftist Iranian student activists. The appeal of Maoism and the global 






Chapter 4 - Iranian Maoism in the 1960s and 1970s: Causes and Consequences 
 In 1965, a leftist Iranian student movement based in Europe declared its support 
for Mao Zedong and his theories of Communist revolution. Calling themselves the 
Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party (Sāzmān-e Enghelābi-ye Ḥezb-e Tūde),  
they were animated by the belief that “Comrade Mao has evolved Marxism, [and] we 
must solve issues from the point of view of Mao Zedong Thought.”322 They began 
circulating Persian translations of the works of Mao Zedong and other militant texts 
among Iranian students abroad. In pamphlets and periodicals, they extolled the virtues of 
andishe-ye māu se dūn, or Mao Zedong Thought.323 These Maoists were an offshoot of 
the Tudeh Party (Ḥezb-e Tūde), the primary Communist organization in Iran, and were 
bitterly opposed to the Tudeh leadership. 324 In the view of the Revolutionary 
Organization (RO), the Tudeh were ineffective, disconnected from the situation in Iran, 
and excessively under the influence of the Soviet Union. Over the next decade, the RO 
would repeatedly return to China for military and ideological training, become involved 
in Chinese propaganda efforts, and play a role in radicalizing the Confederation of 
Iranian Students - National Union (CIS-NU). By 1969, the entire Secretariat of the CIS-
NU and most of the leaders of the Organization of Iranian Students in the United States 
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(ISAUS) were Maoists.325 By the end of the decade, the RO had “carried away a 
significant portion of the [Tudeh] party's supporters in the West, perhaps 90 percent.”326  
 This Maoist “high tide” was not to last. By 1971, many Iranian leftists began to 
turn against China as a revolutionary model, partly because Beijing had begun openly 
supporting the Iranian government. Furthermore, the RO was unable to establish a 
presence in Iran, nor was it able to instigate a guerilla uprising based on the principle of 
mobārez-e mosalahāneh, or armed struggle. Although some Iranian guerilla 
organizations continued to endorse aspects of Maoist theory or practice even after the 
death of Mao Zedong, they were all ultimately crushed by government reprisals.327 
Others continued to operate overseas or merge with the U.S. Communist movement, but 
they never again gained any significant influence.328 
Scholarly attitudes towards Iranian Maoism have been characterized by a 
narrative of failure. In fact, this type of narrative is typical of studies of the Iranian Left. 
One can easily detect this from the titles alone, from Maziar Behrooz’s classic Rebels 
with a Cause: The Failure of the Iranian Left, to Ali Mirsepassi’s chapter “The Tragedy 
of the Iranian Left.” Matin-Asgari’s brief account of Iranian Maoism concludes that 
although the RO influenced the Left, the organization ultimately suffered from a lack of 
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direction and theoretical incoherence that led to serious strategic blunders.329 Whether 
failure or tragedy, the lines of inquiry into the Maoist movement have been limited to 
inquiries concerned with its ultimate failure to take power.  
 Furthermore, while well known to scholars of the Iranian left, Iranian Maoism is 
relatively unknown outside the discipline. Within the small body of literature on Sino-
Iranian relations, the direct connection between the RO and China is mentioned only in 
passing and often downplayed. Hafizullah Emadi inaccurately claims that the Chinese 
provided no financial support and makes no mention of either the ideological and military 
training that was provided by China.330 Matin-Asgari reviews the history of Iranian 
Maoism briefly and does not consider these ties to have been especially significant.331 
More recent works begin with Sino-Iranian rapprochement in the 1970s and make no 
mention of the episode.332 It is also mostly absent from the historiography of China’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War.333 
This chapter aspires to write a new narrative of Iranian Maoism. It is admittedly a 
partial account in that it focuses primarily on the RO, which was not the only Maoist 
organization, but which was the only one with direct ties to China.334 It will put the story 
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of the RO in conversation with recent works of Chinese and Sino-Iranian history and 
explore its participants' motives and impact on the Iranian opposition and the course of 
Sino-Iranian rapprochement. What value did Iranian students in exile see in Maoism, and 
what did they take from their experiences in China? Why did the Chinese cultivate this 
relationship, and what impact did it have on their concurrent attempts to woo the Iranian 
government?  
The RO cadres found in China a useful set of rhetorical tools to criticize the 
inertia of the Soviet-aligned Tudeh and gain influence among the increasingly radical 
Iranian student population abroad. Furthermore, their relationship with the Chinese 
government, while limited in scope, was significant in that it provided the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) with useful tools for internal and external propaganda at a low 
political and financial cost. Finally, although the discovery of this relationship by 
SAVAK335 initially hardened the Shah’s attitude towards China, it may have helped 
convince him to consider closer relations with the CCP to weaken the appeal of armed 
struggle and political violence in the student movement. 
Historical Background of the Iranian Maoist Movement 
The popularity of Maoism among Iranian students was primarily related to three 
historical contexts: the decline of the traditional Iranian Left post-1953, the reconstitution 
of the student movement as a radical opposition movement in the 1960s, and the growing 
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rift between China and the Soviet Union, known as the Sino-Soviet split.336 It was 
reinforced by a global environment in which internationalism and Maoism were 
increasingly “in vogue” among student radicals in the U.S. and Europe, as well as among 
Third World revolutionaries. This was part of a broader rejection of the dominant Marxist 
currents, which emphasized a peaceful transition to socialism. 
 As mentioned earlier, the Iranian Left has a considerable history dating back to 
the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. Communist politics influenced and 
connected various social currents, including nationalist agitators, disaffected oil workers, 
dissident tribal leaders, and ethnic autonomy movements.  In later years, Marxism 
became a potent force among secular student radicals and a growing number of religious 
lay intellectuals.337 In general, Marxist-Leninist ideas and organized Communist parties 
have had an impressive impact on the social, cultural, intellectual, and political life of 
many Iranians for close to a century.338 In the 1940s, the influence of the Left in Iran 
reached its peak. The Tudeh party emerged as the most politically influential Communist 
organization in the country and as the only political party with significant influence 
among the workers of multiple critical industries.339 It also had a large following among 
the intellectual elite, particularly university students, starting in the 1940s.340  
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One of the most striking aspects of the history of the Iranian Left is the degree to 
which it was connected to international currents, especially in the Soviet Union.341 The 
first Iranian Communist Party was founded in 1920 and grew out of the mobilization of 
Iranian and Azeri workers in Baku as the Russian Empire collapsed. The Tudeh party 
was founded with Soviet guidance and maintained strong political and ideological links 
to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).342 Iranian Communists have 
sometimes been portrayed as tools of Soviet policy, but this is more caricature than 
empirically supported. Matin-Asgari has argued the Tudeh was successful largely 
because of its organization, comprehensive agenda of social reforms, and support for 
modern party politics and trade unions.343 In many cases, Tudeh comrades resisted 
directives from Moscow and had a significant degree of freedom to pursue their own 
policies. Whatever the extent of Soviet influence, it is true that the Iranian Left was 
“particularly affected by external ideological context, that of the international socialist 
and communist movements.”344 For this reason, when internal opposition to the 
traditional Iranian Left emerged, it often took aim at the Soviet Union.  
The Tudeh suffered a serious blow to its credibility in 1945-1946 when it backed 
Soviet-sponsored separatist movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan and supported 
Soviet demands for an oil concession.345 While the leadership privately protested to 
Soviet officials, it was clear the Tudeh was expected to fall in line, and the party publicly 
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defended these actions to the detriment of its popular image. In 1947, prominent party 
member Khalil Maleki broke away from the Tudeh. He argued that the Tudeh leadership 
saw everything through the prism of U.S.-Soviet conflict and refused to analyze the local 
situation accurately as a result.346 Maleki later wrote that the Tudeh Party should have 
learned from the example of Mao Zedong and resisted Soviet pressure to endorse policies 
that were not suitable to the local situation; if they had not supported the secessionist or 
the oil concession, they might have been able to do what China had done.347 This may 
have been the first positive mention of Maoism in Iran. Opposition to the Soviet Union 
and appeals to the Chinese experience would become popular themes of the new Left that 
emerged in the 1960s among Iranian students in the West, with Maleki as an active 
participant. 
Despite this, the main factor in the decline of the Tudeh as a political power was 
not internal opposition but government oppression. In the period of military consolidation 
following the U.S.-sponsored 1953 royalist coup against populist Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddeq, the organization was almost completely destroyed. Nearly all of 
its leadership was executed, arrested, or driven into exile.348 Although the Tudeh 
remained culturally and intellectually influential among the Iranian Left, it could not 
function as an effective opposition party. The same was true of the National Front, the 
party of Mohammad Mosaddeq, which was outlawed and decimated by internal strife and 
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oppression. The various student organizations in Iran were also brutally beaten into 
silence. From 1953 to 1960, open opposition in the country was largely non-existent.349  
In the absence of meaningful opposition at home, Iranian students in Europe and 
North America began to organize themselves. By the late 1950s, there were new Leftist, 
Muslim, and Nationalist student networks growing in Britain, France, Western Germany, 
and the United States, although they were careful to remain at least nominally apolitical. 
Opposition at home began to quietly revive in 1960 under the National Front II (NF II), a 
loosely affiliated cross-section of different opposition groups. This revival galvanized the 
student movement in Europe, the United States, and Iran and led to a flurry of activity 
that ended in the formation of the Confederation of Iranian Students - National Union 
(CIS-NU) in April of the same year. Based in Europe, the CIS-NU had the endorsement 
of the leading U.S. and Tehran-based student organizations that claimed to represent all 
Iranian students. Soon after, it began to take a militant tone and make more serious 
demands of the Iranian government. It also staged protests against the Shah when he 
traveled abroad, which irritated him terribly and eroded his credibility in the eyes of the 
West. By the early 1960s, the center of active opposition had shifted from Iran to the 
dissident student population in Europe and the United States.350  
At the same time, two related developments were unfolding on the international 
scene: the Sino-Soviet split and the rise of both militant student activism and popular 
Maoism in the West. China and the Soviet Union had maintained a close alliance since 
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the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949, but this partnership began to fray in the 
late 1950s. Ideological disagreements arose over Mao’s economic policy and his 
bellicose stance towards the West, and also over Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and 
policy of “peaceful coexistence” with imperialism. Starting in 1959, Mao actively 
pursued an ideological clash, criticizing the Soviets publicly and privately. The main 
thrust of these criticisms was that the Soviet Union was guilty of moving away from the 
original principles of Marxism by preaching peace with capitalist countries, which they 
called “Soviet revisionism.” Border clashes throughout the 1960s saw Sino-Soviet 
relations plunge to new lows.351 
Mao linked these ideological disputes to his domestic enemies and used the 
opportunity to push a radical alternative to Soviet policy internationally. Where the 
Soviet Union advocated caution and economic development, the Chinese advocated 
armed struggle, anti-imperialism, and independent nationalism as the correct path 
towards world revolution. China was increasingly associated with its vocal support for 
revolutionary struggles around the world and its advocacy for a militant approach to 
politics. Over time, this strategy became more about countering Soviet influence than 
supporting revolutionary movements, but the Chinese did well in the propaganda war and 
forced the Soviets to adopt a more militant policy in response.352 
As part of this strategy, the CCP actively recruited Communist dissidents who 
were willing to endorse their agenda in the Sino-Soviet split. To this end, they translated 
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Maoist materials and information about the Chinese position into a wide array of 
languages and distributed them globally.353 This effort made the “Little Red Book” one of 
the most printed books of the 1960s and 70s, with official editions in three dozen 
languages.354 By the mid-1960s, Maoism was popular among student groups and Third 
World radicals, from Berkeley to Beijing. This attraction reflected the international trend 
toward student radicalism and militant political organization in the 1960s, culminating in 
the international protests that rocked the world in 1968.355 Iranian students were not only 
active participants in this movement but were “the vanguard of the student movement 
that occurred across the globe in the 1960s.” 356 Against this backdrop, Iranian Maoism 
would emerge as a cascading current in the student movement. 
The Revolutionary Organization and the Student Movement 
“The first thing I want to tell you is that we never use the term ‘Maoist.’ Later, 
people opposed to us called us Maoists, but we never used it.”357 These are the words of 
Mohsen Rezvani, leader of the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party (RO), in 
an interview in May 2018. They preferred “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” to 
describe their particular orientation, which followed the nomenclature of the CCP. This 
was not coincidental, as the RO was formed out of direct contacts between the CCP and 
activists within the CIS-NU. These student agitators traveled to China for the first time in 
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1963, and they returned several times over the next two decades. Rezvani remains a self-
proclaimed Maoist to this day: a testament to the impact these trips had on him.358 
 The RO originated in the British student movement centered at Manchester 
University. Activist students had been organized there since the late 1950s after 
successfully ousting the conservative leadership of the embassy-affiliated Society of 
Iranian Students in England (Anjoman-e dāneshjuyān-e Irāni dar Engelestān).359 Among 
them were Tudeh activists Parviz Nikkhah and Mohsen Rezvani, who were active in the 
European student movement and opposed to the current Tudeh leadership.360 Their early 
opposition centered on strategy rather than ideological issues; the question of Chinese 
politics did not exist yet. Instead, they criticized the Central Committee for remaining in 
exile, although, as they would later find out, to return was no easy task. The Central 
Committee had also criticized itself, which was an important factor in convincing the 
younger generation to turn against them. Rezvani would later reflect that, at the time, “we 
didn’t have a good weapon” to attack the Central Committee directly.361 They found this 
weapon in the form of Mao Zedong Thought. 
 The formation of the RO as a Maoist faction was instigated by contact between 
Parviz Nikkhah and the Chinese Student Association in Bucharest. In 1963, Nikkhah had 
been sent to a meeting of the International Union of Students (IUS) in Romania. Here, he 
came into contact with members of the Chinese Communist Youth League. Nikkhah 
learned that they were looking to establish contacts with Iranian students, and when he 
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explained to them that he was a member of the Tudeh Party but opposed to the Central 
Committee, they invited him to visit their contacts with the CCP at the Chinese Embassy 
in London, one of the few places in Europe where China had diplomatic representation. 
Nikkhah brought this information to Rezvani, and together they made contact with CCP 
representatives at the embassy and were invited to visit China directly.362 
At the time, there were no direct flights to Beijing, so Rezvani and a few other 
students took a roundabout route from London to Paris to Rangoon, capital of Burma 
(present-day Myanmar). Rezvani recalls with some humor a story that is revealing of the 
students’ position vis-a-vis the CCP. To their surprise, when they arrived in Rangoon, 
they were greeted by a stylish limousine and a motorcycle escort. At the hotel, located in 
a large and richly decorated building, their hosts gave a warm and enthusiastic welcome 
to their “guests from Tehran.” The next day, they boarded a flight for southern China 
alongside the delegation from Albania. The Albanians complained to them that they had 
been treated very poorly, had been given scanty accommodations, and had been packed 
tightly into a low quality hotel. This was unusual because Albania was at that time the 
only Western country allied with the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet split, and was considered 
to be an important ally. It was then that both groups realized that the two delegations had 
accidentally been switched; their hosts had confused the delegates from the Iranian 
capital “Tehran” with the delegates from “Tirana,” the capital of Albania.363 In fact, the 
CCP did not consider the Iranian students to be of particular importance, but rather 
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invited them as a part of a larger strategy of engaging with dissident student groups to 
gain support for its ideological war against the Soviets. 
 After a night spent at a peasant commune, the delegation flew to Beijing and met 
once again with representatives of the Communist Youth League. It quickly became clear 
that the Chinese had substantial information about Iran. In addition to meeting with 
Nikkhah, they had also been in contact with Fereydoun Keshavarz, a former Tudeh party 
leader who had broken away in 1958. At the same meeting, they met with representatives 
from the Central Committee, who told them that the CCP once had a relationship with the 
Tudeh party, but that the Tudeh comrades had left when Khrushchev ordered the 
withdrawal of all Soviet experts from China.364 In total, 19 Tudeh experts left the country 
in solidarity with the Soviet Union’s decision.365 The situation had left the Persian section 
of the CCP’s international radio program, which the CCP considered an important part of 
both international and domestic propaganda efforts, unable to function.366 
The RO students were most impressed with the organization of the CCP. Their 
itinerary was meticulously planned out, sometimes to a greater degree than the Iranians 
would have liked. The Chinese took great pains to keep them on a tightly controlled 
schedule and out of contact with the general population. At their initial hotel in Beijing, 
they were told not to speak to anyone in the city. The Iranians promptly ignored this 
directive, and when it became known that they were chatting with locals, their hosts 
admonished them and changed their hotel. Rezvani also notes that he and others were 
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struck by the lack of opposition newspapers and the degree to which the Chinese relied 
on asking “higher up” comrades to decide things rather than participating in discussion 
and debate. However, these events did not seem to sour their overall impression of the 
country, and they left more determined than ever to learn from the experiences of 
China.367 
 In a series of meetings, the students responded positively to the CCP’s overtures 
and spoke of their differences with the Tudeh Party and their commitment to advancing 
the cause of the revolution. They requested ideological and military training and were 
willing to send delegations to China for this purpose. In return, the students offered to 
send comrades to assist with radio broadcasts and with translating Mao’s works into 
Persian. The CCP delegation received this suggestion warmly but stressed that the 
Chinese experience was relevant only to China. The purpose of ideological education was 
to teach the method of adapting Marxist thought to the specific situation of Iran.368 
The idea of adapting Marxism to a particular set of circumstances, rather than 
trying to reproduce the experiences of another country, would remain an important theme 
throughout the RO’s relationship with the CCP. Rezvani, Tehrani, Lasha’i, and Kashkuli 
all agree that the Chinese made this point constantly.369 Rezvani recalls having this 
impressed upon him by none other than Chairman Mao himself. When meeting with the 
RO delegates and other foreign visitors on a subsequent trip, Mao asked Rezvani what he 
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was doing in China via a translator. “I replied: ‘I am here to study your thought and the 
experiences of China.’ ‘Bu hao!’ he said. 370  I can still hear it in my ears.’ Mao said that 
when the Chinese returned from the Soviet Union, they made many mistakes, and it was 
only after they stopped trying to copy the Soviet models that they achieved success.371 
 Also impressed upon the Iranian delegation, time and again, were the CCP’s 
grievances against the Soviet Union. It was clear that the Chinese were anxious for the 
Iranians to adopt their view of events. Iraj Kashkuli, who was sent to China on a later 
delegation for military training, recalls how this was the only way the Chinese tried to 
influence them directly. “They were sensitive only to the global situation and focused on 
criticizing Soviet politics. From the point of view of the Chinese, [the Soviets] had 
revised the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and violated its revolutionary 
principles.”372 The CCP even revealed unflattering information about China in an effort 
to sway their guests. Rezvani recounts that a CCP official blamed recent famines on the 
withdrawal of Soviet experts.373 
In addition to ideological and military training, the Chinese also agreed to provide 
modest financial support, although the exact amount is disputed by different sources.374 
Cash was received at the Chinese embassy in London and collected by Rezvani 
directly.375 He confirms the Chinese paid for flights, accommodations, and salaries for 
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the Radio Peking staff, as well as other expenses related to visiting China.376 An 
individual trip for multiple cadres might cost upwards of $14,000 dollars, so the financial 
support was considerable. However, the CCP repeatedly expressed that they were only 
willing to pay for individual expenses, as their own experience with the Soviet Union had 
proven that unrestricted support could lead to unhealthy dependencies.377 The more likely 
reason, however, is that the CCP was not genuinely supportive of armed revolution in 
Iran. This stands in contrast to its support for Palestinian revolutionaries and the People’s 
Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), which consisted primarily of 
Soviet-made small arms in addition to militant ideology.378  
The Chinese made it clear they were primarily interested in the Iranian radicals as 
a strategic asset for their propaganda war with the Soviet Union. To this end, the RO 
would go on to condemn the Soviet Union in its official publications and encourage the 
growing anti-Soviet attitude in the CIS-NU.379 Along the same lines, the future leaders of 
the RO sought ideological support for their break with the Tudeh Central Committee, as 
well as the prestige to be gained from affiliation with China and its revolutionary agenda. 
They also sought military training to facilitate their planned return to Iran. China, in spite 
of their public support for armed struggle, was more interested in both reducing Soviet 
influence in Iran and bolstering their own propaganda efforts rather than funding 
revolutionary violence. 
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The Iranian delegation returned to Europe and set about laying the groundwork 
for a return to Iran to assess the political situation. In April 1964, they met with Mehdi 
Khanbaba Tehrani and other young Tudeh members and sympathizers in an unofficial 
“preparatory conference” held in Munich.380 There, they laid out their critique of the 
Tudeh party as a revisionist organization with an anti-revolutionary agenda and linked the 
Tudeh’s inactivity to Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence. Rezvani offered to 
use his contacts with the Chinese in the service of this new organization, which remained 
underground for its first year. At this point, it was still unclear whether the organization 
was going to be separate from the Tudeh party or a faction within it, but all agreed it was 
necessary to engage in an ideological struggle with the Tudeh leadership and relocate the 
organization to Iran.381 
In December 1965, the Revolutionary Organization was brought into official 
existence at a conference in Tirana, Albania. Its first Secretariat included Mohsen 
Rezvani, Bizhan Hekmat, Kurosh Lasha’i, and Bizhan Chehrazi.382 Initially, they focused 
their activities on exploring the experiences of other countries in search of a model for 
revolution in Iran, especially Cuba, Algeria, and China. Rezvani was sent to Algeria to 
meet Fereydoun Keshavarz through his Chinese contacts.383 Later, Rezvani and Iraj 
Kashkuli were also sent to Cuba, although they found the Cubans to be overly 
militaristic.384 This was part of a general search for an appropriate model for revolution 
that ended with a full endorsement of the Chinese approach. Parviz Nikkhah had 
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previously gone to Iran to survey the political situation.385 Early RO activities also 
included the dissemination of pamphlets on Mao Zedong Thought and world revolution, 
as well as translations of the works of Lenin and Mao. By 1966, the RO began to publish 
a newspaper called Tudeh (Masses) that endorsed a Maoist reading of the situation in 
Iran.386 They took the position that the Shah’s reforms had been ineffective and endorsed 
the Maoist position that Iran was a “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” country. Revolution was 
to begin among the peasants, as it did in China.387 
Returning to Iran was the main obsession of the RO activists, and the decision to 
do so would have serious consequences for the RO and the CIS-NU as a whole. In April 
of 1965, an assassination attempt was carried out against the Shah. Although the attempt 
failed and the perpetrator had only tenuous connections to the Nikkhah Group organizing 
within Iran, SAVAK used this incident as an excuse to arrest the entire cell. Led by the 
RO faction, the CIS-NU responded to the arrest of the Nikkah Group with a massive 
publicity campaign against the Shah. This resulted in the commutation of Nikkhah’s 
sentence from death to life imprisonment. The episode was an important moment in the 
history of the CIS-NU, which provided the organization with its first significant victory 
in a direct confrontation with the Shah’s government, and the Shah with his first setback 
at the hands of a Maoist-oriented student groups.388 
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In 1965, Iraj Kashkuli, Bizhan Hekmat, Siavush Parsanezhad, Kurosh Lasha’i and 
several others were sent to Beijing for military and ideological training. The flight took 
them from Geneva to Karachi, and from there to Dhaka, and on to Beijing. From there, 
they traveled south to attend a four-to-six month program at Nanjing University.389 The 
curriculum included the experiences of the Chinese revolution, Mao’s theories on guerilla 
warfare, and practical military lessons. From time to time, these students were integrated 
into Chinese army units and taught survival and basic military skills, such as the use of 
mines and small arms. Lessons were taught in Chinese with interpretation provided by 
two translators from Nanjing University. Both were young Chinese Communists who had 
learned Persian not by choice but rather based upon the needs of the CCP. Their Persian 
was reportedly very good, if somewhat formal.  
 As before, the students’ movement and contact were strictly controlled. When 
they were not attending classes, RO cadres were housed in comfortable villas for foreign 
guests on the outskirts of Beijing, away from residential areas. The compounds were 
fenced and guarded, and contact with the local Chinese or even other student groups was 
prevented. However, the group would occasionally catch glimpses of other delegations 
and noted the presence of many Africans and Europeans in a similar arrangement. 
Classes were isolated to contain only the five or so RO students in attendance, separate 
from other groups studying there. The Iranians even took their meals separately from the 
Chinese, who ate meager portions of cabbage and rice that were unappetizing by Iranian 
standards. The only time the students were afforded contact with the population was 
 





when they spent a week living and working at an agricultural commune. However, 
considering the reports that the communes' residents sang universal praises of the CCP, it 
is likely these trips were tightly choreographed. 
Kurosh Lasha’i and Iraj Kashkuli also encountered the Chinese obsession with 
adaptability that Rezvani described on his earlier trip. Kashkuli noted that “[t]he 
remarkable thing was the Chinese professors always said the same thing before the 
lessons: Comrades, this is the experience of the Chinese revolution and should not be 
copied...You must identify the special conditions in your country and align Marxism with 
the Iranian situation.”390 In a letter to Rezvani, Kashkuli writes that the teacher 
encouraged them to “try to match the issues with the specific circumstances...and 
conditions in Iran.”391 Kashkuli and Lasha’i had the opportunity to do so when they 
returned from China later that year and were sent to Iran to make contact with the 
revolutionary movement in Kurdistan. However, they soon learned that military training 
and practical experience are considerably different things. Their efforts were largely 
unsuccessful, and a year later, they had narrowly escaped with their lives as the 
movement was crushed by government forces. Lasha’i was arrested and eventually 
recanted his political views publicly and endorsed the Shah, and served the regime in 
relatively important positions.392 Lasha’i and other ex-Maoists played an important role 
in building bridges between the Shah and Maoism.  
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While the political lessons taught by the Chinese were influential on the RO 
activists, the military training did not yield any substantial results within Iran. It is also 
worth noting that the Chinese provided no practical support in terms of the logistics of 
launching armed struggle in Iran. The RO cadres attempted to bring the issue of the 
Kurdish separatist movement in Iran to their attention, but the CCP refused on the 
grounds that this would constitute “interfering in the affairs of another sovereign nation” 
(though they were already doing just that by supporting the RO). The CCP’s refusal was 
despite the fact that the Kurdish movement was the only actual armed struggle ongoing in 
Iran at the time. This suggests that the Chinese were not particularly interested in 
launching an actual armed struggle in Iran, or that they did not believe the conditions 
were right at this time. In the end, the RO was much more enamored with China than 
China was with it. 
The RO and Chinese Propaganda 
In addition to military training, RO activists were sent to China to assist with its 
Radio Peking broadcast.393 The Radio Peking program was the CCP’s official Cold War 
propaganda broadcast operation, comparable to Radio Free Europe or Radio Moscow, 
albeit with a smaller audience.394  It had commenced broadcasting in Persian on October 
15th, 1957, with the help of Tudeh experts, but the production of new programs became 
difficult once they departed. By 1963, Radio Peking did not seem to be broadcasting in 
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Persian at all.395 Although the Persian component of Chinese radio broadcasts had a 
demonstrably minuscule audience, the CCP remained committed to broadcasting in a 
variety of languages.396 It was important to the party planners that China appeared to be 
engaged in global activism, and a wide-ranging, comprehensive international propaganda 
program was part of that exercise.  
The RO students were not simply passive objects, however, and had their own 
agenda for Radio Peking. Tehrani wanted to turn the station into a platform to broadcast 
propaganda against the Shah. However, the Chinese programmers insisted on sticking to 
more mundane programs about agricultural statistics and the Chinese view on world 
affairs. Tehrani’s requests to broadcast anti-Shah materials were met with a flat refusal 
without explanation. They were told that this was the policy of “higher-up” comrades. 
Without any real leverage against the CCP, Tehrani and the rest of the RO was forced to 
quietly accept the situation.397 
Outside of Radio Peking, the RO played an important role in China’s domestic 
propaganda. Their visits to factories, communes, and centers of science were likely as 
much to showcase China’s international connections to the population as they were to 
acquaint the Iranians with China. In addition, the Chinese press published a number of 
articles on the “Iranian Revolutionaries” beginning in 1964. Chinese official newspapers 
had a longstanding interest in Iran and events in the Middle East. They published 
 
395 Üngör 311 
396 Ibid, 294. Radio Peking never got more than a handful of letters from listeners, while other programs 
received hundreds of letters. A US internal report also concluded that Radio Peking had next to no 
influence on Iranians. 




hundreds of articles that closely followed Iranian politics over the course of the preceding 
decade and centered a number of propaganda campaigns on Iran. These campaigns often 
stressed opposition to the United States and global imperialism.398 Now, propaganda 
about Iran was increasingly centered on the Sino-Soviet split. 
From 1964 to 1970, the RO was mentioned dozens of times in the pages of 
Renmin Ribao. Their first mention came during their initial visit in October 1963. An 
article on a trade exhibition in Shanghai reported the presence of an “Iranian friend” who 
praised the revolutionary spirit of the event organizers.399 Another article that same day 
praised the revolutionary history of Iran, China, and Turkey as the “highest peak” in the 
history of Asian revolutionary movements.400 In 1966, a number of articles were 
published that covered the proceedings of the Afro-Asian Writers Bureau. The 
organization had earlier that year split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, and 
China tried to convene an “emergency meeting” of African and Asian writers to rival the 
Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Writers Bureau Conference.401 The RO sent Mehdi 
Khanbaba Tehrani as a delegate. During the conference, Tehrani was repeatedly quoted 
in the Chinese press by his codename in Iran, “Comrade Ramin” (Laming 拉明).402 He 
spoke in support of the emergency meeting of African and Asian writers and condemned 
the Soviet-supported conference in Cairo. He was quoted saying, “the path of violent 
revolution is the only way for the liberation of the Iranian people. Only the raging fires of 
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a People’s War can burn away the decaying chains of slavery.”403. The press also 
publicized meetings between delegates at the conference - including “Laming” - with 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Mao Zedong.404 
In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) as a means to 
reassert control over the party and push back against ideological currents he opposed. He 
did this through mass mobilization of his supporters, especially students. These appeals 
targeted the CCP itself, and students were encouraged to “bombard the headquarters” and 
rebel against any party member or authority figure who opposed Mao. Eventually, this 
devolved into witch hunts, often to root out anyone with allegedly “bourgeois” habits or 
mentalities, but was used more often to target personal and political enemies. The 
resulting period became known for its ideological excesses, striking propaganda 
campaigns, and the societal chaos it unleashed. 
 Although it remained intensely anti-Soviet, the focus of China’s propaganda 
efforts shifted to portraying Mao as the sage-like leader of a global revolutionary 
movement.405 References to “Iranian radicals” (Yilang geming zhe 伊朗革命者) reading 
the works of Mao Zedong and following his example were made several times in late 
1960s. In October 1966, a translation of a letter from an anonymous Iranian student, no 
doubt an RO cadre, was published, praising Mao’s little red book: “I am studying 
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chemistry [in my home country]. Learning chemistry can't save the nation, [but] reading 
the works of Mao Zedong can.”406 A 1967 article titled “People of the World all Love to 
Read Mao’s Book” related how the author had encountered an Iranian in the Beijing 
airport who spoke enthusiastically about his meeting with Mao.407 Others discussed the 
“serious study” of Mao Zedong Thought by American and Iranian students and touted the 
RO’s publication of Maoist texts in Persian and articles in support of the Maoist line.408 
On July 21st, 1967, Renmin Ribao featured a conversation that ostensibly occurred 
between Tehrani and Chinese writer Jin Jingmai, author of the novel “The Song of 
Ouyang Hai.” Tehrani is said to have praised the vigor of the youthful swimmers, calling 
them “Ouyang Hai style youth; you should sing their praises.” He attributes this spirit to 
the education of Chairman Mao. Impressed by the Chinese dedication to mass education, 
Tehrani reportedly shouted, “Long Live Mao Zedong!”  
Whether these articles represent genuine conversations, letters and convictions or 
not, they are indicative of the way in which the relationship with the RO’s presence in 
China was mobilized in the service of domestic propaganda.409 While the Iranians were 
not the center of any particular propaganda campaigns, they portrayed China’s foreign 
supporters as diverse and numerous. China was depicted as an active proponent of world 
revolution and potential leader of the global socialist movement. The presence of Iranian 
and other international revolutionaries in China could be mobilized in the press to 
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demonstrate the universal appeal of Mao Zedong’s ideas as well as the experience of the 
Chinese revolution. Although Tehrani attempted to push the Chinese on their reluctance 
to take a stronger stance against the Iranian government, this proved ultimately futile. 
The RO had to be content to play a part in China’s propaganda effort without being able 
to substantially influence it.  
As the Cultural Revolution intensified, its propaganda had a major impact on the 
RO. Some of its members were greatly affected by the time they spent in Cultural 
Revolution China, such as Majid Zarbaksh and Ali Shams. Shams became particularly 
known for “waving around his little red book” and leading the party members in self-
criticism sessions, in which some members broke down in tears for alleged bourgeois 
crimes.410 Lasha’i said of this time that when it came to Maoist dogma, “we became more 
Catholic than the Pope.”411 While previously, the RO had looked to Maoism as a model 
for making violent revolution, for some, it now meant the pursuit of an intellectual and 
spiritual renewal centered around purging oneself of bourgeois thoughts and actions. This 
new approach was somewhat off-putting for the leadership, which found the self-
criticism sessions to be overly dramatic and were often themselves the targets of 
accusations of bourgeois thought. Rezvani perceived this as a challenge to the leadership, 
organized by those he suspected of having revisionist tendencies, and who were taking 
advantage of other overly-zealous members.412 Other cadres, like Tehrani, were 
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disillusioned by what they saw in China during the Cultural Revolution, and came to 
question the wisdom of following the Chinese line.413 
 
Fig 17. “The Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol 1” Persian edition. Published 
in Beijing, 1969. 
By 1969, these underlying internal tensions spilled into the open when some 
members, including Tehrani, left to form the splinter group “Cadres” (Kadr-ha). In 1965, 
shortly after the formation of the RO, the Marxist-Leninist Storm Organization (Sāzmān-
e Mārksīst-Lenīnīst-e tūfān was also created as a rival Maoist party. Its leaders, Ḡolām-
Ḥosayn Forūtan, Aḥmad Qāsemī, and ʿAbbās Saḡāʾī were expelled Tudeh members who 
 




followed the Chinese party line and were later were associated with Albania in their 
opposition to both China and the Soviet Union.414 They also published polemical articles 
attacking the RO into the late 1960s. While Maoist parties and sympathizers maintained a 
strong presence in the CIS-NU, especially in the United States, the RO itself was isolated 
and under attack by both Nationalist and smaller Maoist factions by the 1970s.415 
The remaining RO activists responded to the challenge of the Cadres and the 
Tufan by doubling down on their convictions. They began a new publication called Red 
Star (Setāreh-ye Sorkh) in 1970 which displayed a noticeably more dogmatic approach to 
Maoism.416 At the same time, the Shah had steadily been improving his ties to China, 
which led to official diplomatic relations in the early 1970s. Furthermore, the RO 
seemingly failed to heed the warning that Mao himself allegedly gave to Rezvani, and 
disputed the reports of their own members that had gone to Iran. These reports indicated 
that the White Revolution had caused substantial change in the Iranian economic 
situation, and conditions were not good for rural revolution. The RO, following Mao’s 
idea that it was no longer possible for capitalism to develop in the Third World, 
maintained their assessment that Iran was a “semi-feudal” country rather than one 
transitioning to a capitalist economy.  
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Fig 18. An issue of Setāreh-ye Sorkh. Above the title, the phrase “Raise the flag of 
Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought”is written.  
Criticized for its dogmatic approach and its support of China during this period, 
and suffering from the general “confusion and disarray” that characterized global Maoist 
politics in the mid-1970s, the RO was now in decline.417 While it did not endorse China’s 
pro-Tehran policy, it did not criticize China outright. Furthermore, its attempts to set up 
bases in Iran had failed, and several of its members had been involved in highly public 
defections and were now working for the Shah's government.418 These factors led to a 
steady decline in the popularity of Maoist factions within the student movement.419 
Throughout the early 1970s, the National Front factions led a campaign against their RO 
rivals in a bid to gain greater control over the student union. Eventually, the organization 
was expelled from the CIS-NU, leaving it isolated and ineffective thereafter.420 
The Impact of Iranian Maoism 
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 Although the RO and the Iranian Maoist movement only lasted about a decade, 
they left an unmistakable imprint on the tactics, rhetoric, and ideology of both the Iranian 
opposition and the Iranian state. First, under the leadership of Maoist student groups like 
the RO, the CIS-NU engaged in some of its most radical and direct opposition to the 
Shah and embraced a number of explicitly Maoist positions. Through newspapers, 
pamphlets, and other publications, their ideological position endorsing the Chinese line 
won over the majority of Iranian student leftists during this period. Second, the 
radicalization of the student movement directly contributed to the CIS-NU's support of 
guerilla organizations that launched an armed conflict within Iran. This support amplified 
the impact of the guerilla movement by making it an international issue and keeping it in 
the public eye, as well as by galvanizing the opposition both inside and outside of the 
country through highly visible expressions of solidarity. Third, the popularity of radical 
politics led both conservative Islamic and royalist factions to borrow from the rhetorical 
style and content of Maoism, and several ex-Maoists played a key role in the Shah's 
White Revolution and the development of the ideology of the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) 
Party. This abortive attempt at turning Iran into a one-party state borrowed freely from 
Leftist and Maoist ideological trends and elevated the Shah to a Sage-King figure who 
would lead the Iranian people on the path to their own unique revolution.  
 Afshin Matin-Asgari has analyzed the Maoist movement in a short article and 
explored the history of the CIS-NU and its radicalization in Iranian Student Opposition to 
the Shah. The CIS-NU grew out of a coalition of various ideological and political 




Force. It came to prominence as student opposition was revived following the collapse of 
domestic opposition at the end of the 1950s.421 In 1960, the Confederation of Iranian 
Students (CIS) emerged in Europe, while the Iranian Students' Association in the United 
States (ISAUS) was overtaken by radicals who drove out the conservative leadership.422 
In 1962, these two organizations unified to create the Confederation of Iranian Students – 
National Union (CIS-NU) and received the endorsement of the newly established 
Organization of Tehran University Students (OTUS), making it the sole organization that 
unified student opposition abroad and student opposition in Iran.423 Its ranks included 
communist members of the Tudeh, nationalist members of Second National Front, and a 
growing Islamist faction.424 
 The CIS-NU was cautious at first. In 1962, it largely used nationalist rhetoric and 
called for liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law. They did not explicitly call for the 
removal of the Shah, only for him to “reign and not rule” in accordance with 
Constitutional law.425 However, attitudes quickly changed after violence broke out at 
Tehran University in June 1963, which saw Khomeini arrested and hundreds (possibly 
thousands) of protesters killed.426 This began a fundamental change in the opposition, 
which moved to openly confront the Shah on his trips abroad. In January 1964, the CIS-
NU adopted a resolution that stated that “the shah speaks the language of bullets, one 
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must speak to him in his own language.”427 This was the crucial precipitating event that 
sent Iranian activists on a path towards endorsing the radical politics of armed struggle. It 
is important to recognize that it was domestic developments that sent shockwaves 
throughout the community abroad and led to the appeal and ultimate adoption of Maoist 
politics, not the other way around. Maoism did not radicalize Iranian students through its 
inherent appeal or rhetorical power, but it did play a key part in their journey towards a 
more radical approach to politics. 
 By 1965, the RO had emerged and split from the Tudeh leadership. As a minority 
faction in the CIS-NU, it “led the Confederation to a new phase of radicalism and 
expansion as an upsurge of international student militancy began in 1967.”428 It also sent 
members back to Iran who were arrested and tried in connection with an attempt to 
assassinate the Shah, which led to “a direct confrontation between the CISNU and the 
Iranian government, pushing the Confederation to take more radical positions.” By 1968, 
the CIS-NU had joined the global student movement and participated in a variety of anti-
colonial, anti-war, and anti-Shah activities. They declared the Confederation an “anti-
imperialist, democratic, and popular” organization and elected more and more Maoist 
members to the leadership.429 By 1969, the Maoists had come to dominate the 
organization and control over 2/3rds of its voting membership.430 The ISAUS 
experienced a similar evolution and took a pro-Chinese stance in its newspapers and 
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publications by 1969.431 By 1971, the CIS-NU had openly declared that the Soviet Union 
was pursuing an “anti-people” foreign policy. The Confederation experienced incredible 
growth during this period; from 1969 to 1971 alone, its annual budget grew from 12,000 
German marks per year to over 135,000 marks per year from 2000 official members. 432 
 When the guerrilla movement against the Shah was launched with the Siahkal 
incident of February 8th, 1971, the Maoist factions within the student movement were at 
the peak of their influence.433 After years of agitating for violent resistance, there was 
little question of whether the Confederation would support the militants. From 1972 to 
1975, the CIS-NU engaged in a highly public campaign to support students arrested in 
connection with violent anti-regime activities.434 Through hunger strikes, newspaper 
campaigns, and public demonstrations, their involvement brought unwelcome attention to 
the Shah's use of naked political violence and led to a campaign against Iran for human 
rights violations from a number of international organizations.435 By 1974, they were 
openly calling for the overthrow of the Shah, and the American and European media had 
become increasingly hostile towards his repressive policies.436 The “bad press” 
subsequently led the Carter administration to pressure the Shah to liberalize the political 
system, which contributed to his eventual downfall.437 
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 The guerrilla movement itself was also deeply affected by Maoist politics and 
related theories of armed struggle. As part of the same intellectual, social, and political 
milieu as the student movement, both the Islamic and Marxist oriented guerrillas engaged 
with Maoism and read Maoist texts in their search for a model of militant revolution. As 
Matin-Asgari notes, “Guerilla theorists, whether Muslim or Marxist, argued that armed 
action was the only viable option left...Their literature was also attentive to and even 
preoccupied with contemporary revolutionary theory and practice in Latin America, 
Algeria, Palestine, China, and Vietnam.”438 The two most prominent militant 
organizations were the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG), 
sometimes called the Fadaiyan,439 and the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI)440, both of 
which grew out of clandestine groups that studied revolutionary theory, including the 
works of Mao, Regis Debray, Che Guevera, and Liu Shaoqi.441  While Maoism was not 
uniquely influential on the opposition within the country any more than it was on the 
opposition abroad, it was part of a larger engagement with “Third World” militant 
movements and reflective of a turn in the 1960s towards radical politics in the wake of 
brutal repression. 
 Although neither group explicitly endorsed the Chinese line, their engagement 
with Maoist politics and theories can be clearly seen from their publications. One 
Fadaiyan theorist wrote, “the revolutionary intellectuals greet the revolutionary trend of 
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Marxism-Leninism based on the ideas of Comrade Mao.”442 Another leftist theorist, 
Mostafa Sho'aiyan, was critical of what he saw of the Fadaiyan's uncritical acceptance of 
both Soviet and Chinese foreign policy.443 Bizhan Jazani, one of the founders of Fadaiyan 
and its main theoretical architect, engaged with the history of the Chinese revolution in 
the pamphlets and essays he penned from a cell in one of the Shah's prisons. He 
positively appraises China's communist movement as a revolution that had “triumphed” 
and established a “People's democracy” and occasionally refers to the Kuomintang, the 
Korean War, and other events in Chinese history in his analysis of Iranian society and 
global capitalism.444 Jazani also echoed Mao and European Marxists' assessment of the 
revolutionary character of the peasants, which the Tudeh Party (and Soviet communism) 
traditionally eschewed in favor of industrial workers. Although he was unsure of how to 
successfully mobilize the peasant population, Jazani judged that after the Shah's land 
reforms, “the rural areas have been shaken out of their slumber and the peasant who had 
for centuries accepted the landlord's yoke with equanimity has learned that such slavery 
is unjust.”445 He argued that the Shah's reforms had created new pressures and forms of 
exploitation on the farmers and khosh-nashin (landless peasants), and that this had a 
positive effect on their class consciousness.446 Here, Jazani pivots away from Maoist 
thought on the subject, which proposes that revolution must begin in the countryside, to 
instead focus on the possibilities of an urban-based guerilla campaign: 
 
442 Ahmadzadeh, Massoud, “Mobarezeh-ye mosalahaneh, ham strategi ham taktik”, quoted in Shahibzadeh, 
Yadullah. Marxism and Left Wing Politics in Europe and Iran. (2018), 148 
443 Ibid, 159 
444 Jazani, Bizhan. “Land Reform in Modern Iran” in Capitalism and Revolution in Iran (1980), 72, 116 





Will this pressure force the farmers into submission and surrender? Or will 
they...turn to the revolutionary movement? Obviously, without the necessary 
consciousness and vanguard movements, it would be futile to expect the farms – 
dispersed as they are – to move toward collective action and effective protest. No 
doubt we will have to wait for dispersed and localized protests to come to the 
surface...At the present time, however, there are only two ways in which the 
farmers...can be mobilized and their consciousness raised. First, it is necessary to 
establish armed struggle in the rural areas which in the initial stages will have to 
lean heavily on progressive forces in the urban areas. Such a struggle will 
accentuate rural problems and raise the consciousness of the rural masses in a 
practical way...Second, political and economic movements by the urban masses 
will influence the farmers...Our answer to the problem is clear...to increase the 
consciousness of the farmers and then mobilize them.447 
 Jazani's attention to the rural population and plans to lead it in revolt shares some 
parallels with Mao's famous “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in 
Hunan,” written in 1927.448 Both made extensive attempts to analyze and examine the 
rural population based on direct experiences, though they drew different conclusions 
according to the local situation. Mao argues that after seeing firsthand the successes of 
the peasant associations and their actions against the landlords, the CCP must orient its 
policies towards supporting them. While Mao determined that the Chinese peasants soon 
“will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, 
however great, will be able to hold it back,” Jazani freely admitted that “although our 
knowledge of the economic processes in the rural areas during recent years is quite 
considerable, we have unfortunately no comprehensive data about the effect of these 
processes, and resulting contradictions, on the psychology of the rural strata.”449 Though 
he predicted an increase in the revolutionary sentiment of the peasantry, he did not 
witness revolutionary action on the part of the farmers against the landowning class and 
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thus did not attribute to them a highly revolutionary character. However, he and Mao 
were in agreement about the proper method necessary to draw such conclusions. 
According to Elizabeth Perry, with regards to public opinion, Mao's position was 
“without investigation, no one has the right to speak.”450 Similarly, Jazani writes that 
“[t]o assess the peasants' true state of mind and outlook, one has to get in direct touch 
with this class and its day-to-day existence. And unfortunately that has not been possible 
for the present writer to do.”451 
 Despite his engagement with Maoist literature, Jazani was by no means a Maoist, 
and in fact advised Iranians to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet split. In an essay titled 
“Land Reform in Modern Iran,” he criticized the Iranian Maoist movement for its 
attempts to “have a hand in events from afar and whose knowledge of the country is 
about the same as their knowledge of Burma and Nepal.”452 Jazani argued they had: 
...pledged themselves to a dogma – although this of course they attempt to 
conceal. They feel obligated to assess the system in Iran as semi-feudal and semi-
colonial, simply because Mao Tse-Tung in one of his books dating back a few 
decades classified societies in three groups: socialist, capitalist and semi-
feudal/semi-colonial. Now we ask these comrades: what was the system of 
government in China after the revolution? Into which group do Vietnam and Cuba 
fit today? Which classification embraces the prevailing systems in Egypt, Algeria 
and Syria? Thus we can clearly see that reality does not fit into this formula. 453  
Jazani was also critical of Chinese foreign policy, especially its relationship with the 
Shah: 
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[China’s engagement with the Shah] enable[s] the regime to use the political 
prestige of China...to deceive progressive forces at home. At the same time the 
regime relieves itself of possible political and propaganda pressures which might 
otherwise be brought. This influences internal conditions...[and] helps the regime 
withstand moral pressure in the region from international public opinion.”454  
He charges the socialist states, including China, with using relations with Iran to expand 
their own economies at the expense of the Iranian opposition. Jazani calls on them to 
refuse to engage with friendly relations with the Shah and to put pressure on the regime 
internationally.455  
 Ironically, Jazani's critical analysis and creative application of Marxist theory to 
the Iranian situation resembles the path laid out by Mao Zedong and the Chinese 
Revolution.  Mao's greatest contribution to the history of Marxism was adapting Soviet 
Marxism to the Chinese situation, adding in important elements – like the theory of 
armed struggle and his approach to rural revolution - that would go on to become major 
intellectual and political trends in the 1960s. The CCP was also very vocal that fraternal 
parties should avoid over-reliance on China, as China's over-reliance on the Soviet Union 
had been to its detriment. At the very least, it should be appreciated that Jazani echoes the 
advice that was supposedly given to Mohsen Rezvani by Mao himself when they met; 
they must apply the lessons of other revolutions to their own situation and not try to 
reproduce the Chinese experience wholesale. Like Mao, Jazani urged Leftists to: 
...characterize correctly the realities of our society which is in the process of 
movement and growth. For this task, creative Marxism-Leninism will be our 
guide...obstinately advocating this or that formula devised by a revolutionary 
leader in a particular historical period for a particular concrete situation will not 
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only fail to help us find our own way, but will mean that we fail to be good 
protagonists of proletarian ideology.456 
 The People's Mujahedin of Iran incorporated Maoist texts in their theoretical 
development and search for a model for revolution. This engagement with Maoism has 
led some earlier scholars to erroneously attribute Maoism as the primary ideological force 
of the movement and that the movement only adopted a Muslim orientation later.457 
Abrahamian argues instead that the organization was always Muslim in orientation, and 
that a major split occurred in 1975, when some members left to form the “Marxist 
Mujahedin” and explicitly endorsed Maoist theory.458 They were particularly influenced 
by Mao's essay “On Contradictions,” which they adopted as their primary “handbook” of 
revolution.459 Massoud Rajavi, the long-time leader of the People’s Mujahedin, 
encouraged a cult of personality similar to the one that surrounded Mao and other 
charismatic leaders prior to his disappearance in 2003. Slogans coined by Mao and the 
CCP were sometimes found on Mujahedin pamphlets. In other words, while they did not 
openly endorse Maoism, Maoist texts formed an important part of their thinking about 
resistance and revolution. 
China’s Motivations and Agenda 
 In spite of its vocal support for violent revolution, China declined to provide 
either material support for armed struggle or rhetorical support for the Kurdish 
movement. The CCP also refused the RO’s pleas for a more relevant and opposition-
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based approach to Radio Peking’s Persian service. The primary reason for this stance was 
that at the same time as they were supporting the RO, the CCP was also trying to 
establish friendly relations with Tehran. While willing to endorse the Iranian 
revolutionaries to a point, Beijing was careful to do nothing that might harm a future 
partnership with the Shah. Both relationships advanced the goal of countering the 
Soviets; the RO successfully reduced the influence of the Tudeh and advocated the 
Chinese line internationally, while good relations with Iran would provide a check on 
Soviet influence there. 
China had long articulated an interest in pursuing friendly relations with the 
Shah’s government. This was first expressed as an official policy in the 1955 Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Conference at Bandung. There, Zhou Enlai struck a moderate, diplomatic tone 
and proposed that there was no need for conflict between China and the Asian states 
which aligned themselves with the United States.460 According to preparatory documents 
for the conference, Chinese policy was to attempt to “influence” Iran, although no 
specific goal was developed.461 Their primary concern at that time, while they were still a 
Soviet ally, was that Iran did not act as a “spring-board of anti-Soviet aggression.”462 Iran 
ignored Zhou’s conciliatory tone, and their representative only made vague statements 
warning the Chinese against trying to solve the Taiwan issue by force.463 This was 
because the Iranians had been cultivating ties with the Taiwanese, who had an unofficial 
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embassy in Iran as early as 1955.464 Beijing was aware of this embassy and was also 
eager to check the growing influence of the “Chiang bandits.”465 
Iran cemented its rejection of China’s offers of friendship first by joining the 
U.S.-led Baghdad Pact in 1956 and then by establishing official relations with Taiwan in 
1957. This did not stop the CCP from reaching out again in 1958 to propose a new trade 
agreement.466 This proposal was ignored. Relations remained cool until 1965 when China 
renewed its efforts by sending a radio message to the Iranian Prime Minister while in-
flight over the country. News of the message was published in the Chinese press.467 This 
time, the Iranians responded favorably. An informal trade agreement was signed in 1966, 
and official ties were established in 1971 after a long period of quiet courtship, during 
which time Iran publicly defied the United States on the issue of Taiwan’s membership in 
the UN.468 Iranian newspapers also began to write positively about China for the first 
time since 1949. The Iranian newspaper Ayandegan put Iranian support for China at the 
UN in terms of defiance of U.S. hegemony: 
…the first time that the UN has stood up to a Big Power which has not only been 
a major fulcrum, but also one which has always imposed its will on the 
international body. Undoubtedly, without American consent, China would not 
have entered the UN…The U.S. is not happy with Taiwan’s ouster, but at least it 
can now breathe a sigh of relief. America’s efforts to improve relations with 
Peking on the one hand and maintain good relations with Formosa [Taiwan] on 
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the other have created a strong contradiction in American foreign policy. But, 
now it can overcome this contradiction.469 
The shift in tone was indicative of just how much the political and ideological 
environment had changed since the 1950s, and the popularity of the anti-imperial, anti-
American rhetoric the Shah had partially embraced.  
The most public signs of a thaw in relations came with two highly publicized 
visits to China by members of the Shah’s family: Queen Farah Diba Pahlavi, the Shah’s 
wife, and Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, his twin sister. Both women were deeply involved in 
courtly politics and public engagement, but were not technically officials nor did they 
hold any post in government. This allowed the two women to pitch their visits as only 
quasi-official, as the question of relations with China had to be delicately balanced 
against the demands of the Soviet Union. The Chinese did not seem to mind that the Shah 
himself was not visiting, and were happy for any opportunity to reduce their diplomatic 
isolation and rub shoulders with the allies of their rivals. Ashraf was also chosen in part 
because of her pre-existing friendship with Zhou Enlai, which was facilitated by Pakistan 
some time in the early 1960s. She writes about this friendship in her memoir Faces in a 
Mirror: 
[Zulfiqar Ali] Bhutto’s lasting gift to me was the chance to meet Zhou Enlai. For 
years I had believed that one cannot ignore a country as populous as 
China...Bhutto knew of my eagerness to meet Zhou Enlai.  So he made 
arrangements for such a meeting in Pakistan’s embassy in Indonesia. This 
meeting led to my first trip to China. In my initial encounter with Zhou Enlai, I 
was quite impressed by his calm voice, and delicate, if not feminine, demeanor. In 
our conversations, he spoke of his country’s traditions and customs. Despite his 
calm appearance, Zhou Enlai had succeeded to retain his leadership position by 
thwarting the plots of his political rivals. He was also given the nickname of 
 




“pou-ta-ou-vang” meaning a doll who bounces back every time it is tossed 
around. Despite their reputation for being secretive and mysterious, I found Zhou 
Enlai and other Chinese to be frank and plain-spoken, unlike the Russians who 
use too many words to define a single point. In a word, the Chinese tell you 
exactly what they want and expect others to do the same. After returning to Iran, I 
told my brother that: “One cannot ignore a country of 800 million people by 
pretending that Taiwan has replaced China.” He agreed with me, yet Iran’s 
diplomatic relations with China were not resumed until 1965.470  
Ashraf Pahlavi arrived in Beijing on April 14th, 1971. Although Zhou Enlai repeatedly 
brought up political issues in his welcoming speech, Ashraf pitched her visit as a “voyage 
of personal discovery” and a chance to renew her friendship with Zhou. Never drawn into 
any political awkward comment or discussion, she skillfully struck a balance between 
personal and political rhetoric: 
Your invitation…has meant the fulfillment of an adolescent dream, namely, to 
visit your magnificent country and learn first the more or its unique culture and 
fascinating people. I come to China...on a voyage of personal discovery. My 
remarks are therefore, brief and should be regarded as non-political. But for the 
benefit of those who invariably attribute any political innuendo to any move, let 
me say this. My brother and sovereign, the Shahanshah of Iran, has always 
maintained that in this world of boundless diversity, co-existence and co-
operation...between countries with differing socio-political systems is perfectly 
possible. I believe my presence here amongst you bears testimony to the validity 
of this dictum...I know that, through this unpretentious visit, we already have 
taken the first step in that direction.471  
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Fig 20. Ashraf met with a variety of CCP officials over her six-day visit, although 
neither she nor Queen Farah were received by Mao Zedong. 
Queen Farah’s visit was the first official visit following the normalization of 
diplomatic relations, but it had much in common with Ashraf’s. First, although the queen 
was accompanied by Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, she was conspicuously not 
accompanied by her husband, who was in the Soviet Union at the time. The significance 
would not have been lost on the Chinese, and yet they did not seem to take it as a snub. 
On the contrary, Queen Farah received a lavish welcome and was doted on by her guests 
for ten days in September 1972. At a lavish reception at the Great Hall of the People in 
Beijing, Zhou praised the Shah and the Iranian people at length: 
Under the leadership of His Imperial Majesty Pahlavi, the Shahanshah of Iran, the 
government and people of Iran have achieved success in safeguarding state 




building their country… Friendly contacts and traditional friendship between the 
Chinese and Iranian people date back to ancient times. The world-famous 
'SilkRoad' opened more than 2000 years ago...However, owing to sabotage and 
obstruction by imperialism, the friendly ties...were interrupted for a period of 
time. Today we are glad to see that the traditional friendship between the Chinese 
and Iranian peoples have resumed on the basis of principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, 
equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.472 
In response, Queen Farah praised “your remarkable achievements, inspired by the 
thoughts and teachings of Chairman Mao” and expressed an interest in “in a closer 
association with the great new society that is being built under the wise leadership of 
Chairman Mao Zedong” on behalf of her husband.473 Her praise for Mao Zedong 
Thought was yet another sign of the popularity of leftist rhetoric and the Shah’s strategy 
of borrowing revolutionary concepts and rhetoric. 
  
Fig 21. Queen Farah and Zhou Enlai, September 18th, 1972 
 






Fig 22. Queen Farah stayed in the country for ten days and was given a lavish 
welcome. 
Zhou's language is strikingly similar to the rhetoric of modern Sino-Iranian 
relations. The image of a leader of communist China praising an autocratic monarchy was 
as puzzling in 1971 as it is today. However, when placed in the context of China's foreign 
policy in the 1970s, it is not so difficult to understand. After the Sino-Soviet Border 
Conflict of 1969, Mao had become was convinced the Soviet Union was an imminent 
political and military threat. At the same time, Zhou had pursued good relations with Iran 
since the early 1950s, to tempt them away from the American and Taiwanese sphere of 
influence. As Mohammad Reza Pahlavi pursued his independent foreign policy in the 
1960s, he began to broaden his base of international support and reached out to China and 
the Soviet Union simultaneously. At that point, China was happy to engage with Iran, just 
as it had with the United States under Richard Nixon, as part of a strategy to counter the 




Soon after, China dropped all public mention of the RO and “Iranian 
Revolutionaries.” While China had continued to promote its support for Iranian Maoism 
through 1971, once relations were normalized these groups were never mentioned again. 
The RO did push back against these policies, but it was unaware that the CCP was 
growing closer to Tehran until Princess Ashraf’s public visit.474 Many of their members 
ultimately accepted the situation. Rezvani defends the CCP’s choice to establish ties with 
Iran because he understood it as a strategic consideration.475 Kashkuli complains that 
Tehrani should have acted as an employee of Radio Peking and been satisfied instead of 
demanding anti-Shah content, although the interviewer correctly counters that this avoids 
addressing China’s claim to be a revolutionary state.476 One can detect a hint of bitterness 
beneath these explanations. The RO could do little to influence its patron. “We often 
talked about mutual support, but this was a kind of taʿārof.477 We had nothing to offer 
them”.478 Ties with the RO were therefore desirable in part because of their low cost. The 
organization was influential in the CIS-NU and willing to send delegations that were 
useful for propaganda purposes, but was not powerful enough to make any demands of 
the Chinese or initiate an armed struggle. The relationship could be maintained without 
drawing China into direct conflict with the Iranian government. 
Interestingly, the CCP and the Iranian Maoists maintained a personal relationship 
even after China endorsed the Shah. Rezvani and others would continue to visit as 
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official delegates as late as 1982, but they attended no more training groups.479 He 
recounts how on the eve of the Islamic Revolution, the CCP invited him and other Iranian 
leftists to discuss the ongoing unrest in Iran. While the RO expressed support of 
Khomeini and Islam as a potentially progressive and revolutionary force, the CCP 
remained fundamentally skeptical of the idea of revolutionary religion.480 Rezvani later 
recalled that ironically, the Chinese had been correct to be suspicious, and they had made 
the wrong call despite being closer to the situation, as Khomeini turned against the left 
and initiated a bloody repression only a few years later.  
The RO and the Shah 
 Iranian radicals both inside and outside of Iran engaged with Maoism as they 
criticized, adopted, and rejected its premises. This popularity did not go unnoticed by 
other forces within the opposition, both secular and religious. The topic of cross-
fertilization between Islamic and Leftist thought in Iran during the 1960s is itself worthy 
of a separate thesis and cannot be adequately covered here. Suffice to say, there was a 
substantial genuine engagement between Muslim and Marxist ideology, and many 
Iranians did not consider the two to be mutually exclusive identities. Some, notably Ali 
Shari'ati, explicitly developed a theory of social revolution based in Islamic thought that 
replicated and made compulsive many of the arguments of socialist thinkers.481 Shari'ati 
was also notably influenced by French thinkers like Massignon and Badiou, who were 
themselves influenced by Maoist thought, and his thinking reflects a general (if cursory) 
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engagement with popular currents of contemporaneous Marxist and Third World political 
thought.482 However, it would be difficult to argue that this represented a genuine 
engagement with Maoism, beyond a general familiarity with the debates surrounding it. 
Shari'ati's public lectures became more radical over time, especially following the 
appearance of the guerrilla movement, which blended Marxist and Muslim language and 
ideology freely.483 Shari'ati's ideas became synonymous with the People's Mujahedin 
organization and became so popular that, as Abrahamian puts it, “Shari’ati has gone 
down in history as the main ideologue of the Iranian Revolution...Shari'ati's 
works...differed from their own only on minor points...the ideology of the Mujahedin, 
consequently, spread inside and outside Iran mainly through Shari'ati”484 
 The popularity of radical discourse, whether Muslim, Marxist, or increasingly a 
fusion between the two, was spreading among both secular students and seminarians, as 
well as the middle-class bazaari merchants. This did not go unnoticed by more 
conservative Islamic voices, such as Khomeini, who began using phrases like mostazafin 
(the oppressed) in his sermons, and railed against imperialism and social inequality. This 
shrewd “project of plagiarizing from the left, to buttress right-wing hegemony” took 
place throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and culminated in the language of the Islamic 
Revolution, as well as some of its later rhetorical flourishes, such as the 1980 Iranian 
Cultural Revolution.485 This project was important to the ultimate victory of the 
conservative factions and the emergence of Iran as an Islamic Republic, as it successfully 
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convinced many Leftist organizations that otherwise might have been hostile to a 
conservative religious revolutionary to get behind Khomeini as the leader of the Iranian 
revolution. 
 The Shah's regime engaged in a similar project of plagiarism and co-opting 
popular leftist ideas to put them in the service of dictatorship. In the 1960s, the Shah 
began to engage in what Matin-Asgari calls “authenticity politics,” in response to popular 
discourse that sought to defend Iranian culture against the “technological, economic and 
cultural domination of 'the West.'”486 The state became more and more involved in the 
production of an intellectual culture explicitly cultivated to counter the influence of the 
opposition, which included the creation of organizations such as the High Council of 
Culture and the Arts that employed former Marxist and Maoists in key positions.487 In 
1965, the Center for the Intellectual Cultivation of Children and Adolescents was 
established to cultivate a new generation of intellectual and artistic talent, and its 
publication wing was run by Firuz Shirvanlu, a Marxist former member of the CIS-NU 
who was arrested (and later pardoned) with Parviz Nikkhah as part of the assassination 
attempt on the Shah.488 During Shirvanlu's tenure, the Center published a variety of leftist 
literature and translations, including Samad Behrangi's famous radical children's book 
Little Black Fish.489 The National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT) organization was 
especially dominated by ex-Marxists, including several Maoists like Parviz Nikkhah and 
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Firuz Fuladi.490 Nikkhah and another ex-Marxist, Mahmud Jafarian, “became top 
propagandists for strategic policy lines laid down by the Shah” and oversaw a number of 
publications and broadcasts that wrapped “monarchist propaganda in a pseudo-Marxist 
language.” This language only increased as the Shah warmed up to China in the 1970s, 
and some Iranian Maoist groups repeated the propagandists' claims that the Shah was “an 
anti-imperialist leader defiant of both superpowers,” to the detriment of their credibility 
with the opposition.491 
Former Maoists were not only the most attractive prospective propagandists for 
the royal media in the 1960s, but were also key to the Shah's attempt to establish single-
party rule in the 1970s. The Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party was announced in 1975, and 
attempted to institutionalize the idea that the Shah was a divine leader of a uniquely 
Iranian anti-imperial revolution.492 It adopted both the rhetoric and organizational 
principles of communist parties and was largely run by ex-communists. Former Maoists 
and RO members, including Nikkhah, Fuladi, and Kurosh Lasha'i occupied key 
positions.493 Lasha'i in particular was directly involved in formulating the Shah's “neither 
Eastern, nor Western” foreign policy, which included improved relations with China.494 
As noted before, this pattern of defections was one of the factors that damaged the 
prestige of the Maoist movement abroad. Ultimately, the attempt to launch the Rastakhiz 
Party was aborted, but its makeup shows the extensive influence ex-Maoist propagandists 
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came to have over the Resurrection Party and the resultant impact on the propaganda and 
rhetoric of the Shah's “revolutionary” regime.  
The Shah was aware of the connection between China and the CIS-NU 
leadership. The 1965 assassination attempt was blamed on pro-Chinese elements by 
SAVAK, although there is evidence that they knew that the connection was tenuous. The 
attack was used as an excuse to arrest the entire cell and to initiate a campaign of 
infiltration and demoralization against the pro-Chinese student factions and against the 
CIS-NU as a whole.495 In a letter from Tehran on October 22nd, 1966, U.S. Ambassador 
to Iran Armin Meyer describes the SAVAK’s new attitude towards the Chinese 
communists: 
Savak is showing interest in long-term threat posed by the Chinese Communists. 
The latter have not been able to form any organization within Iran, but have been 
successful in their propaganda activities among Iranian students in Europe. An 
increasing number...have begun to show Communist Chinese sympathies and 
some of them apparently have even visited China. The Chinese have flooded 
Europe with publications which are having an effect on Iranian students some of 
whom can be expected to return to Iran and to attempt to conduct subversive 
activities. Savak believes that students returning...will have to be checked very 
carefully lest the Chinese Communists get a foothold in Iran. Although Savak 
believes that the pro-Soviet group now dominates the Tudeh party, it feels that the 
Chinese Communists, considering that they have been laboring under the double 
disadvantage of being newer in the field than the Soviets and of having no official 
representation in Iran, have done very well to date.496 
The Shah also publicly declared that the failed assassin was directly connected to 
the Nikkhah Group. In an interview with Le Monde, the Shah claimed to have received a 
full confession from Nikkhah and his associate Mansuri: “He looked me right in the eyes 
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and told me ‘Yes, we encouraged Shamsabadi to make the attempt on your life, since we 
are pro-Chinese communists and seek to overthrow the regime’”.497 While the Shah 
likely knew this was just a convenient fabrication, based on his subsequent behavior, it 
also seems that he took the underlying threat of Chinese infiltration seriously, and sought 
to use this occasion to bury those who he feared might also try an assassination attempt in 
the future. This would have important repercussions both for his views on China and his 
ultimate decision to pursue a closer relationship with Beijing. 
 The Shah had never been particularly friendly towards China. As a staunch anti-
Communist, he claimed Iran had no interest in China’s “ant-like” society.498 As early as 
1963, he had written a letter to US President Lyndon B. Johnson that argued in favor of 
peaceful relations with the Soviet Union in the face of “Chinese peril to universal 
peace.”499 Shortly after the assassination attempt, the Shah raised the issue with U.S. 
officials. “The Shah said that he had evidence that the recent attempt on his life was 
planned by students recently returned from England...Ambassador Holmes pointed out 
that there are indications of Chinese Communist influence among the students in Iran.”500 
From 1965 to 1966, the Shah became increasingly vocal about the threat of Chinese 
infiltration and ideological warfare. He accused the CCP of not being “peace-minded” 
and called them “fanatical ideologues” pushing a “policy of belligerence” in meetings 
with U.S. officials.501 He encouraged the U.S. to hold fast and act aggressively in 
Vietnam to counter Chinese influence there. He claimed that if the Chinese were not 
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stopped there, they would overrun Indonesia and Southeast Asia.502 Notably, these fears 
did not center on military concerns but the potential impact of Chinese propaganda.  
The Shah expressed concern about Pakistan’s close relationship with China and 
the risk posed by “trainees being supplied with ChiCom propaganda” in the Pakistani 
army.503 He offered to help “persuade Ayub of Pakistan to be careful in his dealings with 
Communist China,” and later reported that “he had spoken “very firmly” to Ayub about 
[his] overdependence on Communist China. He...told [him] that the best friend of the 
Paks is the US and he warned against a Pak relationship with Russia, as well as 
Communist China.”504 He also criticized the U.S. for driving Pakistan into the arms of the 
Chinese by providing insufficient military aid, likely to subtly suggest that they not be 
stingy with him.505 In this way, he continued to frame his concerns over China in ways 
that would allow him to appear useful or send the right message. His work on Pakistan 
was particularly appreciated by the U.S. 506  
The Americans had doubts that the level of Chinese infiltration of the student 
movement was particularly high. A 1970 CIA study Student Unrest Abroad found the 
effectiveness of Maoist publications inside Iran “has been undercut by rapid economic 
and social development” and questioned whether the 20 students arrested in Tehran in 
February 1968 were actually pro-Chinese.507  From the view of U.S. administrators, it 
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seemed the Shah had either overestimated the danger of Chinese infiltration, or otherwise 
was exaggerating it to justify his oppression of the student movement. Others within the 
government found his fears more credible. In 1972, a report was prepared that discussed 
the possibility that the Shah might be assassinated by groups claiming to be “Marxist, 
Marxist-Leninist, or Maoist.” “Though rightly deemed no immediate threat to the general 
security...these groups still pose a threat greatly in excess of their numbers...To a young 
dissident with the anarchistic outlook of the “New Left,” the level of disruption and 
uncertainty that the killing of the Shah would generate represents a positive gain.”508 It is 
likely that the Shah, who had already survived multiple assassination attempts, shared 
this assessment. 
The Shah’s apparent increased anxiety about China came at the same time that 
Chinese officials began making friendly overtures to Iran once again. Several 
international factors contributed to his decision to accept. First, after years of being 
closely allied with the West, the Shah made a point to develop an “independent foreign 
policy” after the White Revolution of 1963. This mostly consisted of attempts to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc while maintaining good relations 
with the United States509 Improving relations with China could be seen as part of this 
overall strategy. Second, in 1964, China exploded a nuclear bomb and was recognized by 
France and the UK, which made the CCP a major player in world politics. 510 Third, the 
support provided to Pakistan by the CCP helped convince the Shah that “the Chinese are 
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reliable friends.”511 Finally, the massacre of Communist forces and supporters in 
Indonesia from 1965-1966 convinced the Shah that it was no longer so urgent to 
aggressively oppose China to prevent the spread of Communism in Asia.512 
Both Chinese support for the RO and the impact of Maoism on the student 
movement ironically contributed to the Shah’s decision to pursue closer ties with Beijing. 
He did this in order to “take wind out of the sails of his detractors,” who were now 
largely pro-Chinese.513 When discussing Sino-Iranian rapprochement China’s support for 
revolutionary movements, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian 
Gulf (PFLOAG) is cited as the main area where the Shah was concerned about Chinese 
influence, and thus he sought to cut it off. However, China did not begin to support these 
uprisings until 1968, and the Shah had made his intentions toward China clear by 1965. 
Therefore, it seems most likely that in this earlier period, it was Chinese support for 
Iranian revolutionaries and their influence among his opponents that was on his mind. By 
drawing closer to China, he hoped to reduce the appeal of Chinese propaganda to radical 
students. His heightened fear of Chinese infiltration led him to both oppose Chinese 
influence directly (as in Pakistan) and later to try to reduce it through diplomatic means. 
In fact, it had exactly this effect, and Chinese support for the Shah was an important 
factor in the decline of the appeal of Maoism. In spite of this success, the revolutionary 
djinn could not be put back into the bottle, and it did little to curb the appeal of armed 
struggle. By this time, violent resistance was supported by a newly reorganized National 
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Front that included left-wing factions, and activity was being carried out by militants who 
were inspired not only by Mao, Che Guevera, and Regis Debrey, but by Islam as well. 
Conclusions 
The popularity of Maoism was linked to the collapse of the traditional Iranian 
opposition groups in the wake of severe government repression, which led to a search for 
a new way forward among leftists and liberals. In contrast to the dominant Soviet theory 
of peaceful coexistence, China endorsed armed struggle against capitalism and supported 
contemporary militant movements. Against this backdrop, Iranian students in Europe 
established a limited partnership with the CCP in 1964 to pursue their own revolutionary 
goals and gather supporters. Wielding Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon to critique the 
central committee of the Tudeh Party, and later their own members, the RO and other 
Maoist factions became an important force in the early student movement. The Chinese 
sought a replacement for Radio Peking experts and to bolster their image as a supporter 
of revolutionary groups without damaging the possibility of drawing closer to the Shah. 
To that end, China provided military training but did little else to support the RO agenda. 
This episode convinced the Shah of the danger of Chinese ideological influence and may 
have contributed to his decision to open up lines of communication with the CCP. 
While previous studies have focused on an explanation for the failures of 
Maoism, this work has presented an alternate narrative of Sino-Iranian relations and the 
history of the Iranian Left in which Maoism plays a significant role. This case shows the 




global history of the Cold War. Although the RO never achieved political success, they 
contributed to the spread of a sprawling social movement that captured the imagination of 
the majority of Iranian students abroad. Steeped in Maoist rhetoric and a revolutionary 
approach to politics, they sought to recast the Iranian revolution as part of a global history 
that was connected to China, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Many aspects of 
this history remain unexplored. In particular, the experiences of the many other small 
groups of students who traveled to China to study are almost unknown. These 
experiences, though seemingly ephemeral, retain their historical value and deserve to be 
examined more closely. Such accounts can help us to see threads of connection between 
societies that are often obscured by nationalist narratives or overlooked in favor of 
questions deemed to be of greater importance. It is the hope of the author of the present 
study that it will inspire additional research into the experiences of other overlooked 
radical groups, in order to deepen our understanding of the international left and the 










Conclusion: Historicizing Sino-Iranian Relations  
 When Chinese and Iranian intellectuals first re-discovered one another at the 
beginning of the 20th century, it was in the context of a shared discourse of Pan-Asian 
constitutionalism and illiberal nationalism. Early contacts between the two culminated in 
cordial official relations between the Iran and Republic of China in the context of their 
shared approach to domestic and international politics. Official declarations of goodwill 
between the two enhanced the global prestige of the two states as they sought to resist the 
imperial designs of Western powers and shape international politics in a beneficial 
direction. These expressions were tempered by clashes in the international arena over the 
production and sale of opium, which the Iranian government tacitly supported in the face 
of Chinese opposition. 
 Relations between Chiang's China and Pahlavi Iran steadily improved throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s, and peaked following the Communist takeover of China in 1949. At 
this time, two increasingly divergent narratives about China and its relevance to Iran 
began to take hold. In magazines and travelogues, official state discourse painted the 
“loss of China” as a strategic blunder caused by American refusal to support the 
Nationalists. Chiang was painted as a Chinese Reza Khan, and attempts to court 
American support and to disparage leftist opposition groups were filtered through the 
story of China's great misfortune. At the same time, the Tudeh Party was developing a 
counter-narrative that saw China as a proverbial city on a hill and the revolution as a 
massive achievement that inspired oppressed workers around the world. Several Tudeh 




express solidarity and support for the CCP and its project of rural revolution. The PRC 
took a keen interest in events in Iran, which it extensively covered in the pages of official 
newspapers. For China, Iran stood out as a quintessential victim of Western imperialism 
– another great civilization humiliated by the West, and therefore a potential ally in the 
global struggle against imperialism. 
 The 1950s witnessed the development of unofficial connections between the 
Tudeh Party and the CCP, as the Iranian government refused to recognize the People's 
Republic of China in favor of maintaining its relationship with the now-tiny Republic of 
China. The proliferation of information about China brought issues like Chinese Muslims 
and the modern history of China to the attention of the Iranian reading public for the first 
time. The highly-publicized presence of Iranian students in China and repeated references 
to the trials, exploitation, and past glories of Iran as one of the most significant Asian 
civilizations likewise had a similar effect on China. Ideological sympathies and synergies 
were beginning to stir, both through expressions of solidarity and through dissident 
members of the Tudeh Party, who began to critique its policies with reference to the 
example of China. While these unofficial connections were mostly limited to leftist 
circles, they laid the groundwork for important ties between China and Iranian Maoist 
groups in the 1960s. 
 A decade later, changes in the domestic and international environment set the 
stage for a new phase of unofficial relations. In Iran, opposition within the country was 
violently dismantled by an increasingly authoritarian Pahlavi state, which shifted the 




looking for a way to break through the intellectual and theoretical stagnation that they felt 
was rampant within the Party, and they found it in the ideological arguments of Maoism. 
By the 1960s, Maoism had become more and more associated with armed struggle and 
violent resistance to oppression. The Sino-Soviet split drew a line in the sand between the 
Soviet Union's “peaceful co-existence” under Khrushchev and Mao's proclamation that 
“all imperialists are paper tigers.” All over the world, young people and Leftist 
movements were radicalizing and connecting with one another, an experience that 
culminated in the global revolts of 1968. 
 Maoism became a force in Iranian opposition politics abroad with the foundation 
of the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party in 1965. The RO and other Maoist 
became a major faction within the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union and 
the Iranian Students Association in the United States, and supported some of their most 
dramatic and confrontational moments with the Shah in the early 1970s. At the same 
time, Marxist and Muslim students in Iran were affected by both the student movement 
and international leftist debates, especially at University of Tehran. Small underground 
networks of radicalized students read and debated the military tactics and Marxist 
theories of Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Che Guevera, Regis Debray, and other radical thinkers, 
often freely mingling Muslim and Marxist ideological concepts. Although they were not 
Maoist, the guerrilla movement that launched in the 1970s within Iran was still impacted 
by these debates. Radical Third World politics were so popular among the Iranian 
opposition during this time that the state strategically borrowed the rhetoric and formulas 




 China took note of this development and was directly involved in supporting it, 
although this support likely did little to enhance its appeal or ability to spread. The CCP 
sponsored the RO to visit China for military and ideological training several times, and 
even hired several members to work as translators for Radio Peking's Persian 
programming. Although significant ties did not develop, this was mostly due to the fact 
that China continued to court the Iranian state in secret and refused to commit any actual 
military equipment or direct assistance to active Kurdish revolts, despite the repeated 
requests of the RO. Despite this, China touted its relationship with the RO in its internal 
propaganda as part of a vision of Third World solidarity, albeit a hierarchical one with 
China at the head. While initially, the prestige of official Chinese support was a boon to 
the RO, it eventually became a liability when China established diplomatic relations with 
Iran in 1971 and threw their support behind the Shah. In fact, there is evidence to suggest 
that Iran's sudden positive response to China's friendly overtures in the mid-1960s was in 
part motivated by a desire to undercut the appeal of Chinese propaganda among student 
radicals. In this way, the unofficial relationship between China and Iranian radicals may 
have had a substantial impact on official policy.  
 Previous scholarship has tended to focus on the official relationship between 
China and Iran, and has neglected the first three-quarters of the 20th century in their 
analysis. However, this narrow view of Sino-Iranian diplomatic history as “official 
history” overlooks the critical importance of the types of unofficial relationships that 
form social, cultural, and ideological networks of exchange. It has also been dismissive of 




full impact of the Chinese Revolution and global leftist currents on the Iranian opposition 
and the Islamic Revolution cannot be appreciated without knowledge of these networks 
and how they contributed to Iranian and Chinese reading public's conceptions of the self 
as a global citizen deeply connected to revolutions throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. Propaganda was one way in which the state could disseminate particular 
narratives about the relationship between different sets of “self” and “other,” and in 
which dissident organizations could push back against those narratives. Additional 
studies of the voluminous propaganda produced by China, Iran, and Iranian opposition 
groups during this period might reveal new insights into what other types of Other/Self 
dynamics were at play without reference to an explicitly Western “other.” 
The history of Iranian and Chinese interaction is far more complex than official 
discourse would imply. This dissertation offers but the opening salvo in a sustained 
attempt to explore the history of social, cultural, and intellectual exchange between China 
and Iran in the 20th century. In doing so, it is attentive to questions of representation, 
identity, and social history. An ideological tour of Iran-China relations highlights the 
multiple “stages” of modern Iranian and Chinese history, from the early 20th-century 
constitutionalism and anti-colonialism, to the interwar state-nationalism, to the 1940s 
Soviet-style anti-imperialist discourse, to the Cold War-era ambivalence between 
nativism versus the Red threat, to the 1980s discourse and the austerity aesthetics of 
Cultural Revolution, to pseudo-pragmatic policy swings of the 1990s and beyond. This 
“tour” reveals fundamental similarities between the two that point towards a common 




global, interconnected nature of modern Asia in the 20th century. These ideological stages 
were made possible by this interconnectedness, as Iranians and Chinese citizens finally 
had access to the information necessary to form imagined social bonds and reflect on 
their own identities and politics as a result. 
A Historical Perspective on Modern Sino-Iranian Relations 
Since establishing official relations between the PRC and Iran in 1971, China has 
continued to take a cautious and balanced approach to Sino-Iranian relations.514 Official 
ties developed when Iran was still a monarchy under Mohammad Reza Shah, and China 
was still ideologically committed to Mao Zedong's particular brand of Communism. In 
the context of Cold War politics, Iran was interested in playing the "China Card" against 
both the United States and the Soviet Union and reducing the appeal of Chinese 
propaganda among the Iranian left. China wanted to tempt Iran away from the United 
States and the Soviet Union, mostly to counter the Soviet Union after the collapse of 
Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s. If a monarchy and a communist dictatorship seemed 
like strange bedfellows, the situation became even stranger after 1979, when officially-
atheist China quickly recognized and established relations with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Positive relations emerged despite profound ideological contradictions between the 
two governments. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Sino-Iranian relations remained 
limited even as China slowly expanded its role in the Middle East as an economic power 
and small arms supplier.515 China sold weapons to both sides in the Iran-Iraq war, 
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although its contributions were vastly outstripped by the United States, Russia, Germany, 
and France, which did the same.516 When the war ended in 1988, Chinese industries 
played an essential role in reconstructing the Iranian economy, and Chinese companies 
completed critical projects like the Tehran Metro. By the mid-2000s, China had also 
become a significant importer of oil in violation of US sanctions.517 Trade relations 
increased steadily, from just over one billion dollars annually in the 1980s to nearly three 
billion dollars by the early 2000s.518 China also gained Iran's support—and silence—on 
hot-button issues that traditionally have damaged Chinese international standing. 
Notably, Iran has refused to condemn China's horrific treatment of the Uighurs in 
Xinjiang, which recently has escalated to a policy of systematic brutality centered on a 
network of concentration camps. 
Despite many analysts' predictions, Beijing consistently balanced its relationship 
with Tehran against Washington's demands. John Garver argues that from the 1980s to 
the mid-2000s:  
China is both a partner and a rival of the United States. At times it has cooperated 
with the United States in ways contrary to Iranian policy. At other times, it has 
cooperated with Iran in ways contrary to U.S policy…The United States–China–
Iran relation involves elements of Sino-American cooperation at the expense of 
[Iranian] policy interests, and elements of Sino-American rivalry with Beijing 
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supporting Tehran against U.S. policy aims…In effect, China has decided not to 
oppose the United States in the Middle East.519  
At times, China did oppose American policy in Iran, but it has balanced its support for 
Tehran with the need to maintain relations with the United States. This policy has 
remained consistent in recent years, as has been demonstrated by Behravesh and Scita. 
Though China denounces US policy, it has occasionally voted for resolutions that have 
expanded sanctions at the United Nations. Though it sells Iran military equipment, it 
withholds drones due to US pressure. Though it has continued to do business, it has also 
kept trade and political ties modest and in line with Iran's regional rivals. This is out of 
necessity, as whatever it might desire, China has no real capacity to oppose things like 
the US decision to assassinate Iranian General Soleimani or the unilateral re-imposition 
of sanctions. 
Historical analysis can help bring perspective to a discourse that is often alarmist 
and exaggerated. For example, in June 2020, during the completion of this dissertation, 
the leak of a document attributed to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made waves 
on social media.520 The document outlined a statement of intent to pursue a strategic 
partnership between China and Iran that would enhance political, military, cultural, and 
economic cooperation between the two nations. Called a "deal,"521 a "pact,"522 and even 
 
519 Ibid, 281-283 
520 “China-Iran Document” 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54db7b69e4b00a5e4b11038c/t/5f0a3b017adc097c9945645c/1594506
439567/China_Iran_Document.pdf, accessed 11/6/2020 
521 “What China's New Deal with Iran Says About Its Ambitions in the Region” Joseph Hincks. 
https://time.com/5872771/china-iran-deal/, accessed 11/6/2020 
522 “China-Iran pact won’t be trouble-free for either side” Yun Sun, AsiaTimes, July 20th, 2020. 




an "alliance"523 as it filtered into the mainstream media, this news has been received in 
the United States with predictable panic. Foreign policy commentators proclaimed it was 
the beginning of an "Iran-China axis" between "totalitarian twins" that plans to "dominate 
the Middle East" through "defying the U.S," a plan that would be "bad news for the 
West" and make China "the Middle East arbiter."524 Despite the document's nebulous 
nature, commentators asserted that the agreement would fundamentally alter geostrategic 
calculations in the Middle East. Comments on social media were similarly outraged, with 
some comparing the alleged deal to a “New Treaty of Turkmenchay” Iran's past 
exploitation by imperial Britain and Russia.  
These alarmist predictions stand in contrast to analysts like Jacopo Scita, Lucille 
Greer, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Julia Gurol, Maysam Behravesh, and Jonathan 
Fulton.525 Through careful quantitative analysis, they have pointed out several 
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inconsistencies between the reality of the proposed agreement and the response it has 
generated. Their arguments can be summarized as follows:  
First, such analyses miss the broader regional context. Greer and Batmanghelidj 
note that China has pursued similar and more extensive ties with most of Iran's neighbors. 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Iran's two main regional rivals, have already 
signed comparable comprehensive agreements with China. Scita and Gurol have written 
about how China has sought to balance ties with Iran against relations with other Gulf 
Arab states. As Fulton has noted, the ninth China-Arab States Cooperation Forum 
(CASCF) Ministerial Meeting was taking place the same week that news of the leak 
broke. Overall, a partnership similar to the one proposed would bring Sino-Iranian 
relations back in line with the rest of the Middle East.  
Second, economic cooperation between China and Iran has stagnated or declined 
since 2014. In 2019, Sino-Iranian trade stood at nineteen billion dollars, the lowest 
number in a decade. At the same time, China's trade relations with other countries in the 
region have remained constant. While China has defied US sanctions to remain the 
primary importer of Iranian oil and the only country to do so in violation of US sanctions, 
it has remained conservative about its overall investment in the Iranian economy over the 
last six years. Exports, foreign investment, and Chinese construction projects have all 
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fallen considerably. Therefore, the proposed agreement should be understood as an 
attempt to rectify China's underinvestment in Iran relative to other Middle East states.  
Third, the terms of the document itself have been greatly exaggerated. The quoted 
figure, four hundred billion dollars, seems extraordinarily unlikely given China and Iran's 
current economic capabilities and the impact of international sanctions. Claims that 
Chinese military personnel will be stationed in Iran are similarly dubious. Doing so 
would also be nearly impossible given the Iranian public's long-standing hostility to the 
presence of foreign armies and the legacy of repeated British and Russian occupations. 
The Chinese and Iranian press have also been silent on the news and according to Scita, 
the head of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce referred to the idea of a $400 billion 
investment as "a joke."526 It seems clear that no massive investment is forthcoming.  
As this dissertation has shown, Sino-Iranian relations have historically been 
consistent, but limited. The record shows moments of cooperation and competition, but 
overall the lesson is that China does what is best for China. More importantly, it shows 
that China consistently balanced its ideological support for the Iranian opposition with 
attempts to reach out to the Iranian government. All of this points to a modest increase in 
Sino-Iranian relations along the lines of what already existed, not a "milestone in history" 
as some commentators have suggested. 
The take-away from this analysis is that Sino-Iranian relations have historically 
been consistent, but limited. The record shows moments of cooperation and competition, 
but overall the lesson is that China does what is best for China. Since the 1970s, China 
 






has judged that good relations with the United States are best for China, though 
sometimes that pill has proven difficult to swallow. At the same time, it demonstrates that 
China tends to choose stable relations with geostrategic advantages over volatile ones that 
are likely to spark conflict, and is not above playing both sides of an issue. Even at the 
height of Maoist ideological influence, the Chinese state simultaneously courted the 
Iranian government and the Iranian opposition. Ultimately, they chose stability over 
chaos and the Iranian state over Maoist rebels. For all its propaganda, it was more 
interested in its geopolitical goals than overturning the global order. 
Ultimately, the idea that China threatens US geostrategic interests through the 
Persian Gulf is patently absurd on its face. China has a single strategic port, in Obock, 
Djibouti, which sits on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden, and is only a short distance from the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. But 
this pales in comparison to the United States, which has bases in virtually every Gulf 
Arab country and a massive capacity to project naval power globally. Moreover, the 
types of military cooperation between Iran and China under discussion that are feasible–
joint training exercises and intelligence sharing–already exist. Although infrequent, there 
have been three joint drills and port exercises between China and Iran. By comparison, 
the United States conducts annual air, land, and sea drills with nearby countries like Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.  
The real problem that US officials and hawkish analysts have with Sino-Iranian 
relations is no mystery: it runs counter to the Trump administration's attempts to instigate 
regime change in Iran through a cruel policy of wide-ranging sanctions. Despite the 




like a "normal nation," the logic of the sanctions is obvious: if the Iranian people have 
enough pain inflicted upon them, they might rise up and overthrow the Islamic Republic. 
This policy is long-standing and has shifted justification from Iran's nuclear ambitions to 
general accusations of an Iranian threat to regional stability and, perplexingly, the 
American people. While there is no denying that the Islamic Republic is an authoritarian 
regime that poses a threat to its own people and has regional ambitions, such exaggerated 
and inconsistent reasoning only highlights the sanctions' real purpose. The Iranian people 
are collateral damage in this conflict, as they are the ones who can no longer easily afford 
food, clothing, and medication. The price of nearly all consumer goods has skyrocketed 
as Iran's oil exports plummet.  
Ironically, sanctions are the reason Iran is courting China in the first place. Since 
the reinstatement of sanctions, Iran's oil production has fallen from 4 million barrels a 
day to as low as 1.9 million bpd in June 2020.527 This is the lowest level since 1981 when 
Iraq launched the Iran-Iraq War with an attack on Iranian oil facilities. Iran's economy 
has been hard hit, and ultimately the Iranian people pay the heaviest price. While 
exaggerated, the leaked deal represents the Iranian state's attempts to tempt China to 
commit to buying Iranian oil at a discounted price in exchange for economic 
development. Even this modest and limited attempt to break out of economic isolation is 
met with apocalyptic predictions from the foreign policy establishment.  
That said, closer cooperation between China and Iran is not necessarily a win for 
the Iranian people. Proponents of the deal describe it in superlative terms, a mark of 
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China's policy of "mutually beneficial relations" and based on a historic and ancient 
friendship between Iran and China. It is important to remember, however, that China 
remains fundamentally self-interested. Opening to Chinese markets has inherent dangers. 
In the decade when Sino-Iranian trade was at its peak, a flood of cheap, low-quality 
goods seriously damaged local manufacturing and retail industries and depress wages in 
Iran. In 2013, the Guardian observed that an influx of Chinese products and capital were 
putting ordinary Iranians out of business: "Tehran's roads are thus full of taxi drivers who 
until recently owned businesses, but went bankrupt because they could no longer afford 
to pay for imports while competing with cheap Chinese merchandise."528 Should the 
proposed agreement be put into effect, this problem will no doubt intensify at a time 
when Iranians are already in severe economic pain. China may also share information and 
internet censorship techniques, extending the "Great Firewall of China" to Iran.  Iranians 
both inside and outside Iran have raised such objections, notably in a symbolic letter to 
the United Nations signed by a coalition of expatriate intellectuals, artists, and public 
figures. 
The question "does it benefit Iran" would perhaps be better rendered as "who in 
Iran does it benefit?" It would unquestionably benefit the government's desire for foreign 
investment, a market for oil, and pushback against diplomatic isolation. But it is less 
certain that it would help Iranians. The only certainty is that China will pursue a deal that 
is in its own best interest, whether or not that lines up with the interests of either the 
Iranian state or the Iranian people. 
 
528 "China floods Iran with cheap consumer goods in exchange for oil" The Guardian. February 20, 2013. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/feb/20/china-floods-iran-cheap-consumer-goods, 





Abidi, Aqil Hyder Hasan. China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. (Humanities Press, 1982) 
Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. (Cambridge University Press, 2018)  
_________________. Iran Between Two Revolutions. (Princeton University Press, 1982) 
_________________. The Iranian Mojahedin (Yale University Press, 1989) 
Acharya, Amitav. “Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR   
Perspective.”Australian Journal of International Affairs vol. 70, no. 4, (August 2016), pp. 
342-357. 
Afary, Janet. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, 
Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996) 
Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold 
War (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
_____________. “The Shah's détente with Khrushchev: Iran's 1962 missile base pledge 
to the Soviet Union.” Cold War History, Volume 14, Issue 3, (2014) pp.423-444.  
Amanat, Abbas. Iran, A Modern History (Yale University Press, 2017) 
____________. Pivot of the Universe: Nasir Al-din Shah Qājār and the Iranian 
Monarchy, 1831-1896. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 
Ansari, Ali M. Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906: Narratives of the Enlightenment. 
(Gingko Library, 2016) 
Armstrong, Elisabeth. “Before Bandung: The Anti-Imperialist Women’s Movement in 
Asia and the Women’s International Democratic Federation.” Signs: Journal of Women 
in Culture and Society. vol. 41, no. 2, (2016), pp. 305–331. 
Azad, Shirzad. Iran and China: A New Approach to Their Bilaterial Relations. 
(Lexington Books, 2017) 
Balland, Daniel et al. “Chinese-Iranian Relations”. EncyclopediaIranica. Vol. V, Fasc. 4, 
pp. 424-448 and Vol. V, Fasc. 5, pp. 449-460. 
Barabantseva, Elena. Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-
Centering China. (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2011) 
Bayat, Mangol. Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 
1905-1909. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 




Benn, James A. Tea In China : a Religious and Cultural History. (University of Hawai’i 
Press 2015) 
Berberian, Houri. Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 : 
“the Love for Freedom Has No Fatherland”. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001) 
Boroujerdi, Mehrzhad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of 
Nativism (Syracuse University Press, 1996) 
Brophy, David. “A Lingua Franca in Decline? The Place of Persian in Qing China”. In 
Green, Nile (ed). The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca 
(University of California Press, 2019) 
Burkett, Jodi. “The National Union of Students and transnational solidarity, 1958–1968”. 
European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire vol. 21, no.4, pp. 539- 555. 
Calabrese, John. “From Flyswatters to Silkworms: The Evolution of China's Role in West 
Asia. Asian Survey, 30. (1990) p.867.  
_____________. “Peaceful or Dangerous Collaborators? China's Relations with the Gulf 
Countries.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 65, no. 4, (1992), pp. 471–485 
Cassel, Pär Kristoffer. Grounds of Judgment : Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in 
Nineteenth-Century China and Japan. (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
Chan, Anthony B. Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord 
China, 1920-1928. (UBC Press, 2010) 
Chang, Adam. “Reappraising Zhang Zhidong: Forgotten Continuities During China’s 
Self-Strengthening, 1884-1901”. Journal of Chinese Military History 6.2, 157-192 (2017) 
Chang, P'eng-yuan. “The Constitutionalists” in China in Revolution: The First Phase, 
1900-1913, edited by Mary Clabaugh Wright. (Yale University Press, 1971) 
Chaqueri, Cosroe. “Did the Soviets Play a Role in Founding the Tudeh Party in Iran?” 
Cahiers Du Monde Russe, vol. 40, no. 3, 1999, pp. 497–528. 
Chen 994; Tang, Chi-Hua. Treaty Revision Campaign of the Beijing Government, 1912–
1928: Out of the Shadow of the “Abrogation of Unequal Treaties.” (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press, 2010) 
Chu, T. H. Tea Trade In Central China. China institute of Pacific Relations (1936) 
Cook, Alexander. Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History. (Cambridge Univeristy 
Press, 2014) 
Craig Harris, Lillian. “China’s Relationship with the PLO” Journal of Palestine Studies, 




Cronin, Stephanie. (ed) Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran New Perspectives 
on the Iranian Left. (Taylor and Francis, 2013) 
Curtis, Glenn E. and Eric Hooglund. Iran: A Country Study (2008) 28, 116–117 
Curzon, George. Persia and the Persian Question. (1892) 
Dehkhoda, Ali-Akbar, Janet Afary and John R Perry (trans). Charand-o Parand : 
Revolutionary Satire From Iran, 1907-1909. (Yale University Press, 2016)  
Di Cosmo, Nicola, Michael Maas, and Rong Xinjiang. “Sogdian Merchants and Sogdian 
Culture on the Silk Road.” (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
Djordjevic, Nenad (ed). Sapajou: The Collected Early Works of Old Shanghai's Greatest 
Cartoonist - The Early Years. (Earnshaw Books, 2010) 
Evans, John C. Tea In China : the History of China's National Drink. (Greenwood Press, 
1992) 
Farrokh, Mehdi. خ محتصر افغانستانتاری  [A Concise History of Afghanistan] Tabriz (1937) 
Farrokh, Mehdi. خاطرات سیاسی فرخ- [Political Memoirs of Farrokh] Tehran: Amir Kabir 
Publications (1968) 
Farrokh, Mehdi. یک سال در کشور آسمانی چین [One Year in the Heavenly Country of China]. 
(1952), 2 
Floor, Willem and Mansoureh Ettehadieh. “Concessions” EncyclopaediaIranica. Vol. VI, 
Fasc. 2, pp. 119-122 (2011) 
Ford, Graeme. “The Uses of Persian in Imperial China: The Translation Practices of the 
Great Ming”. in Green, Nile (ed). The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian 
Lingua Franca (University of California Press, 2019) 
Friedman, Jeremy. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World. 
(University of North Carolina, 2015) 
Garver, John W. China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World. Seattle: 
(University of Washington Press, 2006) 
_____________. China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's 
Republic of China. (Oxford University Press. 2016) 
Gladney, Dru. “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring majority/minority 
identities”. Journal of Asian Studies 53(1) (February 1994): pp. 92-123, 70-71 
Goldstein, Jonathan. “The Republic of China and Israel” in China and Israel, 1948-1998 




Green, Nile (ed). The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca 
(University of California Press, 2019) 
_________. “From the Silk Road to the Railroad (and Back): The Means and Meanings 
of the Iranian Encounter with China,” Iranian Studies, vol. 48, no. 2, 2013, pp. 165-192 
Gries, Peter. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. University of 
(California Press, 2004) 
__________. “Narratives to Live By: The ‘Century of Humiliation’ and Chinese National 
Identity Today,” in Lionel M. Jensen and Timothy B. Weston, eds., China's 
Transformations: The Stories Beyond the Headlines. Rowman and Littlefield pp. 112–
128 (2006) 
Hafizullah, Emadi. “China's Ideological Influence and Trade Relations with Iran, 1960- 
1990”. Internationales Asienforum, Vol. 26, No. 2, p.143-154 (1995) 
Hairi, Abdul. Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran A Study of the Role Played by the 
Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics. E. J. Brill (1977) 23-24 
Halliday, Fred in Cronin, “The Iranian Left in International Perspective” (Routledge 
Taylor and Francis, 2013) 
Ḥaqšenās, Torāb. “Communism In Persia after 1953 Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. VI, 
Fasc. 1, pp. 105-112 (2011) 
Haw, Stephen G. “The Semu Ren in the Yuan Empire” Ming Qing Yanjiu XVIII (2014). 
Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Jazani, Bizhan. “Land Reform in Modern Iran” in Capitalism and Revolution in Iran 
(1980), 72, 116 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. ““The Portals of Persepolis”: The Role of Nationalism in Early 
U.S..-Iranian Relations” in Aghaie, Scot Kamran and Afshin Marashi (Eds). Rethinking 
Iranian Nationalism and Modernity, (University of Texas Press, 2014) 
Katouzian, Homa. “The Revolution for Law: A Chronographic Analysis of the 
Constitutional Revolution of Iran.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 47, no. 5, 2011, pp. 757–
777 
Katouzian, Homa. State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qājārs and the 
Emergence of the Pahlavis, (2006) 33–34, 335–336 
Kayaoglu, Turan. Legal Imperialism : Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the 
Ottoman Empire, and China. (Cambridge University Press 2010); 





Kemp, Geoffrey. The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in 
the Middle East. (Brookings Institute Press, 2012) 
Knoblock, John and Jeffrey Riegel. The Annals of Lü Buwei: A Complete Translation and 
Study. (Stanford University Press. 2000) 
Köll, Elisabeth. Railroads and the Transformation of China. (Harvard University Press, 
2019) 
Kotek, Joel. Students and the Cold War. (Macmillan Press, 1996) 
Koyagi, Mikiya. “The Vernacular Journey: Railway Travelers in Early Pahlavi Iran, 
1925-1950”. Int. J. Middle East Stud. 47 (2015), 745–763, pp. 747-748 
Kumaraswamy, P.R: China and the Middle East – The Quest for Influence (SAGE 
Publications, 1999) 
Landsberger S.R. (2008), Encountering the European and Western Other in Chinese 
Propaganda Posters. In: Wintle M. (Ed.) Imagining Europe - Europe and European 
Civilisation as Seen from its Margins and by the Rest of the World, in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A.. 147-175. 
Li-Chiao Chen. “The Signing of the Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920” Iranian Studies, 52:5-6, 
991-1008 
Lovell, Julia. Maoism: A Global History (Random House, 2019) 
Lüthi, Lorenz. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. (Princeton 
University Press, 2008) 
Mair, Victor H., and Erling Hoh. The True History of Tea. (Thames & Hudson, 2009) 
Marashi, Afshin. “Performing the nation: The Shah's official state visit to Kemalist 
Turkey, June to July 1934” in Cronin, Stephanie. The Making of Modern Iran: State and 
Society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941, (Routledge, 2003) 
Marashi, Afshin. “Paradigms of Iranian Nationalism: History, Theory, and 
Historiography” in Aghaie, Scot Kamran and Afshin Marashi (Eds). Rethinking Iranian 
Nationalism and Modernity, (University of Texas Press, 2014) 
Martin, Vanessa. Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism : the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013) 
Matin-Asgari, Afshin. “Iranian Maoism: Searching for a Third World Revolutionary 
Model” MERIP Issue 270, Vol 44, Spring (2014) 
Matin-Asgari, Afshin. Both Eastern and Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian 




Matin-Asgari, Afshin. Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah. (Mazda Publishers, Inc, 
2002) 
 
Matin, Kamran. Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social 
Change. (Routledge, 2015) 
 
Matin-Asgari, Afshin.. Both Eastern And Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian 
Modernity. (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
Matin, Kamran. Rezaeiyadi, Hamid. “Neither Ākhūnd nor Fukulī”: Munāzirah and the 
Discourse of Iranian Modernity”. Journal of Iranian Studies, Volume 49, 2016 - Issue 5, 
pp. 855-885 
Matsumoto, Masumi. “Islamic Reform in Muslim Periodicals.” Etudes Orientales 21–22 
(2004): 88–104 
Milani, Abbas. Eminent Persians: The Men and Women who Made Modern Iran, 1941- 
1979 (Vol 1), (Syracuse University Press, 2008) 
Mirsepassi, Ali, “The Tragedy of the Iranian Left” in Intellectual Discourse and the 
Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran. (Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 
Mittler, Barbara. A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture. 
(Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2016) 
Mittler, Barbara. A Newspaper for China? : Power, Identity, and Change In Shanghai's 
News Media, 1872-1912. (Harvard University Asia Center, 2004) 
Moaddel, Mansoor. “Shi'i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco 
Movement of 1890-1892”. Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 3 pp. 447-468 (1992) 460 
Motadel, David. “The German Other: Nasir al-Din Shah's Perceptions of Difference and 
Gender during his Visits to Germany, 1873–89”. Iranian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4 (JULY 
2011), pp. 563-579 
Motadel, David. “The German Other: Nasir al-Din Shah's Perceptions of Difference and 
Gender during his Visits to Germany, 1873–89”. Iranian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4 (JULY 
2011), pp. 563-579, 567-568 
Muḥammad ʻAlī Sayyāḥ, Khāṭirāt-i Ḥājj Sayyāḥ, yā, Dawrah-i khawf va vaḥsha. 
(Tehran, 1967) 
Mullaney, Thomas S. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern 
China. (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2011)  
_________________. (Ed). Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and 





Murray, Stuart. “Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy.” 
International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 22-39. 
Nabavi, Negin. “Journalism 1. Qājār Period”. EncyclopaediaIranica. Vol. XV, Fasc. 1, 
pp. 46-54 (2012) 
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